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ABSTRACT 
 
Using data from Indiana, I investigate the functioning of two health care quality 
assurance mechanisms: medical malpractice (“med mal”) claiming, and the physician 
licensing/disciplinary system. In the mid-1970s, Indiana adopted a comprehensive package of 
med mal reforms, including a medical review panel, a total damages cap, and a patient 
compensation fund (“PCF”).  Indiana also reorganized its licensing/disciplinary system at 
roughly the same time.  
I evaluate the post-reform performance of the systems over the past forty years, and the 
extent to which the two systems overlap in targeting problematic doctors. Despite enacting 
comprehensive med mal reforms, Indiana experienced significant premium increases – 
comparable to those experienced in states that did not enact med mal reforms. However, 
litigation trends (i.e., claiming and payout rates) in Indiana do not explain the observed premium 
trends. In combination, this suggests that factors outside the tort system have a significant effect 
on med mal premiums.  
I also find evidence that disciplinary and med mal risks are systematically predictable, 
and that an increased number and size of past (paid) med mal claims predicts higher disciplinary 
risk. But, very few doctors are actually “tagged” by both systems. Past disciplinary actions lower 
a physician’s med mal risk in the short-run, but show no significant effect in the long-run.  
Although the med mal and disciplinary systems operate independently, and may have 
different priorities and goals, my findings suggest an obvious model for the interaction of the 
systems.  My findings also indicate that physicians who end up targeted by both the med mal and 
disciplinary systems are not randomly selected. 
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION 
 
In response to the first medical malpractice (“med mal”) crisis, Indiana enacted one of the 
nation’s first and most comprehensive reforms in 1975. Three major components of the 1975 
reform were (a) a limit on the total recoveries of med mal plaintiffs (through judgment or 
settlement); (b) a Patient’s Compensation Fund (“PCF”) covering excess damages upon the 
exhaustion of defendants’ primary policy limits; and (c) a medical review panel to screen 
proposed med mal claims before a presiding court assumes jurisdiction.  
Another area of reforms during the 1970s and 1980s was the state medial licensure and 
discipline system. The med mal crises influenced public perceptions about the overall quality of 
care and the amount of quality control provided by the state Medical Licensing Board. As many 
other states, Indiana reorganized the Licensing Board and detailed statutory disciplinary grounds.  
This dissertation studies both the med mal and the state licensure systems of Indiana. I 
rely on comprehensive data obtained from the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) and the 
Indiana Professional Licensing Agency (PLA).  
Chapter 2 describes Indiana’s legal framework for handling med mal cases (which 
combines damage caps, a mandatory medical review panel, and a PCF); Indiana law regarding 
licensing and discipline; and my data sources.  Chapter 2 also situates Indiana’s med mal and 
disciplinary systems within the context of how other states have handled these matters.  It is 
important to note that reforms in this space are usually associated with malpractice crises -- 
marked by sudden and dramatic spikes in the cost of malpractice coverage.   
Chapter 3 evaluates trends in Indiana’s malpractice claiming, payouts per claim, payouts 
per physician, and med mal insurance rates over a forty-year period – beginning in 1975, when 
tort reform was enacted, through 2015. I show that after a short ramp-up period, the post-reform 
med mal claim rate had remained reasonably stable. Since the mid-1980s, the number of 
physicians has steadily increased; per physician lawsuits rate remained fairly flat, and then 
trended downwards since 2001. Per-physician rate of paid cases has been dropping since 1994, 
and payout per physician has been dropping since 2001. But, I find a clear increase in 
physicians’ cost of insurance coverage (premiums plus surcharges paid to the PCF) from the 
early 2000s through 2006. I find this premium spike decoupled from the med mal litigation 
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trends: when the premium spiked, the per physician rate of paid cases and payouts (which should 
be the most relevant for predicting insurance premium) has been dropping for years in Indiana. 
These findings are broadly consistent with other state case studies and a limited number of 
national studies.   
Chapter 4 analyzes the performance of Indiana’s medical review panels. The review 
panel was adopted in 1975 as a part of the med mal reform. A panel was to be staffed by three 
health care providers and a non-voting attorney. I find, first, that more than 70% of the 22,304 
med mal cases resolved in Indiana in the past four decades were reviewed by these panels.  
Second, case outcomes generally tracked the findings of the medical review panel. When the 
medical review panel found malpractice (which it did in 15% of the reviewed cases), the 
likelihood of payment was 78%.  Conversely, when the medical review panel found there was no 
malpractice, the likelihood of payment was only 14%. Third, I show that, on average, cases that 
went through the medical review panel process took longer to resolve. Duration of panel cases 
shortened over time, but non-panel case showed an even larger drop. A finer breakdown shows 
that the shortened duration of panel cases can almost be entirely explained by the shorter delay 
between panel opinion and case closure, rather than the time taken by panel procedure itself. 
Fourth, many providers served on medical review panels, but repeat players were rare. frequent 
panelists (i.e., those who severed 30 or more times) tended to be in more specialized areas, such 
as surgery and obstetrics and gynecology. I also find that panelists who served on 30 or more 
panels found malpractice were less likely to find malpractice than all panelists.   
Chapter 5 studies Indiana’s licensing and disciplinary processes. I show that during the 
43-year study period, only 1.2% of the sixty-three thousand physicians were disciplined; and that 
drug-diversion, incompetence, and substance abuse cases accounted for about 70% of all 
disciplinary cases. Half of the cases resulted in probation (26%) or suspension (25%).  
I identify factors associated with a higher hazard for various disciplinary offenses, and 
provide some evidence of variation by type of disciplinary offense. Male physicians have a 
higher hazard of sexual misconduct.  Physicians with more Controlled Substance Registrations 
(“CSRs”) have a higher disciplinary hazard for substance abuse and drug-diversion disciplinary 
offenses. Pediatricians have higher disciplinary hazard for sexual misconducts. Radiologists have 
a higher hazard for being disciplined for negligence. Anesthesiologists have higher disciplinary 
hazard for abuse and drug-diversion cases. Psychiatrists’ hazards are higher for all offense types, 
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but especially high for sexual misconducts. Similarly, obstetricians-gynecologists have higher 
hazard for all types, but especially high for negligence and sexual misconducts. My analysis on 
sanction severity shows the cases where negligence was the only disciplinary ground are 
significantly less likely to end up with severe sanctions.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the interplay between the disciplinary and med mal systems, and 
repeat-player dynamics in both systems. The medical malpractice and the state licensure systems 
have a common goal of ensuring quality of care. How often do these two quality control 
mechanisms pursue actions against the same doctors? I merge med mal history with board 
disciplinary records of 29,939 physicians licensed by Indiana, who practiced in the state between 
1975 to 2015. I identify and compare the demographic characteristics associated with a higher 
likelihood of med mal claims and medical discipline. I also estimate how past med mal claiming 
affects the doctor’s current risk of discipline, and vice versa.  
I show that the state licensure system pursued disciplinary actions against far fewer 
doctors than the med mal system did. Extremely few doctors were tagged by both systems, and 
the most common sanction for such physicians was probation. A random effects panel data 
model indicates that disciplinary risk increases with cumulative paid med mal cases, and that 
larger payouts increase disciplinary risk. However, unpaid med mal cases had no significant 
effect on disciplinary risk. In the short run (<2 years), disciplinary action results in higher med 
mal claiming risk, but lower med mal claiming in the long run.  These findings suggest an 
obvious model for the interaction of the two systems. 
Chapter 7 considers the policy implications of my findings, and concludes.  
I provide alternative and additional analysis, an overview of other existing PCFs, and a 
list of abbreviations, acronyms, and definitions of key terms in Appendix.  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND DATA SOURCES 
 
The United States has experienced three medical malpractice crises in the past forty 
years. Physicians' med mal premiums experienced sudden and dramatic increases in the mid-
1970s, mid-1980s, and early 2000s. Physicians blamed plaintiffs’ lawyers, and lobbied state 
legislatures to enact tort reform. The specific reforms varied by state, but typically included a cap 
on non-economic (“non-econ”) damages. Currently, more than thirty states have a cap on either 
non-econ or total damages. 
Plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer groups had a very different explanation of the 
premium spikes, and called for insurance reform and tougher regulation of physicians. Eight 
states responded by creating Patient Compensation Funds (PCFs). PCFs are funded by 
surcharges on providers, and they pay malpractice claims that exceed a statutory threshold.1 
PCFs are intended to stabilize the market for med mal insurance, and guarantee that coverage is 
available to pay high dollar value claims. PCFs do not try to “fix” the tort system, but instead 
focus on the insurance side of the equation.  
Consumer groups and the media also pressed state legislatures to toughen the disciplinary 
and licensing process for physicians. In response, states added public members to licensing 
boards; expanded the funding and power of those boards; and imposed mandatory reporting of 
med mal claims and adverse decisions regarding hospital privileges. 
Tort reform has been extensively studied by multiple researchers, but the performance of 
PCFs and the disciplinary and licensing process have largely escaped attention. This dissertation 
focuses on those issues using data from Indiana.  
Background: Reforms in the United States 
The cause and solution of medical malpractice crises are contested. Physicians 
complained about the financial and psychological pressures, but were also concerned about a loss 
of autonomy. In general, however, med mal crises were framed as an economic issue—doctors 
could no longer afford liability insurance, and they were being forced to leave or limit their 
                                                
1 As discussed below, in Indiana, these surcharges are based on physician specialty, and are not experience rated. 
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practice – thereby reducing access to health care. Mass media also played a role, by highlighting 
blockbuster jury awards and bizarre claims; and selectively translating those event into 
litigiousness (Haltom and McCann 2004).  Liability insurers and business interests also saw 
value in pushing for limitations on tort liability.    
Plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer groups blamed price-gouging insurers and negligent 
physicians for the med mal crises. But, their calls for insurance reform and tougher regulation of 
physicians were much less persuasive to the general public, which sided with tort reform 
advocates. Table 2.1 categorizing these reforms. Below, I first discuss tort reform, and then turn 
to insurance reforms and licensing board reforms.  
  
Table 2.1: Major Legal Reforms During the 1970s and 1980s 
Category Target Reform 
Tort Reform Plaintiffs Lawsuits rate  
 Pretrial review panel 
 Statues of limitations 
 Attorney fee limits 
 
 Size of recoveries 
 Damages caps (non-economics, total) 
 Periodic payments/structure settlements 
 Joint-and-several liability changes 
 Collateral-source rule reform 
      
Insurance reforms Insurance market Patient Compensation Funds 
 Joint Underwriting Associations 
 Mandates for liability coverage 
  
Medical quality  Physicians Peer review requirements 
 Licensing boards reorganized, power increased 
  Reporting requirements 
Note: Modeled after Bovbjerg (1989). 
Tort Reforms 
Over the past four decades, states have enacted a range of limitations on tort litigation. 
The first wave of medical malpractice reforms tried to lower the frequency of claiming and the 
payment that plaintiffs would be able to collect. Most of the first-wave tort reforms were 
modeled after California’s Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act f 1975 (MICRA). These 
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reforms typically targeted plaintiffs, by creating barriers at each step of the claiming process. For 
ease of analysis, and consistent with earlier researchers, I have grouped these reforms into three 
groups (see e.g. Bovbjerg 1989; Mello 2006; Kachalia and Mello 2011; Mello, Studdert, and 
Kachalia 2014; Mello and Kachalia 2010).  
The first sub-group aims at restricting plaintiffs’ ability to sue. At the point that a patient 
is considering bringing a claim, a shortened Statues of Limitation will bar the suit unless it is 
filed within a specific time after the injury occurred or is discovered. If the patient manages to 
find his way to a lawyer, Limits on Attorney Fees makes plaintiffs’ attorneys less willing to take 
many cases.  If a plaintiffs’ lawyer does accept the case, a Medical Review Panel/Pretrial 
Screening Panel reviews their case before it can proceed to trial, and renders an opinion about 
whether the provider complied with the standard of care.  However, a “no malpractice” 
conclusion by the medical review panel does not bar the plaintiff from filing a claim with the 
court.   
The second group of reforms makes litigation more difficult and costly.  Expert Witness 
Requirements limit the pool of those who can serve as experts, and impose procedural hurdles 
before an opinion can be offered. If the plaintiff actually prevails, the third group of reforms 
makes it more difficult to collect the full amount awarded. Caps on Damages— which apply to 
either non-economic damages or total damages—limit the amount of recoverable damages. 
Malpractice lawsuits may involve more than one defendant. The common law provides for joint 
and several liability – meaning the plaintiff can collect the full award from each individual 
defendant, even if they were only responsible for a small share of the damages.  Joint and 
several liability reform eliminates this possibility. Collateral-Source Rule Reform subtracts from 
the recovery any amounts received by the plaintiff from other sources. Finally, instead of paying 
out the malpractice award in a lump sum, Periodic Payment allows insurers to pay out the award 
over a longer period of time. If the plaintiff does not collect the entire award over her lifespan, 
the insurers would be able to retain the remaining amount.  
All of these tort reforms are premised on an assumption that the litigation system is beset 
with litigious plaintiffs, greedy ambulance-chaser lawyers, and run-away juries. Empirical 
studies find little evidence to support these assertions. It is almost indisputable that there are 
much more medical injuries than malpractice suits. Injuries are largely under-claimed. Hospital 
records review studies found no evidence that frivolous lawsuits are common (Weiler 1991; 
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Weiler et al. 1993; Studdert et al. 2006).  Interviews with contingency fee lawyers revealed that 
plaintiff lawyers carefully screen out weak cases to maintain their reputation and client flow 
(Kritzer 1997, 1998, 2001, 2004; Shepherd 2013). Jury verdicts are uncommon; plaintiff 
victories are even less common. Huge verdicts are unrepresentative, and they are rarely paid in 
full (Vidmar et al. 2005; Hyman et al. 2006). Doctors almost never pay out of their own pocket, 
and insurers almost never pay beyond doctors’ policy limits (Zeiler et al. 2007). 
Despite the political appeal and continued interests in various types of tort reforms, 
empirical studies found little evidence of their effectiveness.  States with non-economic damage 
caps show decreased med mal payouts (Mello 2006; Mello, Kachalia, and Goodell 2011). But, it 
is far from clear that the caps are the reason for the lower payouts. Studies found that claim rates 
are declining in all states, but declining more in cap states (Paik, Black, and Hyman 2013). 
What is more, these caps have some unexpected impacts on med mal claiming. Sharkey 
(2005) found that juries and judges in non-econ-cap states award more economics damages to 
offset the effect of non-econ caps. Finley (2004) noted that the non-economic damages cap 
appeared to disproportionately impact the elderly, women and children. Martin and Daniels 
(2009) interviewed med mal plaintiffs’ lawyers in Texas, and showed that the caps 
systematically removed the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to take med mal cases. Stated 
differently, it was increasing difficult for injured patients, not limited to the elderly, women and 
children to find a lawyer. Sloan and Chepke (2010) concluded that the actual mechanism of non-
econ caps is to shift the costs of medical injury from defendants to plaintiffs and their attorneys. 
Aside from damage caps, most other traditional tort reforms have been found to have 
only limited effects. Researchers found no evidence that medical review panels have a significant 
impact on claim payouts or frequency (White et al. 2008); two studies reported that establishing 
a panel was associated with lower insurance premiums for some specialties (Sloan 1985; 
Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan 1990). Contingency-fee limits, collateral-source offsets, and 
others have rarely been found to have significant effects. 
I study Indiana’s cap in Chapter 3, and review panel in Chapter 4. 
Insurance Reforms 
Med mal insurance has proven prone to the “underwriting cycle,” where the amount that 
insurers charge is not an accurate reflection of how much they pay for malpractice claims, 
especially in the short run (Baker 2005b). Insurance companies decide how much they are going 
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to charge based on their expected losses. Insurance industry experiences wavelike business 
cycles over time. During a “soft” market, insurance companies underestimate future losses and 
charge low price for coverages, and set aside modest reserves against future payment. Insurance 
is easy to get. Eventually losses start to mount – and insurance companies conclude they are 
under-reserved. They then have to charge higher prices, and the market turns “hard.” This means 
that premium spikes may not be attributable to spikes in claiming or payouts per claim. Stated 
differently, a med mal insurance crisis may not be the result of a med mal crisis.  
Other national factors, such as reduced investment return rate and increased prices for 
reinsurance, also plays a role. Because insurance companies rely on interest and dividends from 
their investments to offset the inadequacies of the premiums they charge, they are subject to 
general economic trends – and the long-tail of med mal coverage means that small differences in 
their expected investment returns will have a large impact on premiums. It is not an accident that 
the 1980s med mal crisis closely followed a drop in interest rates due to the Reagan 
administration’s economic policies (Fielding 1999). The most recent crisis was associated with a 
rise in reinsurance premiums which was accelerated by the September 11 attack (Bovbjerg and 
Bartow 2003).  
Insurance reforms seek to provide a robust source of coverage that will continue to be 
available during med mal crises. PCFs and Joint Underwriting Associations (JUA) are the most 
common insurance reforms. JUAs are nonprofit corporations, whose members are the insurance 
companies authorized to underwrite malpractice policies in a state. JUAs typically provide 
coverage to providers who cannot obtain primary insurance in commercial markets. By design, 
JUAs charge higher price for coverage.2  
PCFs are state agencies. They are founded by health care providers’ contributions, 
usually in the form of surcharges or annual assessments. Providers are required to maintain a 
minimum amount of primary insurance as a condition of participating in the PCF. PCFs pay for 
the settlement or judgment in a medical malpractice case above a statutorily established amount. 
                                                
2 Florida and Virginia have compensation funds that cover infants who have suffered a neurological birth injury. 
Oregon and New Jersey established programs to assist private insurance companies to obtain reinsurance. Physicians 
in some states have established risk retention groups and/or physician owned mutual insurance companies. In 
addition to state law reforms, many commercial insurers adopted a new policy form—they shifted from occurrence 
policies to claims-made policies. An occurrence policy covers all incidents in the policy year regardless of when the 
claim is filed. A claims-made policy, by contrast, covers only claims filed in the policy year. 
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States established PCFs after major carriers existed the market during the mid-1970s. In 
theory, the main benefit of a PCF is to stabilize the state insurance market by attracting more 
primary insurers into the state. PCFs cover the higher end of the payout distribution, thereby 
limiting the risk exposure of commercial carriers. In addition, PCFs are state-run, and will not 
exit the market, even during crises. But, the actual impact of PCFs on the insurance market is 
unclear. Availability and affordability of malpractice liability insurance varies widely across 
states that operating a PCF. Four of those states, including Indian, were “not showing signs of 
problems” during the last crisis period. Three other PCF states were “showing signs of 
problems,” according to the American Medical Association (see Mello, Studdert, and Brennan 
2003). Pennsylvania was “in crisis” , and the Pennsylvania Fund is considered to have 
“contributed to the state’s liability insurance woes” by high annual assessment (Bovbjerg and 
Bartow 2003, 17). South Carolina’s lawmakers were concerned about the PCF’s financial 
solvency (see South Carolina Legislative Audit Council 2000). Others are considering create one 
(see e.g. Connecticut Office of Legislative Research 2003b; Connecticut Office of Legislative 
Research 2003a).  
Although PCFs are an insurance reform that does not directly target the rate of med mal 
lawsuits, the creation of a PCF may still affect claiming and payouts. However, existing PCFs 
vary substantially in their design features. In some states, the fund’s liability is unlimited; in 
other, the fund’s liability is limited by damage caps. It is hard to predict the effect of PCFs in the 
abstract when there is so much variation. I provide an overview of these existing PCFs and their 
designs in Appendix Section VII. 
Missing from the impressions, opinions, and legislative considerations is attempts to 
understand how PCFs actually work. As concluded by Sloan, Mathew, Conover and Sage in their 
2005 study of PCFs,   
PCFs have received virtually no attention by scholars, …. Yet PCFs 
address the fundamental issues of medical malpractice that have led to 
reoccurring crises in the availability of medical insurance coverage and in its 
premiums for such coverage. As such, PCFs represent a potentially effective 
policy instrument when designed correctly. 
Using comprehensive databases obtained directly from Indiana’s Department of 
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Insurance (IDOI) and Indiana’s Professional Licensing Agency (PLA), I begin to answer these 
questions in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, like most other states, Indiana did not start gathering data 
until after it enacted med mal reform in 1975. So, I have good data from the post-reform period, 
but no comparable data for the pre-reform period. So, I am unable to evaluate whether there was 
a crisis in the early 1970s that was addressed by the 1975 reforms.  But, I am able to evaluate the 
performance of Indiana’s 1975 reforms over a forty-year period.  As I explain below, there is 
considerable variation in PCF design across states. But, I only have data from Indiana. This is 
not a cross-sectional study.   
Modern State Medical Boards 
Many states reorganized their medical boards around the late 1980s (Ameringer 1999). 
The transition from a professional model to a more bureaucratic model of state medical boards 
operation in part resulted from the pressure perceived after the second medical malpractice crisis.   
Prior to this point, state medical boards were subordinated to and dependent on medical 
societies to direct their activities. The Boards’ mission was more to maintain professional 
autonomy than to protect patients—they were supposed to police the boundary of the profession, 
and protect physicians from other competitors through licensing. Formal disciplinary actions 
were uncommon. Local medical societies assumed the leading role in “disciplining” physicians, 
replacing formal dispute resolution process with grievance committees to hear complaints. State 
medical boards were regarded as the last resort, and handled few cases as a result.  
The 1980s marked a substantial change, as state medical boards took over the 
responsibility to monitor and investigate physicians. There was a heightened public demand for 
accountability – in part because of the continuing increase in health care spending, and in part 
because the med mal crisis that hit the U.S. in the early-1980s accelerated the decline of the 
professional model of physician behavior regulations.  
Responding to these pressures, states reorganized their medical boards, expanded boards’ 
investigative powers, and mandated the reporting of malpractice actions. Adapt to the growth in 
caseload, state boards moved from a professional model, which stressed informality, 
confidentiality, and collegiality, to a more bureaucratic model.   
In Chapter 5, I turn to this issue. State medical board disciplinary process is another 
medical regulatory and quality control mechanism. To what extent do state medical boards’ 
scrutiny of incompetence and unprofessional behaviors overlap with malpractice claims handled 
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by the tort system? Do incompetence and unprofessional behaviors predict malpractice, or the 
two system are largely independent in dealing with physician behaviors? To explore the answers 
to these questions within the Indiana system, I use licensure and discipline data obtained from 
Indiana PLA.  
Indiana is an interesting state for studying state medical board reforms as a legislative 
response to med mal crises. Otis Bowen, a physician himself, was the Governor signed the 1975 
Indiana Medical Practice Act into law. When he served as Secretary of the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services, Bowen testified before a Senate subcommittee on malpractice 
reform that the medical liability crisis partially attributable to the failure of state boards and 
hospital peer review committees to deal with incompetent physicians (Bowen 1987, 817). 
Background: Indiana Reforms 
Indiana provides an excellent location for studying med mal litigation. It is reasonably 
large, with larger cities (such as Indianapolis and Fort Wayne) and smaller urban and rural areas 
spread throughout the state. It is also among one of the first states to enact tort reform – and it 
enacted an unusually comprehensive set of reforms, including a total damages cap, a PCF, and a 
medical review panel. All of these reforms have been in effect for just over 40 years -- providing 
a lengthy time period with which to study the effect of these reforms. 
This section provides details on the legal framework of medical malpractice, licensure, 
and discipline in Indiana. I begin by describing the 1975 Med Mal Act, the reformed medical 
malpractice system in Indiana, which consists of a Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF), a 
medical review panel, and a total damages cap. I then describe Indiana’s system for licensing and 
disciplining physicians.  
The 1975 Medical Malpractice Act of Indiana 
In January 1975, Indiana Governor Otis R. Bowen called for med mal reform: 
In the early 1970’s, Indiana’s health care system was on the verge of a 
crisis. The cause was readily apparent. Medical malpractice suits were being 
filed too often and jury verdicts were reaching inordinate amounts. In its 
finding for 1975-76, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Study Commission noted 
that the average medical malpractice insurance premium for physicians had 
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increased 410% from 1970 to 1975. …The frequency of claims filed against 
physicians had increased by forty-two percent. 
Seven of the ten insurance companies that underwrote most of the 
medical malpractice policies in Indiana stopped writing new policies, canceled 
others, or limited their new business and their liability. (Bowen 1984, 15–17) 
Four months later, Governor Bowen signed the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (“the 
Med Mal Act”).3 The 1975 reforms, among others, include a total damages cap, a medical review 
panel, and a PCF. Figure 2.1 summarizes the med mal claiming procedures in Indiana. I then 
explain the system in the text blow.  
 
                                                
3 Ind. Code § 34-18-1-1 et seq. 
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Figure 2.1: Indiana malpractice claiming procedure. 
Note: Med mal claiming procedure in Indiana. Commissioner = Insurance Commissioner. Exceptions = two 
exceptions allow claimants to file a med mal claim without first submitting it to a medical review panel. Agreement 
exception = all parties of a case agree to proceed the case without a medical review panel. Small claim exception = 
claimant requests no more than $15,000 damages.  
 
Filing with Commissioner 
Review Panel 
Settlement Court 
Plaintiff demands in excess of 
policy limit 
Within policy limit or 
zero payment 
Commissioner and defense side 
Agreed amount of PCF 
payment 
Written objection 
Court Approval 
Court hearing 
Court decide amount of 
PCF payment 
Petition the court  
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Total Damages Cap and PCF Payment 
Indiana’s reformed compensation system has two layers. Injured plaintiff proceeds first 
against the health care provider; and then against the PCF if entitled to damages that are above 
the provider’s primary insurance coverage (i.e., provider’s per occurrence “liability limit”). The 
PCF’s exposure is further limited by a $1,250,000 total amount recoverable per injury/death (the 
“total damage cap”, as of 2016).4  
Provider-defendants must “qualify” themselves so as to be protected by the liability limit 
and the excess coverage provided by the PCF. Qualified providers are providers who file their 
primary insurance policies with the IDOI and pay the annual PCF surcharges. A quality provider 
is responsible for the first $250,000 per occurrence liability limit, which is also the required 
minimum amount of primary med mal insurance coverage.5 PCF pays any settlement or 
judgment amount that is in excess of the provider’s liability limit up to the damage cap.6  
The cap has been amended twice since the adoption of the Med Mal Act.  From 1975-
December 31, 1989, the cap was set at $500,000.  Between January 1, 1990 and June 30, 1999, 
the cap was set at $750,0000 per injury. The current $1,250,000 cap applies to acts of 
malpractice that occurred on or after July 1, 1999.7  The cap is currently scheduled to increase to 
$1,650,000 in 2017 and to 1,800,000 in 2018. Similarly, the liability limit for individual 
providers was only $100,000 between 1975 and 6/30/1999, but has been $250,000 for 
malpractice that occurred on or after July 1, 1999.8 
The PCF does not pay above-limits awards automatically. If the defendant agrees to settle 
for policy limits and the plaintiff believes they are entitled to more, it must petition the court for 
approval of a PCF payment. A PCF payment that is agreed by the parties and the Insurance 
Commissioner is still subject to the approval of the presiding court. The approved settlement is 
                                                
4 Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(a)(3). 
5 Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(b). 
6 Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3. 
7 Ind. Code § 34-18-14-3(a)(1). 
8 See infra Figure 3.1. 
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not appealable. The Commissioner and defense can file a written objection if there is a dispute as 
to the amount of the required payment by the PCF. This decision is appealable.9 
The total damage cap applies to each injury/death and not to each act of malpractice. If 
the plaintiff suffers a single injury, he or she is entitled to recover only once (up to the cap 
amount) even if there are two separate acts of malpractice.10 Conversely, if a single act of 
malpractice causes injuries to more than one person (hence multiple injuries) can result in 
multiple above-limits payments by the PCF.11   
For a single injury, more liable defendants do not mean less PCF exposure.12 PCF 
assumes the financial responsibility once the $250,000 threshold has been reached, regardless of 
how many defendants contribute to the first $250,000. But, for a single injury, more liable 
defendants might increase the likelihood of reaching the $250,000 threshold which triggers PCF 
payout.   
The PCF is financed by surcharges paid by health care providers. The fund and income 
from the fund are deposited in a segregated account and does not become part of the general 
revenue fund. Fund revenue is invested by the Insurance Commissioner.13 Administrative 
overhead, fees and expenses are paid by the PCF.  The Insurance Commissioner has the sole 
authority for making decision regarding those costs and payments.14 
Review Panel 
A medical review panel is a prerequisite to commencing the action in a court, with two 
exceptions.15 A claim can proceed without a panel if (a) the claimant and all named defendants 
agree to do so; or (b) the claimant seeks damages not greater than $15,000.16 In addition, a 
                                                
9 Ind. Code § 34-18-15-3. 
10 Bova v. Roig, 604 N.E.2d 1329, 1997. 
11 Medical Assur. of In. v. McCarty, 808 N.E.2d 737 (Ind. App. 2004). 
12 McCarty v. Sanders, 805 N.E.2d 894, 2004 Ind. App. It is possible for a single act of malpractice to result in 
injuries to two different individuals (e.g., a mother and fetus).  If the fetus is born alive, and both the mother and 
infant bring suit, the statutory cap would be doubled.  See infra note 74.   
13 Ind. Code § 34-18-6-1. 
14 Ind. Code § 34-18-6-2. 
15 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4. 
16 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-6. 
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patient may file a complaint against a non-qualified provider in an appropriate court without first 
filing that complaint with the Commissioner or presenting it to a medical review panel.17 These 
two exceptions have been effective since 1985; prior to that, a medical review panel was an 
absolute prerequisite to trial. 
The medical review panel renders opinion as to whether the evidence supports a 
conclusion that the defendant acted or failed to act within the appropriate standard of care; 
whether the complaint conduct was a factor of the result damages; and if so, the extent and 
duration of the disability or the percentage of the impairment.18 A panel also decides whether to 
forward the med mal case to the Licensing Board for review of fitness to practice.19  
Panel opinions are not conclusive, so they do not bar the plaintiffs from proceeding in 
court. However, the opinions of the medical review panel are admissible as evidence in any 
action subsequently brought by the claimant. Either party has the right to call panel members as 
witnesses.20  Since July 1, 1999, a malpractice claimant can commence an action in court and 
conduct discovery while the case is under consideration by the medical review panel.21 
A medical review panel consists of three health care providers and a non-voting attorney 
chair.22 Either party may request the formation of a medical review panel.23 The parties select the 
attorney chair,24 who serves in an advisory capacity, and does not vote.25 The chair advises the 
medical review panel on legal questions.26 Each party selects one health care provider to serve on 
the medical review panel, and those two providers select the third panelist.27 All health care 
                                                
17 Guinn v. Light, 558 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1990). 
18 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-22. 
19 But, I lack data on which cases were forwarded to the Board. 
20 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-23. 
21 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7. 
22 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-3. 
23 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-2. 
24 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-4) 
25 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-3(b). 
26 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-19. 
27 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-6. 
  
17 
providers licensed in Indiana are eligible for selection.28 Two of the panelists must be members 
of the same profession as the defendant (e.g. physicians, dentists, physician assistants, registered 
or licensed practical nurses, etc.) If the defendant is a specialist, two of the panelists must also be 
professionals specializing in the same area as the defendant.29 Providers and the attorney chair 
are paid for their service as panelists, and receive travel expenses. Fees and expenses are paid by 
the party the medical review panel sides with. Where there is no majority opinion, each side pays 
fifty percent. 30 
Required Primary Coverage 
Health care providers need to be “qualified” in order to avail themselves of the 
protections established by the Act, including the review panel screening, the damage cap and the 
PCF. A malpractice claim against a provider who does not qualify would be brought under 
common law procedure, and the patient’s remedy is not affected by the Act.31 To qualify, 
providers need to (1) file with the Insurance Commissioner proof of financial responsibility (i.e., 
filing the insurance policy); and to (2) pay the annual surcharges.32  
Stated differently, to receive the protections of the Act, providers must have primary 
insurance coverage, and pay a surcharge to finance the PCF. The required minimum policy 
coverage is $250,000 per occurrence and $750,000 in the annual aggregate for individual 
providers.33 Hospitals are required to have $5,000,000 coverage if they have no more than one 
hundred beds; and $7,500,000 if have more than one hundred beds.34  
A range of providers are eligible to qualify under the Act, including physician, 
psychiatric hospital, health facility, emergency ambulance service, dentist, nurse, physician 
                                                
28 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-5. 
29 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-8. 
30 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-25. 
31 Ind. Code § 34-18-3-1. 
32 Ind. Code § 24-18-3-2. 
33 Ind. Code § 34-18-4-1(1). 
34 Ind. Code § 34-18-4-1(1)(A). 
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assistant, midwife, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist 
paramedic, blood bank, community health center, and HMO.35 
The Indiana PCF is funding by annual surcharges to physicians’ primary insurance. The 
surcharges do not involve experience rating, and primary insurance coverage is generally not 
experience rated either. Surcharges must be sufficient to cover the PCF’s expenses, including the 
payment of all claims.36  Since 2001, actuarial studies have been conducted to determine the 
amount that must be collected. The Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) uses a Physician 
Class Plan, which is a rate classification system based on specialties, to determine a physician’s 
surcharge amount.37 Each year, the amount of surcharge is calculated based on the median of the 
premiums of the three leading malpractice insurance carriers during the previse year. Leading 
carriers are those that have underwritten the most policies for all physicians practicing in the 
same specialty class. A uniform surcharge is then established for all physicians practicing in the 
same specialty class. This surcharge is based on a percentage of the median.38  
The 2016 physician surcharge rates range from $2,222 for Class 0 physicians (including 
residents and preventive medicine, public health, etc.) to $25,186 for Class 8 physicians 
(Obstetrics/Gynecology and Neurology).39 Table 2.2 summarizes the surcharge rate rules. 
                                                
35 Ind. Code § 34-18-2-14. In addition, Individuals who are members of a partnership or professional corporation 
must establish financial responsibility, and pay the required surcharge separate from the partnership or the 
corporation. Ind. Code § 34-18-4-4. 
36 Ind. Code § 34-15-5-2 (c). 
37 760 IAC 1-60-3. 
38 Ind. Code § 34-18-5-2 (f). 
39 See https://secure.in.gov/idoi/files/Bulletin_225_-_4-1-16_Surcharge_Rates.pdf for 2016 rates for physicians.  
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Table 2.2: Surcharge Rates for Different Types of Provider 
Provider Type 
(governing law) 
Basis used to Calculate Surcharge Rate 
Physicians 
(76 IAC 1-60 et seq.) 
Physician Class plan 
Percentage of median premium for each class 
  
Nursing Homes 
(76 IAC 1-21-8.5) 
Number and type of beds, different rates for for-profit 
and not-for-profit homes 
 
Hospitals or 
Psychiatric Hospital  
(76 IAC 1-21-5 
Number and types of beds, number and types of visits. 
Physicians employed by hospital pay their surcharges 
according to special class.  
 
Ancillary Providers 
(76 IAC 1-21-8) 
Not independent—100% of the premium 
Independent—fixed for each specialty 
Note: Ancillary providers refer to all health care providers other than physicians, nursing homes, hospitals, and 
psychiatric hospitals.  
Other Med Mal Reforms 
The 1975 Med Mal Act also enacted several less significant reforms. First, it limited 
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees. The Act does not restrict the percentage of lawyer’s fee up to the 
providers’ liability limit, but it does impose a cap of 15% on contingency fees on recoveries paid 
by the PCF.40 Many medical malpractice lawyers use a sliding-scale method of calculating their 
fees. A typical sliding-scale fee arrangement enables the lawyer to retain a larger percentage 
from the providers’ portion (i.e. the first $250,000), resulting in an average fee equal to 30%-
40% of the recovery from the PCF (Anderson 2008, 1213). 41  
While the Med Mal Act does not restrict the amount of attorney fees taken from the 
provider’s portion, the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) requires the attorney’s fee to 
be reasonable. In In re Stephens,42 the Indianan Supreme Court overruled the ealier decision in In 
re Stephens,43 and held that using a sliding-scale agreement itself did not violate the Indiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The court found it impossible to clearly define a reasonable fee, 
but set some guidance for lawyers to determine the reasonableness of the fee. 35% was found to 
                                                
40 Ind. Code § 34-18-18-1. 
41 This means the plaintiffs’ lawyers were taking 100% of the policy limits as a fee. Although seems implausible, 
this is not a typo.  
42 In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 2007). 
43 In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 1256 (Ind. 2006). 
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be the common custom in tort litigation, 40% was ordinarily the maximum, and any contigency 
fee in excess of 50% is not reasonable. Accordingly, in the most extreme case, a sliding-scale fee 
agreement is premitted even if 100% of the providers’ portion of recovery ($250,000 if only one 
provider is involed) is taken— as long as only 15% of the PCF payment is charged, and the total 
contingency fee amount is reasonable. 
Second, the Act reformed the statute of limitations. Patients must file a malpractice claim 
within two years after the date of the alleged malpractice44 That is, the the time for bringing a 
malpractice suit begins to run from the date of occurrence, rather than the date of discovery. An 
additional 180 days is available for claimants who seeks damages not greater than $15,000. 
Third, the Act restricts the ad damnum clause. The specific dollar amount that will be sought is 
not allowed to be inserted in the complaint.45  
Finally, the Act imposed a series of reporting requirements on parties involved in med 
mal claims, as well as data compilation duty on the IDOI. These efforts have provided 
transparent data for public disclosure and academic researches.   
Physician Licensure and Licensing Board Reform in Indiana 
Individuals enter the physician pipeline through first attending a U.S. allopathic (MD), 
osteopathic (DO), or international medical school. They are then required to pass multi-step 
licensure examinations, and to complete one or more years of graduate medical education 
(residency or fellowship). It typically takes more than nine years after entering college to become 
a licensed physician (Federation of State Medical Boards 2015, 2). 
Physicians are licensed either with examination, or by endorsement. Licensure 
endorsement is a process through which a state issues a medical license to an individual who 
holds a valid license in another jurisdiction. Endorsement is based on documentation of 
successfully completing an approved examination and authentication of required documents, 
rather than the passing of additional examinations. The process was previously referred to as 
“reciprocity”. Eleven boards place a time limit - usually ten years - for endorsement after the 
initial licensing examination. Applicants who do not meet the ten-year threshold must pass the 
                                                
44 Ind. Code § 34-18-7-1. 
45 Ind. Code §34-18-8-3. 
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Special Purpose Examination. Indiana has no such time limit (and thus no requirement for 
additional examinations (American Medical Association 2013, 170). 
Indiana requires physicians to renew their license every two years. Most states require 
completion of specified number of hours of continuing medical education (CME) for license 
renewal. Indiana places no CME requirement. To renew one’s license, applicants must fill out a 
form that inter alia inquires whether they were involved in any “adverse events” since last 
renewed. Applicants must provide detailed explanation if they answer “yes” to any of the 
questions. The Board reviews all applications, and sometimes decide to pursue actions against 
those who provide fraudulent answers. Some initial license applications are denied on similar 
grounds (i.e., the applicant failed to disclose previous adverse events, such as during residency). 
Fraudulent description of educational credentials may also lead to denial of a license.46 
As a part of a larger wave of state medical boards reorganization, in 1981, Indiana 
establish Health Professions Bureau, which was responsible for multiple health care professions. 
Ind. Code 25-1-5-3. In 2005, Health Professions Bureau transferred authority to the PLA, which 
is responsible for many/most regulated occupations.47  
The Indiana Medical Licensing Board (“the Board”), along with other professional 
licensing boards, now operates as a part of the Professional Licensing Agency or PLA. The 
board is responsible for licensing and disciplining both allopathic and osteopathic doctors. 
Physicians are licensed either by examination, or they are first licensed elsewhere and then may 
seek to be licensed in Indiana by endorsement or application. The Board also issues Controlled 
Substances Registrations (CSRs). CSR is a state license that is required for each location a 
licensed practitioner dispenses, administrates or stores controlled substances. 
The Board consists of seven members, including five physicians, one osteopathic 
physician and a consumer representative.48 The State Attorney General (AG) is responsible for 
                                                
46 Renewal application forms are available at https://secure.in.gov/pla/3503.htm . 
47 Ind. Code 25-1-5-3.3. 
48 Ind. Code § 25-22.5-2-1 
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receiving, investigating, and prosecuting complaints concerning physicians discipline.49 Cases 
come to the attention of the AG’s Office through various ways. Some were from public 
complaints (e.g., patients and families, co-workers, paramedics, and local pharmacies who found 
suspicious prescriptions); others were initiated following complaints from other government 
agencies. The AG may prosecute the matter before the Board if a preliminary investigation 
suggests that the licensee should be subjected to discipline; or the Board by a majority vote 
requests the AG to prosecute a matter. Figure 2.2 summarizes the law with respect to disciplinary 
actions against Indiana licensed professionals.  
 
                                                
49 Ind. Code § 25-1-7-2. But the Board is responsible to investigate six violations specified in Ind. Code § 24-22.3-
2.8. In general, these violations are related to licensure (renewal), and office or record-keeping practice. They are (1) 
Licensure renewal fraud.  (2) Improper termination of a physician and patient relationship. (3) Practicing with an 
expired medical license. (4) Providing office based anesthesia without the proper accreditation. (5) Failure to 
perform duties required for issuing birth or death certificates. (6) Failure to disclose, or negligent omission of, 
documentation requested for licensure renewal. 
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Figure 2.2: License litigation procedure. 
 
Note: License litigation/disciplinary procedure in Indiana. Complaint = inputs from various sources, including 
consumer complaints. AG (state Attorney General) receives and reviews all public complaints, and decides whether 
to further investigate the matter. The Board may appoint an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to hear a case. Some 
ALJ were doctors, some were lawyers, others were neither doctor nor lawyer.  
 
The Board may impose a variety of sanctions, including fines, censure, a letter of 
reprimand, probation, suspension, and revocation. Physicians may voluntarily surrender their 
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licenses or, in limited circumstances, petition to retire in lieu of revocation.  Thus, sanctions vary 
widely in their severity.  
Revocation is the most severe sanction. Physician with revoked licenses cannot practice. 
They cannot reapply for a new license for seven years. They can reapply after seven years. The 
Board can decide to grant an unlimited license, to grant a license on probationary basis, or to 
deny the reapplication.  
If a physicians’ license is suspended, they may not engage in the practice of medicine. 
Suspension is usually imposed for an undefined period with a minimum time that must pass 
before the physician may apply to reinstate the license. Most suspensions are followed by a 
period of probation. But probation can also be imposed alone. Physicians that are under 
probation may continue to practice, but they are subject to certain terms and conditions. 
Common probationary terms include practicing under supervision; group practice; complete a 
certain amount of Continuing Medical Education; have a chaperone present when seeing female 
patients, etc.  
A letter of reprimand is an official disciplinary record. It may be combined with other 
sanctions. A letter of reprimand does not affect the status of the license or their ability to 
practice.  
Censure is an expression of official disapproval. It may be combined with other sanctions 
and does not affect the status of license or ability to practice. Censure is viewed as less severe 
than a letter of reprimand.  
The Board may impose fines for each violation of law (as opposed to each misconduct), 
except for incompetence due to disability. The maximum amount for each statutory violation is 
$1,000. If, for example, a drug-addicted physician gave prescriptions to his female patients in 
exchange for sexual favors, he would violate multiple statutes—including drug abuse, sexual 
misconduct, and inappropriate prescribing. His drug addiction also makes him physically 
incompetent to practice medicine. The Board may impose a $4,000 fine on this doctor, based on 
the four disciplinary grounds. I also discuss the licensing and discipline rules in Chapter 5. 
Summary suspension is a non-final action that can be imposed when there is clear and 
immediate danger to the public health and safety. A summary suspension order is effective for 90 
days, but is extendable.  
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My Data Sources 
The PCF Database 
I rely on a database obtained from the Indiana State Department of Insurance (IDOI) to 
study med mal claiming, insuring, and payments. I refer this database as the “PCF database.”50 
Below, I summarize the statutory reporting requirements, the reliability of the data. I also define 
key terms that I use throughout the dissertation when referring to the data. 
Overview 
The 1975 Medical Malpractice Act of Indiana requires all health care providers who wish 
to be qualified for the protection of the Act to file their primary insurance policy with the 
Insurance Commissioner. The Act also requires all proposed med mal claims to be filed with the 
Commissioner; and imposes various reporting requirements on plaintiffs, defendants, and 
insurers throughout the dispute resolution process. Since 1975, IDOI has been receiving such 
reports. Table 2.3 summarizes the reporting requirements, the party obligated to report, and the 
governing statues. 
 
                                                
50 All the claims and providers included in the database are available online at 
http://www.indianapcf.com/Public/index.aspx . 
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Table 2.3: Reporting Requirements in Indiana Malpractice Law 
Claiming stage Obligated Parties Report 
 By provider/insurer Insurance policy with required 
policy limits.  
 
Filing By Plaintiff (IC 34-18-7-3)  
By Insurer (IC 34-18-9-2) 
A proposed claim is filed. 
A proposed claim is filed. 
 By Insurer (IC 34-18-9-3(a)) $125,000 or more reserve is 
placed for a claim 
 
Panel review By Attorney chair of the panel 
(IC 34-18-10-11) 
Panel members and the date of 
formation 
 By Panel  
(IC 34-18-10-13 (b)) 
Reasons for the delay, if failed to 
render opinion with in time 
allowed. 
 By Attorney chair of the panel 
(IC 34-18-10-26) 
A copy of panel’s report 
 
 
Disposed By Insurer  
(IC 34-18-9-3 (a)) 
Final disposition of a claim 
By Plaintiff’s attorney and by 
provider, or provider’s insurer, 
or provider’s risk manager  
(IC 34-18-9-3 (b)) 
Nature of the claim. 
Damages and injury. 
Legal fees and expense. 
Amount of settlement and 
judgment 
Note: Indiana’s statutory requirements to report med mal claims. 
 
A proposed  med mal complaint is considered to have been filed when it is delivered to 
the Insurance Commissioner.51 Health care providers’ insurers are obligated to notify the 
Commissioner within 30 days after the filing and the final disposition of a malpractice claim;52 
and immediately after placing a claim reserve of $125,000 or more,53 which makes the claim a 
candidate for payment by the PCF. Finally, all settlements and judgment should be reported by 
both sides—plaintiff’s attorney and provider/insurer/risk manager—to the Commissioner.54 
                                                
51 Ind. Code § 34-18-9-2. 
52 Ind. Code § 34-18-9-2. 
53 Ind. Code § 34-18-9-3. 
54 Ind. Code § 34-18-9-2. 
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Effectively all of the fields listed in Table 2.3 are in my database, including cases and 
outcomes, parties and attorneys, insurances coverage costs, and review panels, etc. Table 2.4 
provides a brief overview of my data, including the number of distinct observations and fields for 
each category.  
 
Table 2.4: Overview of the PCF Database  
Category  Subject Distinct 
observations 
Number 
of fields 
Med mal Case All 28,375 9 
 
 Settlement Defendant settlement 47,194 4 
 
 Party Plaintiff 49,170 12 
  Provider 26,260 16 
 
 Attorney Attorney 7,309 13 
 
 Review panel Panel 19,876 4 
  Panel opinion on provider  19,864 1 
  Panelist opinion on provider  61,276 2 
Insurance Carrier Carrier 1,448 3 
 Policy Provider's policies 934,059 15 
Note: Overview of the PCF database. Subjects are main analysis units. Number of fields = number of useful 
variables/fields that are used in analysis, excluding IDs, and fields kept for data management purposes.  
 
For every case, the database provides case status (e.g., closed, active), substantive status 
(e.g., closed with fund payment, judgment, etc.), status changed date, filed date, incident start 
date (i.e., injury date), incident end date, PCF settlement date, PCF settlement amount, county. 
For every defendant settlement, available fields include defendant settlement date, settlement 
amount, legal fee, and legal expenses. For every plaintiff, available fields are plaintiff last name, 
first name, middle name, salutation, organization, address, city, state, zip, county, phone, fax 
email, and whether the plaintiff was a minor. Available provider information includes provider 
type (individual or organization), last name, first name, middle name, salutation, organization, 
address, city, state, zip, county, phone, fax, email, license, and specialty code. Available attorney 
variables include last name, first name, middle name, salutation, firm affiliation, attorney license, 
address, city, state, zip, phone, fax, and email. For review panels, there are fields that specify the 
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case that the panel reviewed, panel overall determination on case, opinion date, and panel 
completion date. The data also provide panel overall determination on defendants, and individual 
panelists’ determination on defendants.  
For insurance carriers, available fields include the name of the company, the ID assigned 
to the insurance carrier by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and the email 
address of the carrier. The database also keeps track of all providers’ historical and current 
insurance policies. Relevant fields include policy number, policy type (occurrence or claims-
made), coverage start date, coverage end date, retrospective date, cancelled date, effective date, 
surcharge rate, adjustment type (e.g., cancel policy, return surcharge, change specialty, etc.), 
whether the policy covers employee, premium amount, carrier that underwrite the policy, penalty 
amount, and penalty paid date.  
A “case” is an alleged medical malpractice causing bodily injury or death. A case may 
involve multiple plaintiffs and/or multiple defendants (i.e., multiple claims). A “plaintiff” can be 
the injured patient, or a family member, or others entitled to compensation.  
A provider must file their insurance policies with the Commissioner to “establish 
financial responsibility” so as to receive the protections of the Act. A “provider” can be a 
physician, dentist, ancillary provider, hospital, or nursing home. A “defendant” is a provider 
involved in a malpractice case. Med mal cases in the database are not limited to physician 
malpractice, but can involve any defendant type.  
A penal member or “panelist” is a provider who serves on a review panel. All defendants 
and all panelists are providers; but not all providers are defendants, and not all providers are 
panelists. A defendant “settlement” can be a judgment or settlement agreements between the 
parties. A PCF settlement is a Fund payout in excess of the defendant’s policy limits. 
The “filing date” of a case is the date on which the plaintiff files the proposed claim with 
the Commissioner. For cases reviewed by a panel, the dates of requests, panel member selection, 
and opinion are also available.  
“Closing date” needs some explanation. The dates and case outcomes are from two 
separate relational tables. Some cases have positive payout, but have missing dates. The primary 
definition of “closing” is when the case status changes from active to closed. When this status-
change date is not recorded, I use the date of PCF settlement, if any. When there is no PCF 
settlement, I use the defendant settlement date – the latest one if multiple defendants settled. If 
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no defendant settlement is available, I impute the closing date with “filing date + four years.” 
The four-year decision rule comes from the mean and median duration of the cases with 
available dates.  
In terms of reliability, filing date is more complete and more consistent than closing date. 
Thus, I use filing year to sort cases in most time-trend analysis, and use closing year only for 
inflation adjustment.  
Unless otherwise specified, all dollar amounts are adjusted to 2015$, with closing date 
used to identify the year in which payment was actually made.   
For case outcome/payout rate analysis, I include only closed cases (as of May 2015 when 
I obtained the data). Thus, “paid cases” (as I use the term throughout the dissertation) refer to to 
cases that were closed with positive payout. “Unpaid cases” are those closed without any payout 
from any defendant. Still-active cases are not in the outcome/payout analysis, and do not count 
as unpaid. In addition, for all analysis, I exclude cases that were filed in 2015. Because I only 
have five months of data of year 2015, including those cases filed during the first five months 
could bias the filing analysis.  
IDOI has made various modifications in its implementation of the reporting system over 
time. I find some evidence of under-reporting in early years. For example, panel review was an 
absolute prerequisite to commencing a claim prior to 1985. But, about 20% of the pre-1985 cases 
do not have panel information recorded in the database.  
Multiple IDs 
The database administrators assign IDs to cases, plaintiffs, providers, and insurers, so 
they can be linked across multiple relational tables. But occasionally, the administrators assigned 
multiple IDs to the same plaintiffs/providers/insurers -- especially when they had doubts as to 
whether the new entry was identical to one that already existed.    
I explored various strategies to address this problem, but they created more problems than 
they solved. These single-person-multiple-IDs were created by many administrators over a long 
period of time, and not in a consistent or systematic way. Second, the IDs are the “key” data 
fields that are used to link cases and parties across multiple relational tables. They can also be 
used to search the online database. Finally, I lack reliable alternative identification mechanism. 
The only plausible alternative would be to rely on full names to create a parallel identification. 
  
30 
This approach would be particularly unreliable for common names. As such, I used the IDs 
assigned by the administrator as they are in the data. That is, I treat observations as distinct ones 
if they have different IDs. 
Comparisons to Data Used in Previous Studies 
Prior med mal studies relied on three major types of data source—hospital records, 
judicial data, and insurance/claim file data. Each of these data sources has strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Hospital records are useful to study the frequency of medical injury and the relative rate 
of claiming.55 Not all medical errors, however, happen in the hospital, and not all medical errors 
that happen in the hospital are recorded in the records. Plus, hospital records may be quite 
voluminous, and are non-public – both of which make them more difficult to use for studies of 
this sort.   
Judicial data provides useful insights into the inputs and outputs of formal legal 
procedures.  However, most med mal cases are settled without a trial – and court records will 
only reveal the fact of payment if judicial approval of the settlement is required. Although 
records do show the outcome of tried cases, the cases that progress to trial are not a random 
sample of the universe of all underlying injuries and claims.56 Court records also contain little 
information on the underlying injuries, which makes it harder to draw inferences about observed 
patterns.  Assume that jury verdicts increase over time. Is that because juries are becoming more 
generous, or because injury severity is increasing? Without adequate data about inputs, it is hard 
to know what to make of any observable changes in outputs.    
Jury Verdict Reporters (JVRs) are another important source of judicial data, especially 
when more official and comprehensive data are not available. JVRs are unofficial, commercial 
reporting services, mainly consumed by trial lawyers. JVRs usually provide case summaries with 
nicely coded injury information. Because courts traditionally did not keep make it easy for non-
parties to keep track of case outcomes, JVRs rely on self-reporting by attorneys. There is good 
                                                
55 For leading hospital records studies, see e.g. Mills (1978) and Weiler et al. (1993). 
56 Cases with clearer factors of liability tend to be settled relatively quickly, which left only those near the decision 
rule to trials. This issue is discussed more extensively in Priest and Klein (1984); Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989); and 
Eisenberg (1990). 
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evidence that these self-reports focus on “significant” verdicts, leaving out many cases that 
plaintiffs lose, and significantly understating the volume of low-dollar value cases.57 
Insurance closed-claim data solved many of these problems, but the original studies only 
obtained data from one or a handful of insurance companies – raising concerns about the 
representativeness of the findings.58 Subsequent studies have relied on state-level Closed Claim 
Databases (CCDs). Several states require insurance companies to report all closed insurance 
claims, or all claims over a certain payout level. Most physicians and some hospitals have 
commercial insurance coverage, so CCDs cover most of the med mal insurance market.  
Insurance companies generally require health care providers to report adverse outcomes; requests 
for patient records that come from a lawyer; actual lawsuits; and other facts that suggest a claim 
might be in the offing.  Thus, state-level CCDs offer a more complete source of data, compared 
to judicial records and individual insurance company data.59 
Of course, state-level CCDs also have weaknesses. First, they have no information on 
still-open cases (i.e., cases in the discovery stage, settlement negotiations, or are currently being 
tried). A typical med mal case will take several years to resolve, and cases with larger damages 
might take longer.  Cases involving children have a particularly “long tail.”  For these reasons, it 
will take a several years for the impact of any reforms to show up in a state-level CCD. Second, 
some states do not require reporting unpaid claims (i.e., claims closed without indemnity 
payment). Because most med mal claims closed without payment, excluding unpaid claims 
makes it harder to examine filing trends and defense costs. Finally, states usually require only 
non-self-insured entities to report claims. Many hospitals, however, are self-inured. 
The Indiana PCF database that I rely on for this study has a number of advantages 
comparing to the data used by previous studies. Unlike typical judicial data, the PCF database 
include both tried and settled cases. Unlike states that require the insurer to report closed claims 
to the state Closed Claim Databases (CCDs), Indiana requires all filings to be reported to the 
IDOI. Thus, the PCF database include both closed and still-active cases - both those closed with 
                                                
57 For leading JVRs studies, see e.g. (Peterson and Priest 1982; Shanley and Peterson 1983; Peterson 1984; Chin and 
Peterson 1985; Peterson 1987; Moller 1996; Seabury, Pace, and Reville 2004; Vidmar, Robinson, and MacKillop 
2006; H. Kritzer, Liu, and Vidmar 2014) 
58 For insurance company closed-claim studies, see e.g. Studdert et al. (2006); Peeples, Harris, and Metzloff (2002) 
59 For leading state CCD studies, see Black et al. (2005); Vidmar et al. (2005) 
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positive payouts and those did not.  And, I have data for an unusually long number of years.  The 
longest sample period in a previous study of state-level CCDs was 1980-2010. My data covers 
1975-2014 – a full nine years of additional data. 
Licensure Data 
My licensure data came from Indiana’s Medical Licensing Board, which is part of the 
PLA. I refer to it as the “PLA licensing database.” The PLA licensing database includes various 
types of licenses held by medical professionals over the period 1902-2015. For each license, 
there is a record of license number, license type, issuance date, expiration date, current status of 
the license, the name of the licensee, the ID created based on licensee’s social security numbers, 
and licensee’s latest address. For 25.7% of the licenses, the specialties are recorded.  
The PLA licensing database and the PCF database do not precisely overlap. To 
distinguish the providers in the licensing database from the providers in the PCF database, I refer 
to the former as “PLA providers” and the latter as “PCF providers.” PCF providers include 
physicians, hospitals, nursing homes, and other ancillary providers. 
By comparison, all the PLA providers are (or were) individual Indiana license holders. 
The types of license included are unlimited licensed MDs and DOs, Temporary DO and MD 
Permits, state Controlled Substance Registrations (CSRs), Limited Scope MDs and DOs; 
Medical Fellowship and Residency Permits, Genetic Counselor and Temporary Genetic 
Counselor Permits. In subsequent chapters, I focus on physicians (MDs and Dos) with unlimited 
licenses.  
 The licensure database is indexed by individual IDs based on the licensee’s social 
security number, and license numbers. The identification mechanism is more reliable than the 
one used in the PCF database. The licensure data, however, are not entirely duplicate-free. For 
some reason, some of the licensees with the same names, same license issuances dates, and even 
zips, are assigned different IDs. Based on the standardized spelling of names, there are 512 
observations with different IDs but matched names. Because of the overall reliability of the 
identification, and the relatively minor rate of possible duplicates, each distinct ID is treated as a 
separate individual/license.   
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Discipline Data 
License Litigation Files 
I relied on the license litigation (as it is called by the PLA) files obtained from the 
Indiana Medical Licensing Board of the PLA, in May 2016, to study physician discipline. 
Disciplinary records and current license status are also available on PLA’s online License Search 
and Verify System.60  
I reviewed and coded all the documents into a flat dataset. Every entry contains a case. 
Where available, each entry contains the following fields: the Cause Number, case type, 
outcome, filing date, final order, whether the case was initiated by a consumer complaint, 
physician name, credential of the physician (i.e., MD or DO), license number, business and 
residence addresses, specialty, offenses that lead to board actions, whether the case was 
reciprocal (if so, the originating state), number of patients involved, date of hearing, whether the 
case was settled, whether the order was imposed by default, types of sanctions imposed, 
conditions imposed with probationary order,  the start and end date of sanctions, attorney name, 
law firm affiliation, law firm address, and a “notes” field containing other not otherwise coded 
information. Types of sanctions were coded into a series of indicator variables. 
A “case” is an administrative matter that has been assigned a Cause Number by the 
Licensing Board. A misconduct or a series of misconducts related in time or place is usually 
assigned one Cause Number, regardless of the duration of the sanction or complexity of the 
procedure. A case involves only one physician/respondent; but may include multiple offense or 
multiple sanctions. Physicians have multiple entries, only if they have been “prosecuted” in 
multiple cases (i.e., they have multiple cause numbers).  
Most cases involve only on misconduct type. I code the underlying misbehavior type 
(“principal offense”), as opposed to all charged statutory violations. Among the 996 disciplinary 
cases in my dataset, 16 cases potentially involved more than one misbehaviors type and therefore 
needed a judgment call about the principal offense. In those cases, I coded the misconducts that 
appeared to contribute the most to the disciplinary decision. I provide alternative Tables and 
                                                
60 Online searchable records available at http://www.in.gov/apps/pla/litigation/?   
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Figures that exclude those 16 cases in Appendix Section IX. The results are essentially the same 
as the ones in the main text.  
I code multiple offenses in one entry/case only when the violations were not related in 
time and space. For example, in one real case, a doctor became involved in a sexual relationship 
with a patient; caused that patient to become pregnant with his child; subsequently forged entries 
on her chart; and then performed an abortion on that patient which resulted in complications 
would be coded as “sex offense” in offense types. But a doctor who had been involved in sexual 
relationship with patients, and was also charged with Medicare fraud, would be coded as “sex 
offense” and “fraud.”  
Below, I provide several justifications for the principal offense coding, and explain why 
the alternatives would introduce more noise than accuracy into the data. First, a plausible 
alternative to coding the behaviors is coding all charges. When prosecuting a case, the state 
usually cites multiple statutory violations resulting from a single misconduct. Most specific 
misconducts, for example, also fit into the blanket “unprofessional behaviors”. As a substantive 
matter, coding allegations and principal offenses answer different questions. The former would 
be the way to study the prosecution practices, and the latter describes the underlying misconducts 
that led to disciplinary actions.  
Second, the statues that laid out disciplinary grounds were revised and detailed as part of 
the licensing board reform. This was aimed at giving the Board greater power to regulate 
physician quality. Prior to the reform, the disciplinary grounds were generic, and some of the 
“sanction-able” behaviors were not in the earlier versions of the state law, and therefore did not 
appear in the earlier administrative complaints. Description of the behaviors, on the other hand, 
are always available in the Complaints and Findings of the Facts and Final Orders. On a related 
point, many (Deputy) AGs handled the complaints, with considerable variations in the formatting 
of the documents, across this extensive period of time. Coding the allegation may add more 
noises than accuracy in the analysis.  
From the perspective of computational feasibility, coding allegations essentially means 
adding more indicator variables in a maximum likelihood estimation. This would be further 
complicated by the rarity of the events (i.e., discipline). Increased number of dummy predicator 
variables heightens the risk of data separation, where some combinations of the predicators are 
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only associated with one outcome (event or non-event). This would, in turn, increase the 
difficulties and bias in the estimation.  
Finally, this principal or index offense coding was also used in prior multi-state studies, 
to eliminate reporting and handling variation. Using the similar coding protocol make my 
findings more comparable to their results (see e.g. Kohatsu et al. 2004).  
Many cases involve a combination of sanctions. For example, assume the Licensing 
Board suspends a doctor’s license because of his drug abuse. Two years after the suspension 
order, the doctor petitions to reinstate his license. The Board grants the reinstatement on a 
probationary basis. The doctor, however, fails to meet the probationary conditions (which 
required him to participate in a rehabilitation program and periodically report to the Licensing 
Board). The Board, which hadn’t heard from the doctor for a long time, issues an Order to Show 
Cause – but the doctor does not show up. As a result, the Licensing Board revokes his license. 
This hypothetical case involves suspension, probation, and revocation. I code all of these 
sanctions. Depending on the specific question of interest, I use all three sanctions to study the 
frequency of Licensing Board activities, but use revocation as the ultimate “outcome” of this 
case.  
The dataset contains 996 entries/cases against 936 physicians – all filed from 1972 - 
2015. One of the 936 physicians does not match with any licensure record in the licensure data. 
Eighty-six percent of the entries are disciplinary cases. Other case include review of denied 
licensure application, review of denied licensure renewal review, and some miscellaneous cases. 
Previous studies using Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) data used the terms 
“prejudicial action” and “non-prejudicial act” (e.g., Marwick 1994). A prejudicial action is 
defined as an action that (a) modifies a physician’s license, or the privileges granted by that 
license; or (b) will potentially result in a penalty to the physician. The definition of prejudicial 
action, therefore, defines both case type and outcome.  
To avoid possible confusions, I use the term “disciplinary” and “non-disciplinary” to 
indicate the cases type, without inferring the outcome. In Indiana, a disciplinary case is 
investigated and “prosecuted” by the state Attorney General (AG), and decided by the Licensing 
Board. Non-disciplinary cases are administrative by nature, so they fully fall into the 
responsibility of the Licensing Board. Both disciplinary cases and non-disciplinary cases could 
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result in license restriction or revocation. Similarly, physicians in both kinds of cases could be 
exonerated. In my analysis, I address case types and outcomes separately.  
Coding Protocol 
The original documents I obtained are scanned copies of litigation files in pdf format. 
The PLA created a file folder for each respondent. Each folder contains all the documents 
involved in the procedure, including Complaint, Petition for Summary Suspension submitted by 
Attorney General’s Office (AG’s Office); Motions submitted by either the AG’s Office or the 
respondents; Order to Show Cause, Emergency Suspension Order, Notice of Proposed Default, 
Finding of Facts and Order by the Board. There are altogether 936 non-empty folders (i.e., 936 
respondents).  
 The component, layout and legibility of the pdf scanned copies vary over time. Instead 
of using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software, I carefully read all the files, 
developed an elaborate set of coding rules, and coded all available cases into a machine readable 
flat dataset. The coded dataset has been scrutinized, cleaned and checked multiple times in 
various ways.  
More specifically, I first coded a subset of 52 (5.6%) randomly selected respondents. I 
used this initial set of cases to develop a coding protocol. I used that coding protocol to code the 
first 100 (10.7%) respondents’ cases, and to assess whether the established categories and coded 
variables captured the breadth and depth of the information contained in the documents. During 
this second phase of test-coding, I also took into account whether the initial protocol was 
functional enough to gather all the useful information, including those had been and hadn’t been 
studied in existing literature. A few data fields were added during this process. I established the 
coding protocol and developed a codebook after these adjustments, and carried out the protocol 
consistently throughout the coding process for the other 90% of cases.61  
After the coding, I took several quality control measures to ensure the accuracy and 
internal consistency. First, all the coded license numbers and names of the respondents were 
checked and matched with the PLA licensure data. Dates outside reasonable ranges were 
corrected. Missing values were entered. I then used a random number generator to select 200 
                                                
61 The codebook is available upon request. 
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respondent IDs. Cases associated with these 200 respondents were check-coded. The results are 
identical to the initial coding.  
The finalized dataset (“disciplinary data”) covers 936 cases filed with the Licensing 
Board from 1972 to 2015, involving 936 respondents. Data fields cover characteristics of cases, 
licensees, attorneys, offenses, and types and durations of resulting disciplinary actions, etc.  
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CHAPTER 3: INDIANA’S MALPRACTICE CLAIMING ENVIRONMENT 
 
This chapter evaluates trends in Indiana’s malpractice claiming, payouts per claim, 
payouts per physician, and med mal insurance rates over a forty-year period – beginning in 1975, 
when tort reform was enacted, through 2015.  I show that after a short ramp-up period, the post-
reform med mal claim rate had remained reasonably stable. Since the mid-1980s, the number of 
physicians has steadily increased; per physician lawsuits rate remained fairly flat, and then 
trended downwards since 2001. Per-physician rate of paid cases has been dropping since 1994, 
and payout per physician has been dropping since 2001. But, I find a clear increase in 
physicians’ cost of insurance coverage (premiums plus surcharges paid to the PCF) from the 
early 2000s through 2006. I find this premium spike decoupled from the med mal litigation 
trends: when the premium spiked, the per physician rate of paid cases and payouts (which should 
be the most relevant for predicting insurance premium) has been dropping for years in Indiana.     
Introduction 
In 1975, Indiana enacted a comprehensive reform in response to the first med mal crisis. 
Among the key aspects of the legislation were a state-run Patient’s Compensation Fund (“PCF”) 
and a total damages cap.62 The reforms, by requiring participating providers to carry a minimum 
primary insurance coverage and paying excess amount above policy limits up to the total 
damages cap, have the potential to influence both the claiming environment and the insurance 
market in the state.  
In this Chapter, I rely on a med mal database obtained from the Indiana Department of 
Insurance (IDOI), which extends back to the first year of the reform, to study the med mal 
environment in the state. I show that after a short ramp-up period, the post-reform med mal claim 
rate has remained reasonably stable. Since the mid-1980s, the number of physicians has steadily 
increased; per physician lawsuits rate remained fairly flat, and then trended downwards since 
2001. Per-physician rate of paid cases has been dropping since 1994, and payout per physician 
has been dropping since 2001. These receding trends are broadly consistent with national trends. 
                                                
62 I study the medical review panel, another key component of the 1975 reform, in Chapter 4.  
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When I look at physicians’ cost of insurance coverage (premiums and surcharges paid to 
the PCF), however, I find a clear increase from the early 2000s through 2006. Consistent with 
other state case studies, I find this latest premium spike decoupled from the litigation trends: 
when the premium spiked, the per physician rate of paid cases and payouts had been dropping 
for years in Indiana. 
About 30% of cases filed in Indiana were ultimately paid. In more than 60% of the paid 
cases, defendants paid at their policy limits, allowing plaintiffs to access the PCF for above-
limits damages. Most (70%) cases that got into the PCF layer were ultimately paid near or at the 
total damages cap.  
Mean payout per paid claim increases over time. Despite the increasing cap amount, the 
percentage of cases resulted in near or at cap payouts increased. Over the entire study period, 
unpaid and small payout cases kept dropping. The decline in small claims was also observed in 
other studies.  
This chapter proceed as follows. Section II reviews the prior studies on med mal 
litigation and premium trends and several earlier Indiana specific studies. Section III describes 
the data, and provides details on Indiana’s reformed legal system. Section IV presents the results. 
Section V discusses some of the findings and implications. Section V concludes.  
Literature Review 
I briefly review the literature on med mal claim rates in other states and nationwide, and a 
few existing Indiana specific studies.63 Baker (2005) and Sloan and Chepke (2010) provide 
thorough reviews of earlier studies. Bovbjerg (1988), Mello (2006), and Mello, Studdert, and 
Kachalia (2014) summarize studies evaluating the effects of various tort reforms on the med mal 
environment. 
National Studies 
Paik, Black, and Hyman (2013), in a national study using NPDB data, reports that per-
physician rate of paid med mal claims has dropped for 20 years in 2012. Lawsuits rates, in states 
with available data, also dropped. Small claims (<$50,000 in 2011$) declined through the study 
                                                
63 I provide a review of PCF in other states in Appendix. 
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period. They note that the claim rates—which has been dropping since 1999 based on injury year 
or 2001 based on closing year—do not seem to be helping in explaining the early 2000s 
insurance premium increase experienced by many states.    
Black et al. (forthcoming, 18), using MLM data over 1990-2015, shows a decline in the 
early 1990s, and a sharp increase in the early 2000s in national average. The average rate has 
been dropped since the peak in 2005.  
The lack of congruence between premium changes (the fall in 1990s and the renounce in 
2000s) and the med mal claim rates confirms with the findings of an earlier study by Baicker and 
Chandra (2005). Using the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) for payouts and Medical 
Liability Monitor (MLM) survey data for premium rates, the researchers found a weak and 
insignificant association between changes in changes in premiums and med mal payments – 
whether past or present.   
Other State Studies 
Conclusions from studies based on available state closed claim databases are consistent 
with national trends. Vidmar et al. (2005) found no rise in claim rates in Florid adjusted for 
population growth or number of physicians. Average payout per claim increase, which was likely 
due to the increase in claims involving very serious injuries and death.  
Black et al. (2005) analyzed med mal claiming in Texas for the 1988-2002 period. There 
was no significant time trend in the number of paid claims adjusted for population growth. 
Controlling for growth in the number of physicians, the number of paid claims peaked in 1992, 
and steadily declined after that. Payout per paid claim increased, likely reflected the gradual 
disappearance of small claims and a shift towards larger claims (involved more severe injuries). 
Payout per large claims remained stable during the the sample period. Payouts per physician 
declined over 1990-2004. Black et al. (2008) reported that the defense costs, a component of 
direct med mal litigation cost, increased in Texas over 1988-2004. But, the growth in defense 
costs was gradual, and therefore cannot explain insurance spikes. Thus, changes the med mal 
litigation system (measured by the number of claims, the payout per claim, and defense costs) 
cannot explain the premium spikes that hit Texas beginning in 2001.  
Rahmati et al. (2016, 17) using the Illinois closed claim database, find that per physician 
rate of paid claims increased over 1980-1985, leveled off through 1991, and then declined. 
Payout per claim increased since 1980, but the increase can be entirely explained by the 
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disappearance of smaller paid claims. They find a negative correlation between MLM-reported 
premiums in Illinois and the total direct med mal litigation cost (payouts and defense costs) [r = -
0.60, r with a one-year lag = -0.64, r with a one-year lead = -0.64].  
 Prior Indiana Studies 
A 1986 GAO case study of Indiana, citing the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI), 
reported that premium rates (from leading insurers) remained stable following the 1975 reform 
until 1980, after which they trended upwards, with most of the increases occurred in 1985 and 
1986. The rate increase in 1985 ranged from 12% to 76%. Two major insurers reported that 
claims filed per 100 physician increased each year and almost doubled from 1980 through 1984, 
but the average paid claim decreased slightly. The IDOI also reported that the PCF was kept 
solvent in 1984 only by a transfer of $7.2 million from the reserves of the state’s med mal joint 
underwriting association. A GAO consulting actuary reported $90 million in unfunded liabilities 
of the PCF as of December 1985 (United States General Accounting Office 1986). 
Researchers at Indiana University studied the the post-reform med mal environment over 
1977-1988 period, and compared the it to those in the two neighboring states: Michigan and 
Ohio. They found that the maximum recoveries in Indiana were much lower, due to Indiana’s 
total damages cap. But, the mean payout in Indiana was higher, which the authors attributed to 
the much higher percentage of large claims (≥$100,000) received the maximum of $500,000 (the 
then effective damage cap) in Indiana. They hypothesized that Indiana’s cap has actually become 
a “floor,” and payment for large claims in Indiana tend to “bump up” against Indiana’s cap 
(Gronfein and Kinney 1991; Kinney and Gronfein 1991; Kinney, Gronfein, and Gannon 1991). 
The Data and the Legal System 
The Indiana PCF Database 
I rely here on a database maintained by he Indiana Department of Insurance (“IDOI”) 
maintains a database on all medical malpractice cases filed since 1975. The database contains, 
claimant/plaintiff, defendant, insurance, payout information.64 Consistent with prior research 
                                                
64 The PCF Database is available at http://www.indianapcf.com/Public/index.aspx. 
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involving closed claims databases, I find some evidence of underreporting in early years (1975-
1979).    
The database is organized by case, as distinguished from claim. In this sense, the filing 
and payout rate findings from this study are not directly comparable to studies that rely on claim 
level data. Every case in the PCF database is assigned a distinct ID. If a case (over a particular 
act of malpractice) involves multiple plaintiffs and/or defendants, all plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
claims share the same case ID. Plaintiffs and health care providers are assigned IDs as well. In 
most of my analysis, I focus on the 22,304 cases that are closed – but the section concerns the 
lawsuits filing rate (Part IV Section B) include all 28,375 cases filed from 1975 to 2014. Chapter 
2 describes my database in greater detail.  
In addition to the PCF database, I used data from other sources. For insurance costs, I 
relied on Medical Liability Monitor (MLM) for premiums; and on IDOI’s Insurance Bulletins 
and Annual Reports for detailed surcharge rates.65 I calculate per-capita rates of lawsuits using 
2010 census data for state and county population.66 The number of non-federal physicians is 
based on the Area Health Resources File from the American Medical Association. For year 
1972-1974, 1976-1979, 1984, 1987, 1991, and 2009 the physician counts are missing. I use a 
first order auto regressive model to impute the missing values where feasible.67 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the stages of med mal claiming in Indiana, and notes the areas in 
which I have data. I describe the proceedings in details in Section B, and also in Chapter 2.  
 
                                                
65 Available at https://secure.in.gov/idoi/2978.htm and  https://secure.in.gov/idoi/2566.htm.  
66 Available at http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/.  
67 Auto regressive model N=704.4352+29.79396*(year-1969) +.8676369*(physicians number in last year).  
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Figure 3.1. Medical malpractice claiming procedures in Indiana. 
 
Note: Arrows “ß” represent available data.  
The Legal System 
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act (“Med Mal Act”) provides various protections for 
defendants, including a shortened statute of limitations, screening by medical review panels, and 
caps on recoverable damages from the individual defendants and from the PCF.68 I focus on the 
PCF and total damages cap in this Chapter, and examine the review panel process in Chapter 4. 
This section summarizes how the the PCF-Cap system functions, and the historical revisions to 
it.  
Required Coverage and PCF Surcharge 
To be qualified for the protections, health care providers in Indiana are required to carry 
minimum primary coverage, and file the policy with the Indiana Insurance Commissioner.  
During the beginning of the sample period, providers were required to purchase coverage with a 
per occurrence limit of $100,000.  But, since July 1, 1999, providers must purchase coverage 
with a per occurrence limit of $250,000.  Aggregate coverage limits were $500,000 prior to July 
1, 1999, and $750,000 after.  Institutional providers are required to carry policies with higher 
annual aggregate limits. 
Providers are also required to pay a surcharge to help fund the PCF.  Providers may either 
pay a nominal amount (and not qualify for PCF coverage), or pay a percentage of the cost of 
primary coverage – thereby qualifying for payment by the PCF of any amount owed in excess of 
                                                
68 Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-7-1; 24-18-10; 34-18-14; 34-51-2-1.  
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the policy limits.69 Consistent with IDOI usage, I refer to providers that pay these surcharges as 
“qualified” providers. Table 3.1 reviews the historical surcharges statues.   
 
Table 3.1: Historical Surcharge Statues 
Effective  
Year 
Surcharge Amount  
as % of primary coverage cost 
Base of Calculation 
1975 ≤ 10%  individual 
1982 ≤ 25%  individual 
1984 ≤ 50%  individual 
1985 ≤ 75%  individual 
1986 ≤ 100% individual 
1987 ≤ 200%  individual 
1999 = 100%  individual 
2001 % of median specialty class specialty/physician class plan 
 
By law, the amount of surcharges has to be adequate for the payment of claims and 
administrative expenses incurred to the PCF.70 Beginning July 1, 2001, the surcharge rate has 
been determined each year on the Physician Class Plan, a specialty-based rate classification 
system.71 Specialties are divided into nine classes, ranging from the least risky Class 0 to the 
riskiest Class 8. Residents and public health, for example, are Class 0 practicing areas. Internal 
medicine is one of the Class 1 specialty. General surgery is an example of Class 6 specialties. 
Obstetrics-gynecology is among the riskiest Class 8 specialties. A uniform surcharge rate is 
established for all physicians practicing in the same class. Because the current surcharges are 
based on physician specialty only, they are not experience rated. Prior to 2001, the surcharge rate 
was a fixed percentages of individual physicians’ primary insurance premium. But, since primary 
insurance coverage is generally not experience rated either, it is hard to conclude the pre-2001 
surcharges involved experience rating.  
 
                                                
69 Effective July 1, 2017 (P.L. 182–2016 Sec.5), to be qualified, individual providers will be required to be insured 
by a policy “at least the amount specified in IC 34-18-14-3(b) [the provider’s liability limit per occurrence and three 
(3) times that amount in the annual aggregate, …”.] 
70 Ind. Code § 34-15-5-2 (c). 
71 760 IAC 1-60-3. 
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Provider’s liability limit, Total Damage Cap, and Periodic Payments 
The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act creates a bifurcated structure for determining the 
maximum recoveries per injury or death. A negligent health care provider is only liable for their 
policy limits ($100k prior to 1999, and $250k for an injury or death since then).72 If a judgment 
or settlement fixes damages in excess of the limit, then a plaintiff may recover excess damages 
from the PCF, whose per injury liability is further capped – at $400k prior to 1990; $650k from 
1990-1999; and $1M since then.  Thus, the total amount recoverable was $500k from 1975-1990; 
$750k from 1990-1999; and $1.25M from 1999-date. In addition, the PCF also assumes the 
obligation to pay excess amount upon the exhaustion of a provider’s annual aggregate limit.73 
This damage cap applies to all med mal cases, but does not apply to collateral litigation 
expenses, such as post-judgment interest. Figure 3.2 show how these changes affected providers’ 
policy limits, and the PCF’s exposure.   
 
                                                
72 Both the provider’s liability limit and total damages cap apply on per an injury/death basis, as opposed to 
occurrence of malpractice act. Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend (1994), Ind.App., 645 N.E.2d 631. 
(recovery limited to statutory maximum despite plaintiff-child’s claim that two separate acts of malpractices, one act 
occurring during the physician’s prenatal care and one act during the hospital’s postnatal care, combined to cause 
the injury.) But see Haswell v. Kramer, 659 N.E.2d 146. (court found the claim involved two separate injuries, one 
to the baby and one to the mother, which should be litigated separately. The claim pertaining the rupture of the 
mother’s uterus and subsequent sterilization was an injury separate from the death of the baby.) 
73 Ind. Code Ann. § 34-18-6-6(a) (2016). See also Medical Assur. Co., Inc. v. Weinberger, M.D., 973 F. Supp. 2d 
925, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138009, 2013 WL 5407200 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (once the annual aggregate limit was met, 
all further amounts should be paid from the PCF.) 
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Figure 3.2: Provider’s per occurrence liability limit and patients’ total recoverable. 
 
Note: historical and current statutory limits on provider’s liability and total recoverable per injury. Ind. Code Ann. § 
34-18-14-3 (2016). 
     
Payments can be made in a single lump sum, or in a series of period payments over a 
number of years. In 1985, the legislature added provisions defining periodic payment 
agreements, and set a present value threshold for such agreements to meet the liability limit 
(which triggers payment from the PCF for above-limits damages).74 The amendment does not 
apply to claims that were filed earlier.75  For a provider to meet the liability limit with a periodic 
payment agreement, the cost of the periodic payment along with a lump sum to the patient must 
exceed 75% of the applicable liability limit.  
An injured plaintiff thus proceeds first against the health care provider, and then against 
the PCF if entitled to above-limits damages. If the provider settles with the plaintiff and admits 
                                                
74 P.L.179-1985, Sec. 1, Sec.2., eff. June 1, 1985, added the periodic payment provisions. P.L.179-1985, Sec. 5 
provided: “this act does not apply to medical malpractice claims initiated through the filing of a proposed complaint 
under Ind. Code Ann. § 16.9.5-9.1 before June 1, 1985.”  
75 Eakin v. Mitchell-Leech, 557 N.E.2d 1057, 1990 Ind. App. LEXIS 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). (The court 
discussed the use of structured settlement before the enactment of 1985 legislation. The majority read the 1985 
amendment as the threshold did not apply to previously filed claims. The dissenting opinion considered the 1985 
amendments to be “a legislative response permitting such [periodic payment] agreements to permit access to the 
fund for the first time.”) 
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liability, the PCF may not dispute the existence of the injury and/or causation, but may dispute 
the amount that is demanded.76 
Findings 
As noted above, Indiana enacted a comprehensive set of medical malpractice reforms in 
1975, which it revisited several times (by adjusting payout maximum from providers and the 
PCF) in the intervening decades.  What did the Indiana med mal environment look like during 
the post-reform period?77  I begin by showing the med mal premiums over time, and then turn to 
the claiming environment. I conclude by examining the payout distribution.    
Premium and PCF Surcharge Rates 
Commercial insurers have kept coming into Indiana since the 1975 reform. ProAssurance 
and the Medical Protective have long been the two major carriers. They collectively accounted 
for about half of the Indiana market, in terms of premium written. The Pennsylvania Hospital 
Insurance Company (PHICO) insured the vast majority of the commercially insured hospitals in 
Indiana, as it did in many other states, before it left Indiana market and place into liquidation in 
2002 by a Pennsylvanian court due to insolvency. About the same time of the PHICO market-
exist, the Indiana University Health Risk Retention Group started to insure Indiana University 
related providers. In 2014, it wrote about 18% of total premiums in the state. In addition to the 
voluntary commercial market, the Med Mal Act also introduced a residual carrier, Indiana 
Residual Malpractice Insurance Authority (or “IRMIA”), providing coverage for those who have 
been declined by at least two commercial insurers.78 The commercial and the residual carriers 
collectively ensure the coverage availability in the state. 
I begin by examining med mal premiums, since they represent a high-profile signal for 
many physicians and the general public about the cost of the med mal system. I rely first on 
                                                
76 Robertson v. B.O., 977 N.E.2d 341, 2012 Ind. LEXIS 894, 2012 WL 5358870 (Ind. 2012). (In a medical 
malpractice claim for a birth injury, the providers settled for a sum allowing the patient to seek excess damages from 
the PCF. The PCF disclosed five expert witnesses testifying that either the plaintiff did not have the alleged medical 
condition or that if he did, it did not result from the conduct of the providers. The court hold that the PCF is 
precluded from disputing the existence or cause of the claimed injury.) 
77 No data is available on the pre-reform period, so I am unable to do a pre- v. post-reform comparison.  
78 Ind. Code  34-18-17-1. See also http://iuhrrg.com/irmia.  
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Medical Liability Monitor (MLM) for evidence on the cost of coverage.  MLM published rates 
for ProAssurance from 1993 to date.79 MLM separately reports premiums for three specialties—
obstetrics-gynecology, general surgery, and internal medicine. In most of the years, 
ProAssurance rates were the higher/highest among the Indiana carriers that responded to the 
MLM survey. ProAssurance offered lower (about 37% lower) rates than the Medical Protective.80  
 In most of the covered years, MLM reports premiums for two rating areas: Lake + Porter 
counties; and the rest of Indiana.81 The rate difference between Lake + Porter counties and the 
rest of Indiana increased over time. In 1993, the Lake + Porter premium rate was 27% higher 
than the rest of Indiana, increasing to 40% higher in 1998, and 50% higher since 2005.    
In all but 1998-2002, MLM also collected PCF surcharge rates. Historical surcharge rates 
are also available in Insurance Bulletins published by the IDOI. In nine of the years in which 
MLM reported surcharge rates, the MLM rates are equal to the ones published/recommended by 
IDOI; in seven years, the MLM surcharges are slightly lower than the IDOI rates. Thus, the 
MLM-reported surcharge rates are mostly accurate. Figure 3.3 presents information on the total 
cost of coverage (premium charged by ProAssurance + PCF surcharges) for all three specialties 
for Lake + Porter Counties, the rating area with the highest rates in Indiana.  
 
                                                
79 Also known as Medical Assurance, and formerly known as Physicians Insurance Company of Indiana. In 2010, 
ProAssurance accounted for roughly 24% of the premium dollars collected by commercial carriers in Indiana and 
was the 2nd largest commercial carrier judged by premium dollars.   
80 MLM did not report the Medical Protective rates in ealier years.  
81 Lake county includes Gary, Indiana. Porter county is immediately to the east of Lake County. Both Lake and 
Porter counties are at the Northwestern border of Indiana, adjoining Chicago, Illinois.  
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Figure 3.3: Total cost of coverage (2015$), 1993-2015. 
 
Note: Total cost of coverage for selected specialties for 1994-2015, in 2015 dollars. Total cost of coverage = 
ProAssurance premium rates + PCF surcharges. Premium and surcharge rates from Medical Liability Monitor 
(MLM), Lake + Porter County claims-made rates. Surcharges in 1998-2001 not available from MLM. Rates 1999 
used MLM premium rates and surcharges published by IDOI.  
 
As Figure 3.3 shows, that premiums and surcharges for the three specialties moved 
together, suggesting that they were driven by non-specialty specific factors. The rates started an 
increase around 2000. Part of the increase was likely attributable to the rise in required coverage 
from 100k to 250k in 1999. Carriers increased their premiums around 1999, reflecting the higher 
coverage requirements. But, many other states also experience premium spikes around the same 
time, according the the MLM data (see Black et al. forthcoming). How much of the early 2000s 
increase was Indiana-specific is not clear. The rates peaked in 2006, and then trended 
downwards. High-risk specialties experienced the highest percentage increases.  
In unreported analysis, I also used premiums and surcharges reported to PCF to measure 
the cost of coverage for all counties in Indiana over time.82 The PCF premiums and surcharges 
data extends back to to 1975, but is more reliable from 1987 and on. The state average rates were 
lower than the Lake + Porter rates reported to MLM in all years. The rates remained almost flat 
                                                
82 See Figure A.1 in Appendix. There are three reasons for reporting MLM data (Lake + Porter only) in the text. 
First, a large share of the Indiana physician population practice in Lake and Porter during the study period, which 
makes this rate generally representative. Second, Lake + Porter is the higher (of the two) rating area in Indiana. By 
using this higher premium rate, I avoid under-claiming the magnitude of the premium spike or med mal crisis. Third, 
other studies use MLM data for studying malpractice premiums across states. For all these reasons, I concluded an 
MLM-based analysis would be helpful in comparing Indiana to other states. 
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with a slightly downward trend until 1999, after which they started a sustained increase, peaked 
around 2006, trended downward until 2013, and leveled off. By 2011, rates for various 
specialties were back to the same rates in the 1990s (before the increase), and from 2013, the 
rates (for high-risk specialties) has been the lowest rates since the 1987.  The mini-spike in MLM 
reported Lake + Porter rates was not observed in PCF-all counties rates.  
It is clear from both the Lake + Porter and the all-counties rates, Indiana premium rates 
declined during the 1990s with a low point in 1999, and increased since the early 2000s with the 
spike in 2006, and trended downward thereafter. In the next section, I turn to the med mal claim 
rates in the state, to examine whether there were similar trends in the med mal litigation or to 
help explaining the falls and spikes in insurance premiums.  
Case Filing 
Because Indiana’s data covers both paid and unpaid cases, I am able to study the time 
trends for the overall filing. Figure 3.4 provides the trends in the number of med mal cases filed 
per year from 1976 to 2014 – unadjusted, adjusted for population, and adjusted for the number of 
active physicians. The unadjusted figure is unlikely to be a sensible measure of the claiming 
environment, because claim frequency is affected by both population and the number of 
practicing physicians. During my sample period, the number of physicians in Indiana grew much 
fast than the population (150% increase v. 21%). The growth in physician supply likely led to 
greater use of health care services per person, which, in turn, may generate physician-patient 
encounter and more med mal claims. Thus, controlling for growth in the number of physicians is 
likely a better adjustment than controlling for population growth.  
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Figure 3.4: Number of cases filed per year, 1976-2014.  
 
Note: Number of med mal cases filed against Indiana health care providers per year, in unadjusted, population 
adjusted, and number of non-federal physicians adjusted numbers.  
 
The top line in Figure 3.4 shows the unadjusted number of cases filed, which was 
generally rising from 1976-2004; declined and stabilized at a lower level from 2007-2011; and 
rebounded somewhat from 2012-2014. The same trends are apparent controlling for the 
population growth.   
But, when I adjusted for physician supply, the number of cases filed remains fairly stable 
from 1986-2004, after which it drops, only to rebound slightly in 2013.  At this point, it is 
impossible to tell whether the rebound that started in 2013 is a temporary fluctuation or the 
beginning of a trend. The physician-adjusted claim rates presented here is an overestimated, 
because the PCF data include claims against all provider types –not limited to physicians.     
Closer examination of the data reveals that three defendants were responsible for the 
filing of hundreds of med mal cases -  creating mini-spikes in Figure 3.4.  Dr. Mark Weinberger 
was sued in 221 separate filings in 2004 and another 130 in 2005.  Dr. Diane Crowley was sued 
in 152 separate complaints in 2013.  Orthopedic & Sports Medicine Center had 96 cases filed 
against it in 2014.  I provide in Appendix Figure A.3, where I treat all cases filed against each of 
these three defendants in a given year as a single consolidated case. Eliminating the spikes 
attributable to these three providers smooths out the 2004 peak and shrinks the 2013 spike.  
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Figure A.3 makes it clear that the number of case filings (controlling for physician 
supply) in Indiana has been dropping since 2001 by filing year. Paik, Black, and Hyman (2013) 
find a similar receding trend in lawsuit rate nationwide.  
There are at lest two possible explanations for the low filing rate before 1986 and the 
increase in 1986. It is possible that number of cases filed before 1986 was as low as my data 
captured. But, it is also possible that the IDOI experienced under-reporting in the early years. To 
address the second possibility, for results based on all years, I provide alternative analysis 
excluding those cases that were filed before 1986 in Appendix Section X. I keep the results using 
entire study period (1975-2014) in the main text. 
There are 1,948 (8.73% of the 22,304 closed cases) cases filed before 1986. The 
remaining 20,356 (91.27%) closed cases were filed in or after 1986. The results are essentially 
the same as the ones using the entire study period.  
Payout Rate 
I now turn to payout rate, or the proportion of cases closed with positive payouts. For 
purpose of payout rate analysis, I include only closed cases. How many cases ultimately resulted 
in payments to plaintiffs, by the defendant, or the defendant plus the PCF? Over the fill sample 
period,  30% of cases close with payment – 12% with payment only by the defendant, and 18% 
with payment from both the defendant and the PCF.83 To what extent do these patterns change 
over time?  Figure 3.5 shows the time trends in payout rates and sources by filing year.84   
 
                                                
83 Primary insurers will almost invariably make the actual payment on behalf of the defendant. I use “defendant” 
here as a generic term for the defense side. 
84 All cases included are closed cases. Filing year is the year in which the now closed case was filed.  
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Figure 3.5: Payout rate of closed cases by injury year, 1977-2015. 
 
Note: Payout rate by injury years in five-year increments, closed cases only. PCF payment threshold changed from 
$100,000 to $250,000 in year 1999.  
 
As Figure 3.5 shows, the overall paid rate (the percentage of cases closed with positive 
payments) started a slow but steady decrease from the mid-1980s, reaching its low point around 
2002, and then rebounded. Percentages of cases that closed with PCF payout dropped until 1986 
and remain stable with a slight upward trend, trended downwards from 1999, then rebounded 
since 2005 until the end of the data period. 
The higher PCF payout rate in the most recent period of 2010-2014 likely reflects a 
selection effect. That is, cases with clear liability tend to be resolved faster; whereas case at the 
boarder line of liability, usually take longer time.  
Table 3.2 also provides information on paid rates, but stratified on the number of 
defendants. Physicians and tort reformers complain about “shotgun lawsuits,” where plaintiffs’ 
lawyers sue everyone whose name appears in the medical record. Table 3.2 turns to this by 
showing the distribution of cases by the number of named defendants.  
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Table 3.2: Number of Named Defendants by Case Outcome, 1975-2014 
Number of % of All Payout Rate 
Named 
Defendants 
Closed 
Cases  Unpaid % Defendant Payout only % 
Defendant + PCF 
 %   
1 34% 35% 40% 25% 
2 27% 28% 25% 23% 
3 16% 16% 14% 19% 
4 9% 9% 10% 13% 
5-10 12% 11% 10% 19% 
11+ 1% 1% 1% 2% 
Missing 0% 0.1% 0% 0.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 22,304 15,596 2,657 4,051 
Note: Named defendants per case, number of and percentage of closed cases; and pay rate by number of defendants.  
Closed cases only. unpaid=closed with zero payment. Defendant payout only= closed with defendant, but zero PCF 
payout. Both payouts=closed with both defendant payout and PCF excessive damages.  
 
Table 3.2 shows that, 77% of the closed cases involved no more than three named 
defendants. Unpaid and smaller payment (i.e., defendant payment only) had similar distributions. 
By comparison, fewer PCF cases involved only one defendant, and more involved two or more 
defendants. Some of the larger payment cases involve complex facts, and hence more potentially 
liable providers. Some of the defendants in those cases were named at first, but dismissed or 
exonerated.   
Do paid rates differ across various defendant types or configurations? The PCF database 
includes various individual and organizational providers. Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of all 
possible defendant configurations and the payout rate. I lack reliable mechanisms to identify 
which providers are physicians. My best approach is to use the PCF surcharge rating class, and 
assume every provider who paid according to “physician class plan” rates were physicians. I 
categorize hospitals, nursing homes, and psychiatric hospitals as “institutions.” The remainder 
are “ancillary providers.” 
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Table 3.3: Payout Rates by Defendant Types, 1975-2014  
Defendant 
Configuration 
    Payout Rate   
% of all  
closed cases 
Unpaid 
 % 
Defendant 
only % 
Both  
payouts % 
Physician Only 24% 76% 11% 13% 
Physician + Ancillary 20% 61% 11% 28% 
Physician + Ancillary + Institution 18% 74% 10% 16% 
Physician + Institution 15% 66% 11% 23% 
Ancillary Only 11% 77% 15% 8% 
Institution Only 7% 61% 20% 20% 
Ancillary + Institution 4% 70% 15% 15% 
Other 0% 67% 0% 33% 
Total N=22,304 70% 12% 18% 
Note: Payout rates by defendant type and configuration. “Ancillary” providers are all health care providers except 
physicians, nursing homes, hospitals, and psychiatric hospitals. 760 IAC 1-21-2(1). “Other” are those cases where 
defendant types are unknown. Institutions include hospitals and nursing homes. Provider are identified to be 
physicians if they have a ISO matched with physician specialties; or have a matched MD/DO license in Indiana 
licensing system.  
 
As Table 3.3 reflects, the vast majority of cases involved physicians. Those cases 
accounted for 77% of all closed cases, or 78% of all paid cases. Three types of configuration are 
associated with higher payout rate, and higher PCF excessive payout rate: physician + ancillary, 
physician + institution, and institution Only. On the other end, physician only and ancillary only 
cases are less often paid, and even less often trigger PCF payment. 
Payout Amounts  
Table 3.4 shows the distribution of cases by range of total plaintiff recoveries in real 2015 
dollars.  
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Table 3.4: Total Payout Distribution of All Closed Cases (2015$), 1975-2014 
Payout Range Number of 
cases 
% of cases % of paid 
cases 
Total 
Payout 
(millions) 
% of Total 
Payout 
$0  15,596 70% N/A N/A N/A 
$1-100,000 2,324 10% 35% 78 2% 
$100,001-500,000 841 4% 13% 231 6% 
$500,001-1,000,000 1,990 9% 30% 1,600 42% 
$1,000,001-1,250,000 875 4% 13% 963 25% 
$1,250,001+ 678 3% 10% 942 25% 
Total 22,304 100% 100% 3,820 100% 
Note: adjusted for inflation using closing year of the case. Payout with structured settlements were treated as 
payments at provider limit plus PCF payments. 
 
As Table 3.4 shows, small claims account for a large proportion of all claims, but large 
claims dominate total spending. Cases with payment under $100,000 accounted for 37% of paid 
cases, but only 3% of payout dollars. Conversely, larger payment cases with over one million 
payments accounted for only 12% of paid cases, but 27% of payout dollars. 
How much of the payout was made by the primary insurer on behalf of physicians? How 
did the provider liability limit and the required primary coverage affects the insurers’ payout 
behaviors? Using the instrument developed by Zeiler et al. (2007) in a study on physician’s 
policy limit, I explored this issue by calculating the payment-to-limit ratio (“PTL”).  
The PTL ratio here reflects the relationship between case level defendant payments and 
the statutory provider liability limit. An at-limit defendant payment produces a PTL ratio of 1. 
Plaintiffs may get access to PCF payments only if defendant payment exceeds the liability limit; 
however, since I am (for the moment) focusing only on defendant payments, Figure 3.5 does not 
include any payments made by the PCF.   
Since 1985, a defendant can use a structured settlement to trigger coverage by the PCF, 
as long as the immediate payment plus the cost of purchasing a periodic payment agreement 
from a third-party is at least 75% of the liability limit (i.e., PTL=0.75), with the future value of 
100% of the liability limit.  
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of defendant PTL ratios for all cases closed with 
defendant payouts (N=6,708). Payout amounts were not adjusted for inflation, as the provider’s 
liability limit, by law, was not indexed for inflation either. I divide the data into three distinct 
time periods: 1975-1985 (i.e., policy limits of $100k, and before the structured settlement rule 
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went into effect); 1985-1999 (policy limits of $100k and structured settlement rule in effect); and 
1999-date (policy limits of $250k and structured settlement rule in effect). Figure 3.6 shows the 
PTL distributions in each of these three periods.   
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Figure 3.6: Defendant payout to liability limit ratio in paid cases, nominal $, 1975-2014. 
 
Note: Defendant Payout-to-Limit Ratio= total defendant(s) payment in a case / provider’s liability limit. Part A, B, 
and C are collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Underlying defendant payments were not adjusted for 
inflation. A 1.0 PTL during periods covered by Part A and B = $100K (nominal); 1.0 PTL in Part C = $250K 
(nominal). Total paid cases = 6,708. Cases with positive PCF payment but missing defendant payout were imputed 
with a 1.0 PTL.  
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The spikes at and around 1 are obvious in all three periods. There are also peaks at PTL 
0.7-0.8 in the later two periods. The percentage of case at PTL 0.7-0.8 increased over time. 
Examination of the ultimate payout amount of these cases confirms that virtually all of them 
resulted in additional PCF payout, suggesting that these cases were periodic payments with 
future values that exceeded the liability limit (as opposed to defendant payments that happened 
to be around 0.7-0.8 times of the liability limit amount).  
Thus, the actual recovered amounts for injuries in both 0.7- and the 1.0- bins were at-
policy-limit payments. The PTL 0.7-0.8 spikes in Part B and C show that defendants use period 
payment in 32%-39% of at-policy-limit cases. 
 The two bins collectively accounted for 53% in Part A period, 58% in Part B, and 64% 
in Part C, reflecting percentage of paid cases resulted in at-policy-limit payouts. The proportion 
of cases near or at limit defendant payout increased over time. Smaller payout cases decreased 
over time. Cases with less than 0.1 PTL ratio dropped from 45% of the paid cases in Period 1 to 
32% in period 2, and than to 28% in period 3.  
An at-policy-limit defendant settlement allows the plaintiff to seek above-limit PCF 
payouts. How many paid cases ultimately resulted in PCF payouts?85 How many of the PCF 
cases reached the total damages cap? Figure 3.6 displays the Payout-to-Cap ratios for all paid 
cases, where Payout includes both defendant and PCF payouts and Cap refers to the total 
damages cap. Cases with periodic payments (i.e., PTL 0.7-0.8 but positive PCF settlement 
amounts) were imputed with provider policy/liability limit plus PCF payout amounts. Similar to 
Figure 3.6, I divide the data into three distinct time periods, reflecting different policy limits 
required and cap amounts.  
                                                
85 Cases closed with 1.0 PTL (i.e., defendants paid at limit, and triggered PCF payouts), and 0.7-0.8 PTL (i.e., 
defendants also paid at limit, but used period payments) are those “resulted in PCF payouts.” 
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Figure 3.7: Total payout-to-cap ratio, 1975-2014. 
 
Note: Total payout (defendant and PCF) to total damages cap ratio. Cases with less than 1.0 PTL but positive PCF 
payment (i.e., structured settlement cases) were imputed with 1.0 PTL plus PCF payment. A few cases were paid 
with above-cap amounts. The two most plausible causes for above-cap amounts are (a) malpractice acts involving 
two or more injuries (e.g., obstetrics error caused the rupture of the mother’s uterus and the death of the baby); and 
(b) reporting or data entering errors. See also footnote 73.  
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Two trends emerge from Figure 3.7. First, percentage of paid cases with less then 0.1 
PTC ratios fell over time: from 45% of all paid cases in Period 1 (1975-1989), to 32% in Period 
2 (1990-1999), and then to 28% in Period 3 (1999-). Because the cap amount increased over the 
three periods, the PTC 0.1 in Period 1 is lower than PTL 0.1 in Period 2, and in Period 3 in 
nominal dollar. Thus, the real decrease in number of small cases is likely greater. 
Second, large case (e.g., those with greater than 0.8 PTC ratios) increased over time – 
accounted for 32.3% of the paid cases in period 1, 42.7% in period 2, and 44.4% in period 3. In 
terms of dollar amounts, cases closed with over 0.8 PTC accounted for a large proportion of the 
payout dollars. Specifically, 71.5% of the payout dollars in period 1, 74.8% in period 2, and 76% 
in period 3 fell into these bins. 
I now turn to the time trends of mean payout per paid claim. Figure 3.8 displays the 
payouts (defendant + PCF) trends in real 2015 based on injury years. The two vertical dash lines 
represent the changes in provider limit and total damages cap.  
 
Figure 3.8: Total payout (insurer + PCF) per paid case, all cases closed with payments. 
 
Note: Cases resulted in PCF payment but with below-provider-limit (mostly, structured settlement) treated as 
provider-limit plus PCF payment. total payout to total damages cap ratio<=1 were winsorized. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows an overall upward trend in average payouts increased over time. Mean 
payout dollars of all paid case raised from $402k (2015$) in period 1 to $560k in period 2 to 
776k in period 3. Similarly, median payouts increased from $181k to $665k to 939k.  
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Because neither the provider liability limit nor the total damage caps were indexed for 
inflation, the real value of payments decreased prior to the effective date of new caps. The 
decrease in real value would be even more obvious if payments are adjusted for inflation in the 
cost of medical services (which is an important component of economic damages).  
 
Figure 3.9:  Total payout (insurer + PCF) per large cases (≥$250,000 in 2015 dollar). 
 
Note: Cases closed with greater than or equal to $250,000 in 2015 dollar. The vertical lines represent the effective 
dates of new cap structures. 
 
Figure 3.9 focuses on cases with larger payouts (≥$250k in 2015$). It shows that, 
following each increase in the total damages cap, payments in large cases increased, and 
stabilized at a higher level. This is unsurprising, since defendants in 60% of paid cases were 
already at their policy limits, entitling plaintiffs to tap the PCF for above-limits damages.  And a 
majority of those cases were ultimately paid with near or at cap amounts. As a robustness check, 
I re-ran the analysis using a cut-off of $100k and $500K for cases with larger payouts and 
obtained similar results.   
Figure 3.9 also shows that the annual median payments were always higher than the 
means for large payout cases, and the difference appears to grow over time. It suggests that the 
underlying distribution of payouts are skewed, with (increasingly) more near- or –at cap 
payments and fewer smaller (i.e., closer to the $250k cut-off) ones.   
0
250,000
500,000
750,000
1,000,000
1,250,000
1,500,000
1,750,000
to
ta
l p
ay
ou
t (
20
15
$)
197
5
197
7
197
9
198
1
198
3
198
5
198
7
198
9
199
1
199
3
199
5
199
7
199
9
200
1
200
3
200
5
200
7
200
9 2011 201
3
201
5
injury year
total payout  (≥ 250K only)
locally weighted regression smoothing annual mean (≥ 250K only) annual median (≥ 250K only)
  
63 
I now turn to per physician rate of paid cases and payout amounts. Per physician rate is 
an appropriate measure of financial impact of med mal liability on physicians, and is therefore 
most relevant for predicting med mal insurance premium. Figure 3.10 shows these trends from 
1980 – 2006, there is no reported paid claims before 1980. The figure ends at 2006, because the 
closing rate drops after that point. Year 2006 close rate (closed cases over all cases filed in a 
year) is 84%. Since many cases filed after 2006 are not close yet, per physician payout dollars 
may appear to lower than they truly are.  
 
Figure 3.10: Number of paid cases and payout amounts (defendant + PCF) per physician, 1980-
2006. 
 
Note: Number of cases closed with positive payouts, and payout amounts. Closed cases only. Filed year refers to the 
year in which the now closed case was filed.  
 
As Figure 3.10 reflects, the number of paid cases per physician increased from from 1980 
to 1985, trended downwards, and started a steady drop since 1995 based on filing year. Payout 
(defendant + PCF) per physician had more fluctuations, it increased until 1985, dropped during 
1985 -1987, increased and settled at a higher level during 1992-2002, spiked at 2001, and then 
started a sustained decrease until the end of the data period.  
I conclude by showing the case mix and annual total payout amounts of PCF in Figure 
3.11. I rely on data from PCF annual reports to generate the figure. Only 2002-2015 data are 
available.  
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Figure 3.11: Number of PCF cases and total annual payment (2015$), 2002-2015. 
 
Note: cause of action and total payout amounts of PCF cases by year. PCF cases = cases that triggered PCF 
payments. Payout amounts are in real 2015$. Data from PCF annual reports.  
 
Figure 3.11 shows that the number of cases triggered PCF payment and the case-mix 
remained reasonably stable during 2002 -2015 data period, with the exception of 2013. The 
spikes in 2013 were caused by hundreds of Fund payments made on behalf of Dr. Mark 
Weinberger, as discussed above in Section IV B. Most PCF cases involved injuries or death of 
adults. Only a small fraction was brought on behalf of children. Personal injury cases 
outnumbered wrongful death cases. The PCF total annual payouts dropped from 2002-2007, and 
then increased and settled at a higher level, which a Dr. Weinberger spike in 2013.  
Discussion 
Post-reform Med Mal Litigation Trend  
According to a state governmental report, Indiana experienced a med mal insurance crisis 
in the mid-1970s, to lead to the reform in 1975. The study attributed the insurance crisis to the 
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increasing number of med mal claims filed, and the larger average damages awarded.86 I lack 
pre-reform data, but the PCF database dated from 1975 allow me to study Indiana’s med mal 
environment during the past forty years. 
Per physician rate of claims, paid claims, and payouts are most relevant if one is 
concerned with the financial impact of med mal liability on physicians. The first decade after the 
reform appears to be a ramp-up period for both lawsuit rate and per physician rate of paid cases 
and payout amounts. But, since 1986, both the number of physicians and insurers have been 
increasing steadily. Per physician rate of lawsuit remained stable between 1986-2001, and then 
started to drop. The number of paid cases per physician fluctuated during 1986 -1995, and started 
a sustained downward trend to the end of my study period. Thus, it is fair to conclude that there 
was no med mal litigation crisis in Indiana after 1986.  
Cost of Insurance Does Not Mirror Litigation Trend 
Available insurance data show a clear increase started in 2001, peaked around 2006, 
trended downwards thereafter. The data expend back to 1987, and show no obvious fluctuation 
prior to the 2001 increase, except a low point in 1999. However, neither the 2006 spike (started 
in 2001) nor the 1999 low (started 1997) mirror the litigation trend. When the cost of coverage 
rose in 2001, the payout per physician was in a steep drop. When cost of coverage started 
dropping in 1997 and bottomed out in 1999, the payout per physician was in one of its historical 
high point. This is not the connection that one expects to see if liability system is the cause of 
premium spike.  
The weak link between the liability claim rates and the premiums increases is reported in 
other state studies and national studies, as discussed in Section II. Legislators who are interested 
in understanding the premium fluctuations in the med mal insurance market may want to look for 
explanations external to the liability system, perhaps in the insurance business practice or 
economics trends (See Baker 2005a; 2005b).  
                                                
86 According to the study of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Study Commission reported that between 1970 and 
1975, the frequency of claim sf filed against physicians had increased by percent, and the average damages award 
had increased from $12,993 to $34,297; and that the premiums increased by 410 percent, 7 of the 10 primary med 
mal insurance companies in Indiana stopped writing new policies, or limited their new business and their liability. 
As a result, many physicians were left with inadequate malpractice insurance coverage, or no coverage at all (Bowen 
1984, 15; United States General Accounting Office 1986, 8). 
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Near- and At- Cap Cases Dominate Payout Dollars 
Some Indiana-specific factors likely also have contributed to the litigation trends. Indiana 
has an unusual combination of low primary policy limits ($250k in 2015) and a PCF that funds 
payouts up to a total damages cap of $1.25M.  How does this combination affect payouts in paid 
cases?   
Near and at cap cases dominate payout dollar. Small payouts make up a bulk of cases, but 
account for a small proportion of payout dollars. This disproportionate distribution is reported by 
other state studies as well (e.g. Black et al. 2005). About 30% of med mal cases close with a 
positive payout, and about 40% of the paid cases were ultimately paid with near-cap amounts 
(i.e., greater than or equal to 0.8 PTC). Those cases accounted for fully 75% of the payout 
dollars.  
Partly because this sizeable portion of cases were paid near or at the cap, every legislative 
revision of the cap structure so far has had an almost immediate effect on the average payment in 
all cases, and especially so in larger payout cases. A new legislation effective from July 1, 2017 
will increase the primary insurers’ exposure and the total damages cap for the third time, with a 
fourth revision scheduled. Whether this pattern of discontinuity where the typical payout in large 
cases tends to “dump up” against the cap (Gronfein and Kinney 1991) persists is remain to be 
seen.  
The payout distribution also changed over time, reflecting the changing proportion of 
small v. large claims. Over time, the percentage of small payout case of all paid cases keep 
dropping, while proportion of PCF cases (large payout cases) is generally increasing. The 
disappearance of small claims is observed nationwide (e.g., Paik, Black, and Hyman 2013). But 
the number of large paid claims are trending downwards elsewhere, with no obvious time trend 
in average payout in large paid claims (Paik, Black, and Hyman 2013). By comparison, 
percentages of large paid claims and average payout per large claims (both mean and media) are 
generally increasing. But these increasing is probably attributable to the historical low total 
damages cap, and the periodical revisions in the cap amount.  
 
A Few Outliers Can Affect the System Greatly 
Weinberger, a former ear, nose and throat doctor, triggered 351 malpractice claims 
arising from unnecessary surgeries during 2004 and 2005; Dr. Crowley produced 152 
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inappropriate prescription related malpractice claims in 2013; and the orthopedic and Sports 
Medicine Center of Northern Indiana had 96 contaminated epidural injection claims filed against 
it in 2014. These repeat players created “mini-spikes” in case filings; and at least in the case of 
Dr. Weinberger, dramatic increase in payout dollars as well.  
The PCF has/should have a high stake in outlier cases, since the Fund assume the liability 
to pay in place of primary insurer upon the exhaustion of the annual aggregate limit. In fact, 
when the majority of Weinberger cases were settled in 2013, total PCF payout amount spiked to 
$180,000,000 (2015$) by a 29% increase from 2012 payout year. The Weinberger payments also 
created a low point in PCF balance. And because the Fund was financed on a “pay as you go” 
basis (which means the surcharges are calculated and charged to pay for the current year claims 
without significant reserve for the future), the PCF need more funding in year 2013 and the years 
followed. This may partly explain the increase in PCF surcharge, but not premium, starting 2013.  
The numerous claims and elevated PCF payouts was just a part of the dramatic Dr. 
Weinberger story. Weinberger, a class of 1989 graduate of UCLA Medical School, was first 
licensed in 1990 by the California Board. He subsequently relocated to Indiana, and was licensed 
by endorsement in 1996. 87 “[His] conduct began to catch up with Weinberger in June 2004, 
when patients began filing Proposed Complaints for medical malpractice against him with the 
Indiana Department of Insurance.” However, in September 2004, Weinberger “vanished during a 
family vacation in Greece telling family members they would have to return to the United States 
on their own,” and went on the lam for several years.88 “A court-ordered receivership ha[d] been 
authorized … in order to satisfy over $5.7 million in unpaid claims.’” 
On October 2004, the state Attorney General filed with the state Medical Licensing 
Board a petition for summary suspension, which was granted two months later. The formal 
complaint was filed in January 2005. The Board revoked Weinberger’s license by default three 
                                                
87 California Board license verifying available at 
https://www.breeze.ca.gov/datamart/searchLicTypeByName.do?direct=true  
88 Indiana Licensing Board actions and documents available online at 
http://www.in.gov/apps/pla/litigation/searchresults.aspx?mode=adv ; California Board documents available at 
http://www2.mbc.ca.gov/BreezePDL/document.aspx?path=%5cDIDOCS%5c20150317%5cDMRAAAEY4%5c&di
d=AAAEY150317184445620.DID&licenseType=G&licenseNumber=69777#page=1 .  
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months later. 89 With in two years, Weinberger’s licenses in Illinois and California were also 
revoked. 
After a “high-profile manhunt,” Weinberger was discovered “camping in deep snow in 
the Italian Alps” in December 2009, and was arrested and “sentenced to prison.” In paying his 
malpractice claims, Weinberger’s insurer ProAssurance, exhausted his annual aggregate limit, 
and the PCF had to pay.  
Indiana is not the only PCF whose financing was shocked by a few outliers. Nebraska’s 
fund was put in jeopardy because of 80 lawsuits filed against one doctor over a hepatitis C 
outbreak allegedly caused by unsanitary conditions (Connecticut Office of Legislative Research 
2003b, 1). They are clearly outliers of the medical profession, but their cases raise several 
important questions, which I address below. 
Bad Apples, Bad Barrels, or Both?  
My findings clearly indicate that there are bad apples, who are responsible for a heavily 
disproportionate share of paid med mal claims. The obvious question is what, if anything, the 
med mal system should do about that. Should the commercial insurer, who had Weinberger’s 
claim records, employ a partly experience rated system, or even stop insuring him? If they did 
so, he would likely end up covered by Indiana’s residual insurer – paying a higher rate, but still 
practicing medicine.  Clearly, the existing med mal system has at best an under-powered 
response to this problem. Perhaps the Licensing Board, who supposedly had verified 
Weinberger’s competency upon licensure endorsement and biannual renewals, should step up to 
the plate?  Certainly, the medical review panels, who evaluated claims against Dr. Weinberger 
were well situated to alert the Licensing Board.  And, only the Licensing Board can yank Dr. 
Weinberger’s license to practice medicine.    
I explore each of these possibilities below. Chapter 4 focuses on the medical review 
panel. Chapter 5 analyzes the licensing and disciplinary process. Chapter 6 focuses on the 
interplay between the med mal system and the state licensure system. 
                                                
89 Finding of Facts and Order on Weinberger’s license, p2, available at 
http://www.in.gov/apps/pla/litigation/viewer.aspx?id=19882 . 
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Finally, we should not ignore the reality that even if there are outliers involving 
physicians like Dr. Weinberger, there are also quality problems with many other physicians and 
other health care providers that never come to the attention of the med mal system.   
Conclusion 
Using 40 years of data, I show in this chapter that after the 1975 reform and a ramp-up 
period of 1975-1986. I find no med mal litigation crisis in Indiana after 1986. Per physician rate 
of lawsuit remained stable between 1986-2001, and then started to drop. The number of paid 
cases per physician fluctuated during 1986 -1995, and started a sustained downward trend to the 
end of my study period. 
The cost of med mal insurance spiked in 2006. I find no litigation trends to help explain 
either this insurance increase, or the late 1990s decrease. When the cost of coverage rose in 
2001, the payout per physician was in a steep drop. When cost of coverage started dropping in 
1997 and bottomed out in 1999, the payout per physician was in one of its historical high point. 
The litigation trends and the lack of connection between the claim rate trends and premium 
spikes are consistent with other state cases studies and national studies. 
Similar to what has been reported in other jurisdictions, 30% of filed med mal cases 
ultimately closed with positive payout in Indiana. An unusually high 40% of the paid cases 
closed with at greater than or equal to 80% of the damage cap amount payment. Mean payouts 
trended upward over time, with discontinuities when the total damage cap was revised upwards 
in 1990 and 1999. The increase in mean payout reflects the drop of small claims.  
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CHAPTER 4: MEDICAL REVIEW PANEL IN INDIANA 
 
In 1975, Indiana adopted medical review panels to evaluate the merits of med mal cases.  
Panels were to be staffed by 3 health care providers, and chaired by a lawyer.  In this chapter, I 
examine the performance of Indiana’s medical review panels over time.  More than 70% of the 
22,304 med mal cases resolved in Indiana in the past four decades were reviewed by these 
panels.  I show that case outcomes generally tracked the findings of the medical review panel.  
When the panel found there was malpractice, payment was much more likely than when it found 
there was no malpractice (78% versus 14%).  On average, cases that went through the medical 
review panel process took longer to resolve.  Duration of panel cases shortened over time, but 
non-panel case showed an even larger drop. The shortened duration of panel cases can almost be 
entirely explained by the shorter delay between panel opinion and case closure, rather than the 
time taken by panel procedure itself.   Many providers served on medical review panels, but 
repeat players were rare, except in highly specialized areas. Panelists who served on 30 or more 
panels found malpractice were less likely to find malpractice than all panelists.   
Introduction 
In response to the med mal crises that hit the United States during the 1970s and 1980s, 
31 states enacted medical review panels.  These panels were intended to discourage the filing of 
weak claims, and encourage early settlement, thereby lowering defense costs and med mal 
premiums.  After several years of experience, 11 states repealed their medical review panels. 
(Struve 2003, 58)  However, Indiana has had a medical review panel for the past 40 years.  This 
chapter examines the performance of Indiana’s medical review panels over this extended time 
period.   
I show that more than 70% of the med mal cases closed during the past four decades were 
reviewed by panels. 83% of the paid cases and 87% of the cases that triggered PCF excess 
payments were panel cases. Panels found malpractice in 15% of the cases they evaluated, 
compared to 49% where they found no malpractice.  The remaining 36% of cases were resolved 
in various ways, including settlement, or a split decision on liability. Payout rates generally 
tracked panel findings. When the medical review panel found malpractice (which it did in 15% 
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of the reviewed cases), the likelihood of payment was 78%.  Conversely, when the medical 
review panel found there was no malpractice, the likelihood of payment was only 14%.  
Panel cases, on average, took longer from filing to closing than non-panel cases. The 
average duration of panel cases dropped significantly (from 6.6 to 4.8 years) following a 1998 
legislation (effective 1999) enabling parties to conduct discovery and to file a lawsuit while the 
case was under review by the panel. Non-panel cases, which should not have been directly 
affected by the legislation, showed an even larger drop in mean duration (from 6.1 to 2.9 years).  
Half of the panelists in my dataset only served on one panel. Very few panelists served 
on multiple panels, but when they were, they tended to be in more specialized areas, such as 
surgery and obstetrics and gynecology. Unsurprisingly, panelists who served on multiple panels 
had been practicing longer, and tended to have been sued themselves. I also show that repeat 
panelists were less likely to find malpractice than one-shot panelists. 
This chapter proceed as follows. Section II reviews the few existing studies on review 
panels. Section III describes the legal environment and changes in the law over time, and 
summarizes the data used in the chapter. Section IV analyzes the panel review process and case 
duration; panel composition; panel opinions; and payout rates. Section V discusses some 
implications of the findings. Section VI concludes.   
Literature Review 
Despite their political appeal, academic studies rarely found significant effects associated 
with adding medical review panels to the existing framework for handling med mal claims.90 
Struve (2003) extensively reviewed theory and actual experience in states that adopted medical 
review panels, and noted that most of empirical examinations on review panels were dated. 
Mello (2006) found that earlier studies using more reliable methods found no significant 
association between the presence of a medical review panel and claim frequency and payout per 
claim. 
                                                
90 Some states use the term “screening panel” to refer to the similar body. The statutory term in Indiana is “medical 
review panel.” In this chapter I use “review panels” as a generic term. Panel systems vary across states in a number 
of important ways. Some panels are mandatory or semi-mandatory, while others are voluntary. Opinions of some are 
admissible in subsequent trials, while others are not. Some are composed of physicians, administrators, and 
laypersons, while others are made up exclusively with physicians. 
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Sloan, Mergenhagen, and Bovbjerg (1989) studied claims closed during 1975-1978 and 
1984 in 50 states, using data collected from insurers by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and the U.S. General Accounting Office. The authors found no effect of medical 
review panels on payout rate or size, but reported that panels reduced the time from filing to 
closing by about a year. 
Two studies found associations between medical review panels and lower premiums for 
some specialties. Sloan (1985) found that states that mandated the use of a medical screening 
panel had significantly lower premiums for general practitioners and ophthalmologists. 
Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, and Sloan (1990) found that the establishing screening panels reduced 
obstetrics/gynecology premiums by about 7% the year after they were introduced, a reduced 
premiums in the long run by about 20%. For general practice and surgery, medical review panels 
also lowered the premium, but the effects were not statistically significant. These results suggest 
that medical review panels may be better at screening out weak cases involving some specialties 
than others. 
White and colleagues (2008) provided a summary of statutory provisions of review 
panels in the states that had a panel provision. Their cross-sectional study based on a series of 
multiple regressions, drawing data from various sources, found no significant associations 
between having a medical review panel requirement and payouts, defense costs, case duration 
(from incident to payment), payout rates, and med mal premiums on state level in 2002. 
However, because their “timeliness” outcome was based on NPDB data, which received reports 
only on paid med mal claims, their measurement of timeliness was limited to paid claims. In 
addition, it is not clear how the “ratio of paid to unpaid claims” was measured. In one occasion, 
the authors cited the data as “civil filings” and “cases disposed as a percentage of cases filed in 
courts,” as opposed to med mal filing and paid rate (White et al. 2008, 386). In another, they 
described the data as “the ratio of paid to unpaid claims from 2001 and 2002 in a large hospital 
experience.” They provide no justifications as to why civil filing, or hospital med mal paid rates, 
was a reasonable  and representative measure of medical review panel performance.  
A 1986 GAO report on Indiana’s med mal system (U.S. General Accounting Office 
1986d, 12) addressed the performance of medical review panels, and quoted some insurance 
company executives: 
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The Indiana Medical Association stated that the panel process 
substantially decreases the number of claims going to trial and decreases the 
time required to close claims. According to officials of a large Indiana 
malpractice insurance company, only 2 percent of claims filed against the 
company go to court. They stated that such a low percentage of claims going to 
court can be attributed to Indiana’s panel process. This company also attributed 
its much lower legal costs to defend claims in Indiana to the panel process. For 
example, according to company officials, the company’s average cost of 
defending a claim in Indiana is about $2,100 versus about $10,000 in Michigan 
and Illinois.  
In a series of companion reports on other states (U.S. General Accounting Office 1986a; 
1986b; 1986c; 1986e; 1986f), various interest groups expressed their support or opposition to 
review panels. As expected, physician groups, hospital associations, defense lawyers’ 
associations, and underwriters’ associations praised panel review process. Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
argued the panel review process was biased towards defendants.  
National Practitioner Data Bank reported in 2012 that Indiana had the longest median 
duration for paid claims (paid 2003-2013, “delay between incident and payment”) among all 
jurisdictions (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services 2012, 70). I am not aware of any 
empirical studies that focus on Indiana’s medical review panels.   
Data Source and Legal Environment  
This section recapitulates some of the description in Chapter 2 of the law relating to the 
panel review process. It then discusses the data that I relied on for my analysis. 
Unless parties agree otherwise,91 all med mal claims over $15,000 (as of 2016) must go 
through mandated pretrial medical review before proceeding to a trial in Indiana state court.92 
                                                
91 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-5. 
92 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-6. 
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Beginning July 1, 1999, a malpractice claimant can commence an action in court, and the 
discovery is allowed at the same time the case is being reviewed by a panel.93 
Review panels consist of three health care providers and an attorney chair.  The review 
panels determine whether there was malpractice, but does not assess the monetary value of the 
damages.94 The review panel also makes recommendations as whether to forward the complaint 
to the responsible licensing board for a review of fitness to practice.95 Panel opinions are 
advisory, but are admissible in the subsequent trial, if any. 
Two exceptions to the otherwise mandatory panel process (i.e., all parties agree or small 
claims) was introduced by a 1985 amendment.96 Prior to the amendment, the panel review was an 
absolute prerequisite to trial. In addition, non-qualified providers are not protected by the panel 
procedure. Thus, a patient may file a complaint against a non-qualified provider in a court 
without first filing that complaint with the Insurance Commissioner or presenting it to a medical 
review panel.97 The $15,000 bar of the exception has not been revised in the past three decades; 
nor was it adjusted for inflation.98 Thus, the bar became more stringent over time: $15,000 in 
1985 dollars has the same buying power as $6,810 in 2015 dollars.  
                                                
93 Ind. Code § 34-18-8-7. (“[B]eginning July 1, 1999, a claimant may commence an action in court for malpractice 
at the same time the claimant’s proposed complaint is being considered by a medical review panel. [] court is 
prohibited from taking any action except setting a date for trial, an action under Ind. Code 34-18-8-8 [dismissal of 
action for failure to prosecute], or an action under Ind. Code 34-18-11 [preliminary determination of affirmative 
defense or issue of law or fact; discovery]; until section 4 of this chapter [an opinion is given by the panel] has been 
satisfied.”) 
94 More accurately, review panels are responsible to determined the standard of care part. Ind. Code 34-18-10-22. 
Panels are responsible to determine whether (1) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant or 
defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint.(2) The evidence 
does not support the conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to meet the applicable standard of care as 
charged in the complaint. (3) There is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for 
consideration by the court or jury.(4) The conduct complained of was or was not a factor of the resultant damages. 
If so, whether the plaintiff suffered: (A) any disability and the extent and duration of the disability; and(B) any 
permanent impairment and the percentage of the impairment. 
95 Ind. Code § 34-18-9.6. 
96 P.L. 177-1985, Sec. 8. 
97 Guinn v. Light, 558 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1990). 
98 2016 Bill Text IN S.B. 28 proposed to increase the bar to $35,000. The data used in this chapter are not affected 
by the proposed increase.  
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Either party may request the formation of a medical review panel.99 If neither party 
requests a medical review panel, IDOI will create one. Thus, medical review panels are 
effectively a mandatory feature of the Indiana med mal system, unless one of the exceptions 
applies. The parties select the attorney chair,100 who serves in an advisory capacity, and does not 
vote.101 Each party selects one provider-panelist; and those two panelists select the third.102 Only 
Indiana-licensed providers are eligible for selection to serve on panels.103 Two of the panelists 
must be members of the same profession as the defendant (e.g. physicians, dentists, physician 
assistants, nurses, etc.) If the defendant is a specialist, two of the panelists must also have the 
same specialty.104  
Figure 4.1 summarizes the stages in forming a panel, and the related timeliness 
requirements. In theory, it takes about eight months to get a panel opinion after filing the 
complaint with the Insurance Commissioner. However, the only consequence of failing to meet 
the timing specified in the statute is that the panel chair must report the reason for delay to the 
Insurance Commissioner.  
 
                                                
99 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-2. 
100 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-4) 
101 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-3(b). 
102 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-6. 
103 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-5. 
104 Ind. Code § 34-18-10-8. 
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Figure 4.1: Panel procedure. 
 
In the subsequent sections, I rely on the PCF database obtained from the Indiana 
Department of Insurance (IDOI) to examine the performance of the review panels. The database 
includes all med mal claims filed since 1975 (i.e., following the enactment of the Med Mal Act). 
The database provides information on members and attorney chairs, panel decisions, various 
dates of each claim, case outcomes and payout amounts (if any). I have no data on whether and 
which cases were tried versus settled. Table 4.1 provides an overview of data used in this 
chapter. 
 
Table 4.1: Data Overview 
Units Available 
observations 
Closed cases 22,304 
Panel cases 15,586 
Non-panel cases 6,718 
Panelists 15,204 
Defendants 26,260 
 
Filing with Commissioner 
Request formation 
Not earlier than 20 days after filing 
Within    15 days 
Select chairman 
Within    15 days 
Within  15 days 
Within    180 days 
Select the first 2 providers 
Select 3rd provider 
        Opinion 
Or panel shall report the reason for delay 
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Consistent with other case-level outcome/payout analysis throughout my dissertation, I 
use only cases that were closed by the time by May 2015, when I obtained the data. For purpose 
of this chapter, including cases that were still active would bias the analysis, because those cases 
may still in the middle of panel formation process, and lack panel status, decision, and case 
outcome information.  
I refer to cases in which a panel was named as “panel cases.” All panel cases went 
through at least part of the panel review process. But, as will be discussed later, parties in 
roughly 15% of panel cases actually decided to settle before their panel issued any opinion.  
These cases are included in the panel cases category for purposes of my analysis.  Stated 
differently, it is the “intention to treat” rather than “actual treatment” that determines whether a 
case is classified as a panel case or a non-panel case. Panel review was an absolute prerequisite 
to commencing a complaint prior to 1985.  As such, I treat all pre-1985 cases as panel cases. 
For my provider level analysis, I refer to providers who served on at least one panel as 
“panelist”, so as to distinguish them from the non-voting attorney chair. I use the term 
“defendant” to refer to providers that are named as defendants in one or more claims. Panelists 
and defendants are drawn from the same pool of Indiana licensed providers.  
I have “opinion” data on two level – panel level and panelist level. A malpractice 
conclusion/opinion on panel level means the panel unanimously find the defendant failed to 
comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint; whereas a malpractice 
conclusion on panelist level simply refers to the opinion of that specific panelists.  
Some cases involved a split decision. I can tell, on case level, panels split in their 
conclusion. But, for those cases, I lack data on whether they are 2:1 or 1:2 splits. To tell 2:1 from 
1:2 splits, panelist-level opinions on cases would have been necessary. But, I lack data on such 
level.105  
As discussed in Chapter 2, some panelists and defendants likely have multiple IDs in the 
database (i.e., having been assigned multiple IDs by the PCF database administrators). I lack a 
reliable way to identify which IDs are duplicates without creating more problems; I therefore 
                                                
105 I have data on panel-level opinions on case, panel-level opinions on defendants, and panelist-level opinions on 
defendants. 
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keep the providers as they are recorded in the system.106 The possible consequences may include 
slightly inflating the number of providers and panelists (as some of them may be counted 
multiple times), and marginally underestimating the frequency of panel services and lawsuits (as 
distinct IDs are treated as different providers).  
The ideal way to make causal inference about the impact of the panel proceeding would 
be to compare panel v. non-panel cases with similar characteristics. Unfortunately, I lack 
information on the injury, the amount of damages demanded, and plaintiff demographics. It is, 
therefore, beyond the scope of this chapter to make any casual inferences as to whether being 
reviewed by a panel affects case outcomes. However, I am able to quantify the average duration, 
payout rates of panel and non-panel cases, and panelists’ claim history. Where legislative 
amendments are of interests, I was also able to compute the pre- and post- differences of panel 
and non-panel cases, and the difference between the two “first differences” (which roughly 
represents the real effects of the legislation on panel cases). 
Findings 
In the following section, I first examine the duration of panel proceedings and cases. I 
then turn to panel composition, including the specialties and claim histories of all panelists, and 
of panelists with frequent panel experience. I conclude by examining whether case payout rates 
track panel opinions.  
Panel Process and Case Duration 
Panel review was mandatory for all cases filed between 1975 and 1985.  After that date, 
two exceptions allowed some cases to proceed without a panel. Figure 4.2 shows total closed 
cases, and reported panel cases as a percentage of all cases filed in any given year; pre-1985 
reported non-panel cases are likely reporting errors. There are two lines in Figure 4.2. The 
thinner line (which uses the right y axis) shows the total number of cases filed each year that 
were closed by the time the data was obtained in mid-2015. The thicker line (which uses the left 
y axis) show the portion of panel cases for that year.  
  
                                                
106 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed description of the multiple IDs issues. 
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Figure 4.2: Percent of panel cases, 1976-2014. 
 
Note: Percentage of closed cases filed in any given year that was reviewed by a panel. Right side y axis = number of 
med mal cases filed in any given year, that were closed by mid-2015. Left y axis = percentage of panel cases. 
 
As Figure 4.2 shows, from 1986-2002, roughly 70% of closed cases were panel cases. 
The number of cases and the share of panel cases have both declined since then. Because only 
closed cases are included in Figure 4.2, the recent drop in the share of panel cases likely reflects 
a selection effect. That is, if non-panel cases are resolved faster, they are more likely to be over-
represented in the cases that are closed in recent years.   
Next, I turn to case duration. Prior to 1999, the parties could not file a lawsuit or being 
the discovery process until panel review was complete. For cases filed after June 30, 1999, the 
parties can file a lawsuit and begin discovery without waiting for the panel review process to be 
completed.  
Table 4.2 presents information on mean and median case duration, broken down for 
various case stages. Part A compares means, and Part B provides medians – each broken down 
for panel and non-panel cases.   
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Table 4.2: Case Duration by Panel Status, pre- and post-1999 (in Years), Cases Filed 1975-2014 
Part A. Mean Duration     
  Panel Cases   Non-panel Cases 
  Before After   Before After 
Injury-Filing 2.0 2.0  2.2 2.3 
Filing-Close 7.1 5.3  6.6 3.4 
Filing-Panel Complete 1.8 1.8  N/A N/A 
Complete-Opinion 1.0 1.0  N/A N/A 
Opinion-Close 4.2 3.0  N/A N/A 
      
Part B. Median Durations     
  Panel Cases   Non-panel Cases 
  Before After   Before After 
Injury-Filing 2.0 1.9  2.0 2.0 
Filing-Close 5.8 4.9  4.7 3.0 
Filing-Panel Complete 1.5 1.5  N/A N/A 
Complete-Opinion 0.8 0.9  N/A N/A 
Opinion-Close 2.8 2.6  N/A N/A 
Note: Duration of various stages of panel and non-panel cases. Injury = malpractice act occurs. Filing = filing 
the proposed complaint with the Commissioner of Insurance. Close = closing date of the case, or when not 
available, PCF settlement date. Panel complete = the section of both attorney chair and provider panel member 
completed. Opinion = panel issued their opinion. Before = cases filed before July 1, 1999. After = cases filed 
on or after July 1, 1999. All closed cases with non-missing and non-negative durations were included in the 
computations. Many cases lack one or more of the dates used to calculate the durations. For sample 
sizes/number of available observations, see Table A.1 in Appendix. All durations were initially calculated in 
days, and then divided by 365 to be converted to years. Compared to using the difference between the year of 
closing date and the year of filing date, my approach provides more actuate results.  
 
Table 4.2 shows that, for panel cases, mean duration from filing to closing dropped from 
7.1 years to 5.3 years, and median duration dropped from 5.8 years to 4.9 years when I compare 
pre- and post-1999 cases.  Most of this drop in duration came from the post-opinion period for 
panel cases. Duration for other stages in the case (i.e., panel member and chair selection, hearing 
and rendering of an opinion) was effectively unchanged for cases filed before and after 1999.  
Table 4.2 also shows that duration in non-panel cases dropped as well -- from a mean of 
6.6 years to 3.4 year; and from a median of 4.7 years to 3 years when I compare pre- and post-
1999 cases. Thus, the pre- and post- duration difference of panel cases is 1.8 years (i.e., 7.1 – 
5.3), the corresponding pre- and post- difference of non-panel cases if 3.2 years (i.e., 6.6 – 3.4). 
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And, the difference between the two first differences, roughly representing the real effect of the 
1999 legislation on the duration changes on panel cases, is -1.4 years (i.e., 1.8 – 3.2).  
Panel Make-up and Repeat Panelists  
Either party may request the formation of a panel;107 but, the majority of the time, the 
parties agree to form a panel without a formal request through IDOI.  Panels had to be chaired by 
a lawyer, but the statute did not specify whether it had to be a defense-side or plaintiff-side 
lawyer.  In practice, defense lawyers chaired a majority of the panels; of 11,212 panels with 
available attorney chair information, 62% (6,929) were chaired by defense lawyers and 20% 
were chaired by plaintiffs’ lawyers.108 Payout rates were similar whether the medical review 
panel was chaired by a defense lawyer (36.3%) or plaintiffs’ lawyer (35.2%).   The difference of 
the proportions is statistically insignificant (z = -0.8722, p = 0.38, one-tailed).  
One of the key function of a review panel is to provide expert opinions. Prior research 
showed that in highly specialized areas, a handful of experts testified in a majority of cases and 
most of the frequent experts testified only for one side or the other (Kesselheim and Studdert 
2006). Do we find the same patterns for physicians that serve on medical review panels? Table 
4.3 provides a frequency distribution of panel service. 
 
Table 4.3: Distribution of Panel Service Frequency   
No. 
served 
No. of 
Panelists % 
Mean Practice 
Duration (Years) 
1 7,779 51% 15 
2-4 4,434 29% 19 
5-9 1,901 13% 21 
10-29 1018 7% 23 
30-49 62 0.4% 25 
50+ 10 0.1% 25 
Total 15,204 100% 18 
Note: Practice life-time count of panel service for all providers who served at least once.  
 
                                                
107 Ind. Code 34-18-10-2 (2015).  
108 The remaining 19% attorney-chairs served on both plaintiffs’ and defense sides over their career. 
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Table 4.3 shows that half of the providers who served on a panel served only once. Most 
of the rest served on nine or fewer panels; only 7.5% of the 15,204 physicians served ten or more 
times. Of course, practice duration affects the number of opportunities to serve on a review 
panel; the last column of Table 4.3 displays the mean practice duration (measured by the number 
of years insured in Indiana) of panelists in each bin. Providers who served on 30 or more panels 
had ten more years of practice experience than providers who only served on a single panel.  
Table 4.4 explores the breakdown by specialty of providers that served on review panels.  
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Table 4.4: Specialty Distribution of Panelists 
    Panelists 
 
 All panelists from the 
specialty 
  1- 
time 
2-4 
times 
5-9 
times 
10-29 
times 
30+ 
times 
% N 
Anesthesiology 46% 38% 14% 2% N/A 100% 529 
Cardiovascular  35% 43% 18% 5% N/A 100% 254 
Emergency Medicine 39% 33% 19% 9% 0.1% 100% 694 
Family/General 40% 40% 15% 5% 0.1% 100% 1,618 
Gastroenterology 33% 38% 25% 4% N/A 100% 135 
Hematology/Oncology 45% 34% 16% 5% N/A 100% 129 
Internal Medicine 39% 39% 18% 5% N/A 100% 874 
Nephrology 43% 45% 8% 5% N/A 100% 65 
Neurology 29% 40% 23% 8% 1% 100% 186 
Ob/Gyn 19% 34% 23% 22% 1% 100% 708 
Pediatrics 56% 36% 5% 3% N/A 100% 354 
Psychiatry 51% 37% 10% 3% N/A 100% 235 
Pulmonary Diseases 29% 29% 33% 8% N/A 100% 78 
Radiology 41% 42% 14% 3% N/A 100% 485 
Surgery 22% 30% 24% 21% 2% 100% 2,216 
Physician - other 40% 41% 15% 4% 0.4% 100% 909 
Non-physician 69% 24% 5% 3% 0.2% 100% 2,918 
Missing 88% 11% 1% 1% 0.0% 100% 2,817 
Total 7,779 4,434 1,901 1,018 72 N/A 15,204 
Note: Specialty distribution of providers served at least once on panels. Include 15,204 panelists (i.e., providers who 
served at least once). “Physician – other” = physician in other specialties; “non-physician” = non-physician 
panelists; “missing” = panelists with missing specialty information. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that repeat panelists practiced in areas that are highly specialized and 
frequently sued.  Expressed in terms of percentages, across all specialties other than surgery and 
ob-gyn, only 3.4% of panelists served on 10+ panels.  In surgery and ob-gyn, fully 23% of 
panelists served on 10+ panels.    
Opponents to review panels view the process as sending a fox to watch the hen house. Is 
there any evidence that panelists are biased in favor of physicians? Are physicians who have 
been sued for malpractice more likely to find in favor of defendant physicians? Table 4.5 
addresses this question by linking providers’ frequency of panel service to their claim history.  
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Table 4.5: Claim History of Panelists 
Freq. being   Freq. of Panel Services 
Named Defendant 1-9 10-29 30-49 50+ 
0 54% 12% 2% - 
1-9 44% 79% 74% 100% 
10-29 2% 10% 24% - 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 14,114 1,018 62 10 
Note: Panelists’ service frequencies and claim histories. Include 15,204 panelists (i.e., providers who served at least 
once). 
 
Table 4.5 shows that a majority of panel members had no claims against them, and there 
were relatively few repeat defendants. 54% of non-frequent panelists (served on 1-9 panels) did 
not have any claims in the database; the corresponding figure for the 10-29 panel services group 
was 12; and merely 2% in the 30-49% bin. Conversely, very few non-frequent panelists had ten 
or more claims themselves. Most panelists with 10+ services clustered in the 1-9 claim history 
row. All ten with 50 or more panel services had less than ten claims. Of course, some specialties 
had greater exposure to malpractice suits than others. And because at least two panelists needed 
to be chosen from the same specialty as the defendant’s, greater exposure to malpractice suits 
also means more panelists from the same specialty.  
 Of the 22,304 closed cases in the database, 70% were panel cases. In most cases, panel 
reached a unanimous conclusion as to whether the defendant’s care was short of the accepted 
standard (“malpractice”) or not (“no malpractice”). Sometimes, panel members split on their 
conclusion (“variation of opinion”); other times, the panel decided that some material facts were 
missing, and they could not reach an opinion without those facts (“material issue of fact”).  And 
some cases were settled while the panel process was ongoing. Table 4.6 provides the distribution 
of panel opinion outcomes at the case-panel level.  
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Table 4.6: Number of Cases by Panel Status and Opinion Type 
Panel Opinion No. of Cases % 
No Malpractice 7,609 49% 
Malpractice 2,411 15% 
Settled before Opinion Rendered 2,309 15% 
Variation of Opinion  1,475 9% 
Opinion Missing 1,140 7% 
Material Issue of Fact 642 4% 
Total 15,586 100% 
Note: Number of cases by panel opinion. Closed and panel cases only. Excluding 6,718 (30% of the 22,304 closed 
cases). Panel cases = cases for which there was a panel formed to review the alleged malpractice.  
 
Table 4.6 shows that panels concluded there was malpractice in only 15% of cases. Fully 
49% of panels exonerated the physician of malpractice, and the remainder split between cases 
that settled during the panel review process (15%), non-unanimous opinions (9%) cases where 
the opinion was missing (7%) and cases where the panel was unable to decide because of a 
material issue of fact (4%).   
Table 4.7 links these opinion types to the panel members’ claim history.  
 
Table 4.7: Panelist Determination versus Frequency of Service 
   Service as panelist   
  
1- 
time 
2-4 
times 
5-9 
times 
10-29 
times 
30+ 
times All 
Malpractice 19% 17% 16% 16% 15% 17% 
No malpractice 55% 56% 58% 60% 62% 58% 
Other 26% 27% 26% 24% 23% 25% 
N 6,657 10,450 11,098 14,117 2,728 45,050 
Note: Opinion frequencies by panelist service experience. Column percentages. Unit of analysis is case level 
panelist-opinion. “Experience” refers to the life time count of panel services performed by a panelist. Only those 
who have served at least once are included. “Other” includes settled before opinion rendered, missing opinion, 
material issues of fact. Malpractice = unanimous opinion that the provider failed to comply with the applicable 
standard of care. No malpractice = unanimous opinion that the provider complied with the applicable standard 
of care. Other includes variation of opinion (where the panel did not reach unanimous opinion), material issue 
of fact (where the panel did not reach opinion, because they found certain material facts was not presented), 
and settled before opinion (where a penal was formed, but parties opted to settle before the panel rendering its 
opinion).  
 
A typical case went through one panel; and a typical panel consisted of three panelists. 
Thus, a typical panel case involved three panelists determinations. Table 4.7 shows that repeat 
panelists were less likely to find malpractice than one-shot panelists. Of all determinations made 
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by one-shot panelists, 19% were “malpractice,” which was statistically higher than the 
corresponding proportion of all panelist determinations (17%. z=4.0308, p<0.00001, two-tailed). 
55% determinations by one-shot panelists were “no malpractice”, which is lower than the 
proportion of all panelist determinations (58%).   
Of all determinations made by panelists who served 30 or more times, 15% were 
“malpractice,” which was statistically lower than all panelists determinations (z=-2.7076, 
p=0.0034). Thus, panelists who served more times were less likely to find malpractice than one-
shot panelist; and were more likely to conclude “no malpractice” than one-shot panelists. I lack 
data to track which side select which panelists, and cannot rule out the possibility that some 
frequent panelists were selected by plaintiff’s side.  
Panel Opinion and Case Outcome 
In the following section, I turn to case outcome, and how payout size tracks panel 
findings. Table 4.8 first compares the payout rates between panel and non-panels. As noted 
above, the panel process was absolute mandatory before 1985, all cases filed in or before 1985 
are treated as panel cases in Table 4.8. As a robustness check, I run the analysis excluding all 
cases filed in or before 1985. The results are virtually the same as these in Table 4.8. 
 
Table 4.8: Payout Rates by Panel Status, Cases Filed 1975-2014 
  Case Panel Status  
Payout Panel Non-panel All 
Unpaid 65% 82% 70% 
Defendant Only 13% 9% 12% 
PCF Paid 22% 9% 18% 
N 16,105 6,199 22,304 
Note: Case outcome/payout for panel and non-panel cases. Because prior to the effective date of the 1985 
amendment, the panel process was absolute mandatory, all cases filed in or before 1985 are treated as panel cases 
here. Defendant only=only defendant paid, the case did not involve PCF payment. PCF paid=both defendant and 
PCF paid. Panel cases refers to those cases had the panel formed. Closed cases only, totaled 22,304.  
 
As Table 4.8 shows, cases that went to panel and those did not differ in case outcome. 
Non-panel cases were associated with a much higher unpaid rate (82% v. 65%, hence lower paid 
rate). Panel cases had higher overall paid rate, and higher PCF payment rate. This partly reflects 
the difference in the underlying characteristics and monetary values of panel v. non-panel cases. 
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Figure 4.3 focuses on panel cases, and shows the proportion of cases that resulted in zero payout, 
defendant only payout, and PCF payout, broken out for each possible panel decision.  
 
Figure 4.3: Case outcome by panel opinion type, 1975-2014. 
 
Note: Case outcome/payout rate by panel status and opinion type, closed cases only. 845 closed cases with 
missing opinion type excluded. Malpractice = unanimous opinion that the provider failed to comply with the 
applicable standard of care. No malpractice = unanimous opinion that the provider complied with the 
applicable standard of care. Variation of opinion = panel did not reach unanimous opinion. Material issue of 
fact = panel did not reach opinion, because they found certain material facts was not presented. Settled before 
opinion = a penal was formed, but parties opted to settle before the panel rendering its opinion).  
 
Figure 4.3 shows that the chance of payout was lower (14%) where the panel 
unanimously found no malpractice, compared to when the panel unanimously found malpractice 
(78%).  Compared to all other categories, cases where the review panel found malpractice also 
had a much higher rate of excess payments by the PCF (56%). Variation of opinion cases were 
an intermediate case, with 68% of cases resulting in a payout, and payout from the PCF in 50% 
of paid cases. The distribution suggests that case outcomes generally tracked the findings of the 
review panel. 
Discussion 
Review panel is an important part of the Indiana med mal system. More than 70% of all 
the cases closed during the past four decades were reviewed by a panel. The two primary 
legislative goals of the review panel are to screen med mal cases before they are filed in court, 
and to speed up the disposition.  
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Although the underlying facts are unavailable, the data allows me to compare the payout 
rates with the panel opinion. My findings show that payout rate and size generally tracked the 
finding of the review panel. When the medical review panel found malpractice (which it did in 
15% of the reviewed cases), the likelihood of payment was 78%.  Conversely, when the medical 
review panel found there was no malpractice, the likelihood of payment was only 14%. Overall, 
83% of the paid cases and 86% of the PCF cases were panel cases.  
Panels, however, did not shorten claim resolution in Indiana. On average, Panel cases 
took longer from filing to closing than non-panel cases. It is hardly surprising. Earlier studies 
have provided some speculations as to the reasons. In jurisdictions where panel findings are 
admissible in subsequent trials, such as Indiana, parties may devote more time to access to 
information and conduct discovery. Some cases may be “destined for trials.” Presumably, those 
cases are not particularly clear under the applicable liability rules that which party will prevail; 
or they may be high in monetary stake. Plaintiffs would bring the case to court, regardless of the 
panel findings. Another possibility is that, plaintiffs’ lawyers, may view panel opinions as 
biased; and are willing to pursue the case despite the negative panel findings, and privately hired 
their own expert witnesses which would be more strategically appealing (see Struve 2003) .  
Cases filed after the 1998 amendment, which allows claimants to file the claim in court at 
the same time the case is being considered by a panel, have significantly shorter average duration 
than that of the cases filed earlier. However, non-panel cases, which should not have been 
directly affect by the legislation, showed an even larger drop in duration. The larger drop in non-
panel case duration may suggest an overall trend in med mal case resolution that is not limited to 
panel cases. 
A breakdown of case duration further shows that most of this drop in panel case duration 
came from the period after panels issued their opinions and before the parties closed their cases. 
Duration of other stages in the case (i.e., panel member and chair selections, hearing and 
rendering of an opinion) was effectively unchanged for cases filed before and after 1999. Thus, 
drop in case duration is probably not attributable to the panel proceeding itself. 
This simple before and after comparison bears typical limitations that come with analysis 
of this type. There is no easy way to rule out the possibility that some other trend went parallel 
during the same time frame, for example, the higher required coverage and the increased damage 
cap amount. In addition, underreporting problem likely happened during the early years. And 
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since the “before” period is shorter than the “after”, it is harder to use a large “before” sample to 
correct the potential bias. It is also possible that the case mixes before and after 1999 are 
different (although it would be hard to speculate why later cases demand shorter time as 
evidences show that the portion of small cases dropped over time.) Thus, it would be erroneous 
to credit the shorter time of claim resolution to the changes in panel proceeding without 
considering other changes.   
As to the panel composition, I find that half of the panelists only served on one panel. 
Very few panelists served on multiple panels, but when they were, they tended to be in more 
specialized areas, such as surgery and obstetrics and gynecology. 
I find that repeat panelists were less likely than one-shot panelists to find malpractice in 
the cases that they reviewed. As to the reason, I can only speculate. First, it is possible that the 
repeat and frequent panelists were chosen by the plaintiffs, which may suggest that the “hired 
gun” expert witness phenomenon also exists in review panel setting. Unfortunately, I don’t have 
data on which panelists was chosen by which side.  
Another related but distinct explanation is that the the underlying characteristics of the 
cases reviewed by one-shot panelists maybe different from the one that reviewed by those repeat 
or frequent panelist. State differently, the more complicated cases may find their way to more 
experienced panelists; and long shot claims were assigned to less experienced panelists (based on 
the assumption that even less experienced practitioners would reach the same conclusions as the 
seasoned ones). Because the underlying fact patterns would correlate to both the selection of 
panelists and the ultimate outcomes, more data on the case or injury and which side selected 
which panelists would be necessary for further investigations.  
Conclusion 
Established in 1975 by the Med Mal Act, Indiana’s review panel is one of the nation’s 
first. Previous studies using available data from states with panel systems mostly found no 
significantly improvements in med mal litigation systems associated with panels. I extent this 
body of literature by examining Indiana’s panel system, and how legislative amendments my 
have changed its operation.  
I show, first, that the panel proceeding governed most med mal claims filed, and has been 
an important component of Indiana’s med mal system. Notwithstanding the available exceptions 
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to the panel proceedings, more than 70% of the med mal cases filed in Indiana were reviewed by 
a panel. 83% of the paid cases, or 87% of the cases triggered PCF payments were panel cases. 
But, the portion of cases reviewed by a panel are dropping since the early 2000s. At this point, it 
may still be too early to tell whether this is a sustained decline.   
 Second, I show that case outcomes generally tracked the findings of the review panel. 
When the medical review panel found malpractice (which it did in 15% of the reviewed cases), 
the likelihood of payment was 78%.  Conversely, when the medical review panel found there 
was no malpractice, the likelihood of payment was only 14%.   
Third, I find that duration of panel cases shortened over time, but non-panel case showed 
an even larger drop. The shortened duration of panel cases can almost be entirely explained by 
the shorter delay between panel opinion and case closure, rather than the time taken by panel 
procedure itself.  
 Fourth, I find that very few panelists served on multiple panels, and that when they did, 
they tended to be in more specialized areas, such as surgery and obstetrics and gynecology. I also 
find that panelists who served on 30 or more panels found malpractice were less likely to find 
malpractice than all panelists.   
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CHAPTER 5: PHYSICIAN LICENSING AND DISCIPLINING 
 
State medical boards use professional licensing and discipline to enforce minimum 
performance standards. Using 43 years of data (1972-2015) on discipline obtained from the 
Indiana Professional Licensing Agency, I find that disciplinary cases are rare. Only 1.2% of the 
sixty-three thousand licensed physicians in my dataset were disciplined. I identify factors 
associated with a higher hazard for various disciplinary offenses, and provide some evidence of 
variation by type of disciplinary offense. Male physicians have a higher hazard of sexual 
misconduct.  Physicians with more Controlled Substance Registrations (“CSRs”) have a higher 
hazard for substance abuse and drug-diversion disciplinary offenses. And, negligence cases 
receive less severe sanctions than other disciplinary offenses. 
Introduction 
State medical boards use professional licensing and discipline to enforce minimum 
performance standards. Thus, the medical malpractice and professional licensing/disciplinary 
systems are complementary strategies to address a common problem. Prior research has tended 
to focus on one system or the other (as in Chapters 2-4 of this dissertation). I now turn to the 
disciplinary system, and detail its workings in this Chapter. Finally, Chapter 6 views the two 
systems together.   
Using 43 years of data (1972-2015) on physician discipline, obtained from the Indiana 
Medical Licensing Board, I examine such questions as “how often are physicians disciplined?” 
“What factors predict physician discipline?” “Do those factors vary by disciplinary offense?” 
“What are the consequences of being disciplined?” 
First, I find that disciplinary actions are rare. Only 1.2% of the 63,485 physicians in my 
dataset were disciplined during my 43 year sample period. Four types of cases account for 70% 
of all disciplinary actions: drug diversion (25%), substance abuse (18%), sexual misconduct 
(17%), and negligence related offenses (10%). The two most common disciplinary sanctions 
were probation (26%) and suspension (25%). 
Second, I find that specific physician characteristics are associated with a higher hazard 
of discipline, with variation by offense type. Male physicians have a higher hazard for being 
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disciplined for sexual misconduct. Having more CSRs is associated with a higher hazard for drug 
abuse and drug-diversion. International medical graduates (IMGs) have a higher hazard for 
negligence and sexual misconduct.  
I find similar variation among specialties. Pediatricians, compared to other 
underrepresented specialties, have a higher hazard for sexual misconduct. Radiologists have a 
higher hazard for negligence. Anesthesiologists have a higher hazard for drug abuse and drug-
diversion. Psychiatrists’ have a higher hazard across all offense types, but their risk is especially 
high for sexual misconduct. Similarly, obstetricians-gynecologists have a higher risk of being 
disciplined across the board, but their risk is especially high for negligence and sexual 
misconduct. 
Third, when negligence is the sole ground for discipline, the case is significantly less 
likely to end up with a severe sanction. Fourth, the degree to which the defendant and their 
lawyer (if any) are involved in the case make a difference as well. Default cases are significantly 
more likely to end up with severe sanctions. Representation and settlement with the state 
Attorney General significantly lower the likelihood of severe sanctions.  
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Part II provides a review of past literature. Part III 
describes my data sources, the cleaning and coding process, and some data limitations. Part IV 
presents my findings.  Part V discusses these findings and some policy implications. Part VI 
concludes.  
Literature Review 
Inappropriate prescription, negligence and substance abuses were found to be the most 
common offenses that led to disciplinary actions in California (Morrison and Wickersham 1998; 
Kohatsu et al. 2004), Ohio (Clay and Conatser 2003), and Oklahoma (Khaliq et al. 2005). 
Strikingly few actions were imposed on malpractice or incompetence (U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Services 1986). 
Existing studies also identified certain physician characteristics associated with a higher 
likelihood of discipline, including male gender (Morrison and Wickersham 1998; Kohatsu et al. 
2004; Khaliq et al. 2005), graduating from foreign medical schools (Kohatsu et al. 2004; Khaliq 
et al. 2005), non-white (Khaliq et al. 2005), lack of board certification (Kohatsu et al. 2004; 
Morrison and Wickersham 1998; Khaliq et al. 2005), increasing age and practice years 
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(Morrison and Wickersham 1998; Clay and Conatser 2003; Kohatsu et al. 2004), practicing in 
specific specialties or being involved in direct patient care; and having exhibited unprofessional 
behaviors in medical schools or during residency trainings (Papadakis et al. 2005; Papadakis et 
al. 2008).  
Another line of research focuses on specific types of offense, offenders, or sanctions. 
Enbom and Thomas (1997) and Enbom, Parshley, and Kollath (2004) found that psychiatry and 
obstetrics/gynecology had the highest disciplinary incidence.   
Dehlendorf and Wolfe (1998) studied physicians disciplined for sex-related offenses 
nationwide, and found that sex offenders were more likely to specialize in psychiatry, obstetrics 
and gynecology, and family and general practice. The authors also reported that discipline for 
sex-related offenses was significantly more severe than for non—sex-related offenses.  
Similarly, AbuDagga et al. (2016) found higher percentages of revocation and suspension 
in sex-related offenses than in other offenses. Cardarelli and Licciardone (2006) reported that 
physicians had been revoked licenses were more likely to be anesthesiologists, general 
practitioners, and psychiatrists, as well as those with multiple disciplinary actions.    
Morrison and Morrison (2001) studied psychiatrists, both disciplined and not disciplined, 
and disciplined no-psychiatrists in California. They found a higher percentage of psychiatrists 
among disciplined; a higher percentage of sexual misconducts among disciplined psychiatrists; 
and a low percentage of female among disciplined psychiatrists.  
Jung, Lurie, and Wolfe (2006) studied physicians disciplined for criminal activities. They 
reported that older age, lack of board certifications, direct patient care as factors related to 
criminal activity. General practitioners and family physicians were overrepresented among all 
crimes, and drug-related crimes; and general practitioners and psychiatrists for fraud-related 
convictions. 
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Indiana’s Licensing and Disciplinary System and Data  
Data Sources  
I rely on a database maintained by the Medical Licensing Board containing information 
on all physicians licensed in Indiana.109 I obtained the database in May, 2016. Figure 5.1 
summarizes the disciplinary proceeding and specifies the areas in which I have data. I further 
discuses my data in this section, and the procedure in Section B. I also described the procedure 
and data in Chapter 2.  
 
Figure 5.1: Physician disciplinary proceeding in Indiana.  
 
Note: Physician discipline procedure in Indiana. Arrows “ß” represent data availability. Board stands for the 
Medical Licensing Board of Indiana. AG stands for the state Attorney General. Hearing refers to the Board Hearing. 
Settlements are between the respondent doctor and the state (represented by the Attorney General). Board decision 
refers to disciplinary decision.  
  
I conducted extensive data cleaning, including standardizing the spelling of medical 
school names, identifying the country of medical schools, and adding an indicator for graduates 
of international medical schools.110 Physicians need not disclose their gender to the Medical 
Licensing Board, but 73% of the physicians in the dataset did so.  For the remaining 27%, I used 
                                                
109 I use only unlimited MD and DO licenses for purposes of this chapter.The database also contains information 
about other health care professionals, such as residents, fellows, temporary MDs or DOs, limited scope MDs or 
DOs, etc.  
110 Misspellings and reporting variations (multiple specifications or abbreviations of same schools) inflated the 
number of medical schools attended. There were 14,577 distinct school names before cleaning. After standardizing 
the spelling, and replacing the historical names with current official names, the number of distinct names went down 
to 4,761. Schools that only appear once were not individually standardized. I then searched the standardized school 
names online to add a country, and a dummy variable to indicate schools located outside the United States. Among 
the 63,485 physicians, 2.2% did not report medical school attended. 
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online search to impute gender, based on the license number or first name.111 I supplemented 
reported specialty with information from other official records.112 
I also obtained all physician disciplinary files from the Medical Licensing Board in June, 
2015. Each disciplinary case file typically includes: administrative complaints, final findings of 
facts, and various orders/dispositions. I reviewed all these files and coded them into a flat 
dataset. These files provide details on the progress of disciplinary complaint resolutions that are 
not otherwise available in quantitative bulk data such as those used in existing studies.113  
I do not have data on consumer complaints or reports from the state med mal system to 
the Board. Evidence from other states suggest that many such complaints do not proceed to a 
formal investigation. In addition, no data is available on the period between initial receipt of any 
complaint to case managing/screening, and then to investigation. 
I treat a matter that assigned a distinct administrative cause number as a “case.” A cause 
number is assigned when the Medical Licensing Board considers whether to take disciplinary 
action against a particular physician for one or more alleged offenses. For example, the Board 
may first decide to suspend the license of the offending doctor, later reinstating the license on a 
probationary basis, and eventually restoring an unrestricted license after four years of 
compliance with the terms of probation. I code this series of three actions by the Medical 
Licensing Board as a single case containing multiple sanctions. In sanction severity analysis, I 
treat the most severe sanction imposed in any case as the outcome of interest. However, in my 
disciplinary hazard estimation, all sanctions are counted as “events.” 
                                                
111 Among the 63,485 physicians, 20% are female, 54% are male, 27% did not report gender. I searched online all 
the last names that appeared at least twice with missing gender, to determine the dominant gender of the names. 
Finally, I sorted the data by last name, and replaced the missing gender values with the gender of people with the 
same last name. The tradeoff of the last step is that I may have randomly assigned gender to those unisex names. 
After all these cleaning, 2% remain uncertain (either because the first names appear only once, or because the 
physicians provide a first initial, instead of a first name) 23% are female, 75% are male. The gender ratio after data 
imputation is consistent with the national ratio reported by FSMB.  
112 Based on license numbers, I merged specialty reported to the Indiana Department of Insurance to the licensure 
data. For those disciplined physicians, I also searched other state medical boards, and National Provider Identifier 
Registry and supplemented specialties where available. See https://npiregistry.cms.hhs.gov  
113 The PLA’s online license search and verify system providing electronic licensure information is available at 
https://mylicense.in.gov/everification/Search.aspx. The scanned version of all license litigation files are available at  
http://www.in.gov/ai/appfiles/pla-litigation/ . 
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I developed my own system for classifying disciplinary offenses, and grouping them into 
logical categories. I ultimately identified eight distinct categories, but reasonable minds could 
settle on either fewer or more categories.114  
Virtually all of the cases involved only one type of misconduct. I code the underlying 
misconduct type (“principal offense”), as opposed to all charged statutory violations. Among the 
996 disciplinary cases in my dataset, 16 cases potentially involved more than one misconduct 
type and therefore needed a judgment call about the principal offense. In those cases, I coded the 
misconducts that appeared to contribute the most to the disciplinary decision.  For example, a 
case involving multiple instances of unnecessary surgery, which resulted in fraudulent billing to 
Medicare and Medicaid, was coded as “health care fraud,” although these cases were also 
technically informed consent cases (which may fit into “other unprofessional misconducts” 
category). I provide alternative offense-type analysis in which I exclude these 16 cases in 
Appendix. The results are essentially the same as the ones in the main text. 
I coded multiple principal offenses for a single case only when those offenses – usually 
unrelated in both time and space -- appeared to equally contribute to the disciplinary outcome. 
Table 5.1 summarizes my coding categories. 
I considered an alternative coding strategy, which was based on specific statutory 
violations listed in the administrative (disciplinary) complaints. Unfortunately, Indiana changed 
its statutory framework and gradually specified disciplined grounds during the period I study. 
For this reason, coding based on the cited statutory violations would do a better job of capturing 
changes in prosecuting practice than of physician misconduct.  
 
                                                
114 Specifically, I first coded a subset of 52 (5.6%) randomly selected respondents. I used this initial set to develop a 
coding protocol. I used that coding protocol to code the first 100 (10.7%) respondents’ cases, and to assess whether 
the established categories and coded variables captured the breadth and depth of the information contained in the 
documents. See Chapter 2 for more details about my coding strategy.  
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Table 5.1: Coding of Disciplinary Grounds  
Offense Type Explanation 
Alcohol abuse Alcohol abuse, Driving While Intoxicated, and Public 
Intoxication. 
 
Criminal activity Other criminal conviction. 
 
Drug abuse Self-abuse of drug. 
 
Health care fraud Usually involve unnecessary and harmful surgeries. 
 
Inappropriate prescription Including inappropriate prescription, legend drug 
diversion, and criminally charged Drug Trafficking 
Causing the Death of Another by Unlawful Distribution. 
 
Negligence/Incompetence Usually egregious or repeat malpractice; also include 
mental or physical incompetence. 
 
Sexual misconduct Sexually involved with patients, criminally charged rape or 
sexual battery. Not include Inappropriate sexual comments, 
possession of child pornography, voyeurism, or publicly 
soliciting sex. 
 
N.O.C Not otherwise classified. Records keeping, office or billing 
practice violations; practice without license; failure to pay 
tax; failure to properly withdraw from services. 
Note: Summary of disciplinary grounds/offenses coding. Inappropriate sexual comments, possession of child 
pornography, voyeurism, or publicly soliciting sex were coded as N.O.C., rather than Sexual Misconducts. Victims 
of sexual offenses were usually patients, but in some cases, were housekeepers, patients of the pediatric patients, 
nurses, or other co-workers. Exchanging prescriptions for sexual favors coded as inappropriate prescription. 
 
I then used license numbers to merge the discipline data with the licensure data. This 
allowed me to link disciplinary history to physician characteristics, and study the association 
between physician background, license litigation, offense types and sanctions imposed. 115 
 
 
                                                
115 Some examples of practice-related N.O.C. cases are failure to produce medical records; failure to maintain 
sanitary practice of medicine; misleading advertisements, and unauthorized release of confidential patient health 
information. 
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Physician Licensure and Discipline Procedures in Indiana 
The Indiana Medical Licensing Board, along with other professional licensing boards, 
operates as a part of the Professional Licensing Agency or PLA – an umbrella agency.116 The 
board is responsible for licensing and disciplining both allopathic and osteopathic doctors in the 
state. The Board consists of seven members, including five physicians, one osteopathic physician 
and a consumer representative.117 
Individuals enter the physician pipeline through first attending a U.S. allopathic (MD), 
osteopathic (DO), or international medical school. They are then required to pass multi-step 
licensure examinations, and to complete one or more years of graduate medical education 
(residency or fellowship). It typically takes more than nine years after entering college to become 
a licensed physician (Federation of State Medical Boards 2015, 2). 
Physicians are licensed either with examination, or by endorsement. Licensure 
endorsement is a process through which a state issues a medical license to an individual who 
holds a valid license in another jurisdiction. Endorsement is based on documentation of 
successfully completing an approved examination and authentication of required documents, 
rather than the passing of additional examinations. The process was previously referred to as 
“reciprocity”. Eleven boards place a time limit - usually ten years - for endorsement after the 
initial licensing examination. Applicants who do not meet the ten year threshold must pass the 
Special Purpose Examination. Indiana has no such time limit (and thus no requirement for 
additional examinations (American Medical Association 2013, 170). 
Indiana requires physicians to renew their license every two years. Most states require 
completion of specified number of hours of continuing medical education (CME) for license 
renewal. Indiana places no CME requirement. To renew one’s license, applicants must fill out a 
form that inter alia inquires whether they were involved in any “adverse events” since last 
renewed. Applicants must provide detailed explanation if they answer “yes” to any of the 
questions. The Board reviews all applications, and sometimes decide to pursue actions against 
                                                
116 As a part of a larger wave of state medical boards reorganization, in 1981, Indiana establish Health Professions 
Bureau, which was responsible for multiple health care professions. Ind. Code 25-1-5-3. In 2005, Health Professions 
Bureau transferred authority to the PLA, which is responsible for many/most regulated occupations. Ind. Code 25-1-
5-3.3. 
117 Ind. Code 25-22.5-2-1. 
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those who provide fraudulent answers. Some initial license applications are denied on similar 
grounds (i.e., the applicant failed to disclose previous adverse events, such as during residency). 
Fraudulent description of educational credentials may also lead to denial of a license.118 
In Indiana, the State Attorney General (AG) is responsible for receiving, investigating, 
and prosecuting complaints concerning physicians discipline.119 Cases come to the attention of 
the AG’s Office through both public complaints and reports from other governmental agencies. 
The AG will prosecute the matter if a preliminary investigation suggests that the licensee should 
be subjected to discipline, or the Board by majority vote requests the AG to prosecute a matter.120  
A typical case proceeds through the following stages. The AG’s Office first takes and 
investigates the case. If the AG’s preliminary investigation warrants opening of a case, the AG 
then prepares the complaints. The Board hears the case and issues disciplinary orders.  
The Board is charged with investigating six specific violations. In general, these 
violations are related to licensure, and office or record-keeping practice. These violations are (1) 
Licensure renewal fraud.  (2) Improper termination of a physician and patient relationship. (3) 
Practicing with an expired medical license. (4) Providing office based anesthesia without the 
proper accreditation. (5) Failure to perform duties required for issuing birth or death certificates. 
(6) Failure to disclose, or negligent omission of, documentation requested for licensure 
renewal.121 The Board receives notifications from the National Practitioner Data Bank about 
malpractice payments and other adverse events involving the doctors licensed in the state. 
Findings 
Before analyzing physician discipline, one must understand the composition of the 
population of practicing physicians. I begin by describing the demographic and practice 
characteristics of Indiana’s physician population. I then focus on the sub-set of physicians that 
are disciplined, describing their misconduct and the resulting sanctions. I conclude with 
                                                
118 Renewal application forms are available at https://secure.in.gov/pla/3503.htm . 
119 Ind. Code 25-1-7-2.  
120 Indiana Code 25-1-7-7 
121 Ind. Code 24-22.3-2.8. 
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regression analysis explaining how physician characteristics affect their hazard for various 
offenses, and how sanction severity lines up with offense types.  
The Indiana Physician Population 
Of the 63,485 physicians who have been licensed in Indiana, 21,254 (or 33%) obtained 
their licenses by examination; the rest were licensed by endorsement, which means they were 
first licensed in another U.S. jurisdiction before being licensed in Indiana by reciprocity.  
Approximately 43% (or 27,089) of all the licensed are currently active.122 About 40% of those 
who hold an active Indiana license are currently practicing in the state.  
Table 5.2 summarizes the credentials, education, and gender of Indiana-licensed 
physicians. Three measures are provided. “All” include all physicians in the dataset, licensed at 
some point during 1906-2016. “Active” physicians are those who have an active Indiana license 
in 2016. “Active and in-state” are those actively practicing in 2016, who reported an Indiana zip 
code as their current address.  
 
                                                
122 Physicians holding active Indiana licenses account for about 3% of the active physician population in the United 
States.  
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of Indiana-Licensed Physicians 
  All  Active  Active & In-State 
  No. %  No. %  No. % 
Credential         
MD 58,905 93%  24,877 92%  14,676 93% 
DO 4,580 7%  2,212 8%  1,144 7% 
Medical Education         
United States 42,938 68%  19,860 75%  12,045 76% 
International  17,144 27%  5,986 22%  3,061 19% 
Uncertain 3,403 5%  719 3%  714 5% 
Gender         
Male 47,441 75%  19,702 73%  11,226 71% 
Female 14,700 23%  7,331 27%  4,572 29% 
Uncertain 1,344 2.0%  56 0.2%  22 0.1% 
Total 63,485 100%  27,089 100%  15,820 100% 
Note: Characteristics of Indiana-licensed physicians. “All” include all physicians previously or currently licensed in 
Indiana. “Active” are those with active, on probation, or valid to practice while reviewed license statues. “In-State” 
physicians reported an Indiana zip. MD = allopathic doctors. DO = Osteopathic doctors. International medical 
education = degree from medical schools outside of U.S. Canadian schools and Puerto Rican schools treated as 
“international” for purpose of this table.  
 
Most actively licensed physicians practicing in Indiana are men (71%), who graduated 
from an allopathic (93%) medical school in the United States (76%).123 The currently active 
physician population has a higher percentage of female doctors (27% all active, and 29% active 
in-state), compared to the total historically licensed physician population (23%). Currently active 
international medical graduates (or IMGs) makes up a smaller proportion, compared to the 
historical total. The share of osteopathic doctors (DOs) is comparable across all three samples. 
The distribution of those characteristics are nearly identical to those of the active physician 
population in the United States, according to the data reported by Federation of State Medical 
Boards (2015).124 Table 5.3 provides further information on gender and self-specified primary 
specialties.  
 
                                                
123 Canadian medical schools are coded as “International”. Many studies did not distinguish between U.S. and 
Canadian schools, which may explain why IMGs represents 27%, a slightly higher percentage, of all medical 
educations in Table 5.2. 
124 in 2014, 92% of the physician with an active license are MDs, 23% are IMGs, 32% are female doctors. 36% of 
the new licenses issued between 2012 and 2014 were issued to physicians received their first license.  
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Table 5.3: Specialties of Active In-State Physicians by Gender and Medical Education 
Specialty No. of 
Physicians 
% of Total % Male % IMG 
Family/ GP 2,697 17% 67% 17% 
Internal Medicine 2,255 14% 67% 33% 
Surgery 1,867 12% 90% 10% 
Anesthesiology 1,091 7% 79% 16% 
Pediatrics 1,072 7% 42% 18% 
Emergency Medicine 953 6% 75% 8% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 814 5% 51% 10% 
Radiology 715 5% 82% 11% 
Psychiatry 545 3% 62% 29% 
Cardiovascular Disease 440 3% 93% 30% 
Neurology 294 2% 72% 22% 
Hematology/Oncology 228 1% 74% 40% 
Gastroenterology 227 1% 93% 31% 
Nephrology 173 1% 77% 35% 
Pulmonary Diseases 149 1% 89% 32% 
Other 1,479 9% 74% 17% 
Missing 821 5% 58% 23% 
Total 15,820 100% 71% 19% 
Note: number of physicians who actively practice in 2016 in Indiana by gender and specialty.  
Include both allopathic and osteopathic doctors. Total = total active and in-state physicians. IMG = international 
medical graduates.  
 
As Table 5.3 shows, of the 15,820 doctors who are actively practicing, most specialize in 
family medicine or general practice (17%), followed by internal medicine (14%), surgery (12%), 
anesthesiology (7%) and pediatrics (7%). The specialties of 821 doctors cannot be identified. 
Male physicians are a majority of all specialties, but the proportions are much higher in some  
specialties. For example, men represent 93% of specialists in cardiovascular disease and 
gastroenterology, and 90% of surgeons. Female physicians are a majority only in pediatrics.  
Some specialties have a high percentage of IMGs, compared to the active in-state 
physician population. For example, 40% of the hematology/oncology, 35% of nephrology, and 
33% of internists are IMGs. U.S. trained physicians have the highest percentage in emergency 
medicine, radiology, and surgery.  
In addition to issuing unlimited physician licenses, the Indiana Board also grants state 
Controlled Substances Registrations (CSRs). CSRs regulate controlled substances prescribing 
and dispensing. The Board requires a separate CSR for each location a practitioner dispenses, 
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administrates or stores controlled substances; but does not require additional CSRs if one only 
prescribes in multiple locations.125 The vast majority of physicians in all specialties hold one 
CSR. Some specialties have a higher percentage of doctors holding multiple CSRs, such as 
hematology/oncology, and emergency medicine. I provide the number of CSRs held by doctors 
in various specialties in Appendix Table A.2. 
Roughly 27% of Indiana-licensed doctors attended international medical schools. I was 
able to identify 111 countries in which Indiana licensed doctors attended medical school. 
Graduates of medical schools in India (28%) and the Philippines (10%) accounted for the largest 
number of Indiana-licensed IMGs.126 Graduates from all Caribbean medical schools combined 
accounted for about 10% of the IMGs in Indiana. Caribbean medical graduates likely included 
both students from Caribbean regions and U.S. citizens who were unable to get into a U.S. 
medical school.127 Because of the discovery of “phony doctor networks and the establishment of 
proprietary foreign medical schools geared to U.S. citizens in the Caribbean basin” (Kusserow, 
Handley, and Yessian 1987, 821), Indiana and many other states maintain a list of “disapproved” 
medical schools for licensure purposes.  
 I provide in the Appendix further details on countries and regions that have graduated 
the most physicians in Indiana (Table A.3), U.S. allopathic medical schools attended by most 
Indiana physicians (Table A.4), and Caribbean medical schools that attended by most Indiana 
physicians (Table A.5). 
Unprofessional Behaviors and Board Sanctions 
After initial licensure, the Board monitors and enforces minimum quality of care 
standards through the disciplinary process. This section provides an overview of the cases 
                                                
125 See http://www.in.gov/pla/3740.htm  
126 FSMB reported that among all active physicians in the United States in 2014, 23% were from India, followed by 
15% from the Caribbean, 7% from the Philippines, 6% from Pakistan, and 5% from Mexico.  
127 The Indiana Board has disapproved a number of Caribbean schools for licensure application. I identified some 
graduates from those disapproved schools in my data—48 from U.T.E.S.A. (Dominican Republic), 21 from 
C.E.T.E.C. (Dominican Republic), and 3 from C.I.F.A.S. (Dominican Republic). The Indiana disapproved list was 
adopted from the California Board, which use Liaison Committee on Medical Education standards. For a full 
list of Indiana’s list, see https://secure.in.gov/pla/2799.htm. For California’s list, see 
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Applicants/Medical_Schools/Schools_Disapproved.aspx.  
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handled by the Indiana Board, the common forms of physician misconduct, and the range of 
board sanctions.  
Table 5.4 provides a breakdown by case type. Disciplinary cases typically involve certain 
statutory violations by licensed doctors. Other cases are administrative in nature, including 
reviews of denied initial license applications or denied licensure renewal application. Previous 
studies use the term “prejudicial cases” and “non-prejudicial cases” (e.g., Khaliq et al. 2005). 
Prejudicial case has the same meaning as “disciplinary case” here; non-prejudicial cases includes 
all three other categories.  (Strictly speaking, all four categories are prejudicial, in that the 
consequences can include loss or denial of a license to practice medicine.  
 
Table 5.4. Number of Cases by Type  
Case Type Freq. % 
Disciplinary case 856 86.0% 
Denied licensure application review 82 8.2% 
Denied renewal appeal 53 5.3% 
Misc. 5 0.4% 
Total  996 100.0% 
Note: number of cases by type. Disciplinary case refers to the same types of cases as “prejudicial cases” in previous 
studies.  
 
From 1972 to 2015, the Indiana Board has handled 996 cases, involving 936 doctors. As 
Table 4 shows, 86% (or 857) of the cases were disciplinary in nature; 8% (or 82) were reviews of 
the denied initial licensure applications; 5% (or 53) were reviews of the denied licensure 
renewals; and four were miscellaneous cases.  
31% of the disciplinary cases were settled without formal hearings. In those cases, the 
AG’s office reached consent agreements with the respondent doctors during the pre-hearing 
stage. In 54% of the disciplinary cases, the doctors were represented by one or more lawyers. 
18% of the disciplinary cases were closed by default.  
On average, it takes ten months (median duration) or two years (mean) for the 
administrative complaint to be resolved (e.g. the end of probation, revocation or surrender, etc.). 
The longest case in my data took 19 years. Note that this duration is measured from the filing of 
a filling investigated accusation, not from receiving the initial complaint.  
I now turn to the reasons why physicians are disciplined. As noted previously, I group 
disciplinary cases by their principal offense. Table 5.5 presents the results. As Table 5.5 
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indicates, some cases are reciprocal in nature – meaning the doctor has been investigated and 
sanctioned by another state. Under those circumstances, the Indiana Board will acknowledge the 
investigation and order of that licensing board, and take action by reciprocity. In Table 5.5, 
reciprocal cases were assigned to the category of their underlying offenses, and were used to 
compute the “% of reciprocal” column. 
 
Table 5.5: Disciplinary Actions: Principal Offenses and Share of Reciprocal 
Principal Offense All Cases % of Total % Reciprocal 
Drug-Diversion 217 25% 35% 
Negligence/ Incompetence 156 18% 75% 
Drug-Abuse 142 17% 27% 
Alcohol-Abuse 83 10% 36% 
Sex 79 9% 41% 
Health Care Fraud 42 5% 57% 
Other Criminal 35 4% 34% 
N.O.C. 102 12% 41% 
Total 856 100% 44% 
Note: number of disciplinary cases by principal offense. Disciplinary cases only. A single physician may be 
involved in multiple disciplinary cases. % reciprocal = the proportional of “all cases” that are based on 
investigation/sanction initiated and completed by another state’s licensing board.  
 
 As Table 5.5 reflects, no one offense type dominates, but drug diversion, negligence/ 
incompetence, and abuse were the most common reasons for discipline. About 44% of all 
disciplinary cases were reciprocal, but the proportion of reciprocity varies widely across offense 
types. Most noticeably, 75% of the negligence/ incompetence; and 57% of the fraud cases were 
reciprocal. At the other end of the spectrum, drug abuse seems to be primarily a “local matter.”  
I find that most (but not all) disciplinary cases result in some form of discipline. The list 
of available sanctions also ranges in severity.128 Table 5.6 show the distribution of imposed 
sanctions. Cases are coded based on the most severe sanction imposed. For example, a case 
would be coded as “suspension”, if the Board suspended the license; imposed a fine; and later 
approved to reinstate the license on a probationary basis.  
 
                                                
128 See  http://www.in.gov/ai/appfiles/pla-litigation/page2.html  
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Table 5.6: Outcomes of Disciplinary Cases 
Outcome   Cases Percent 
Sanctioned Probation 227 27% 
 Suspension 219 26% 
 Revocation 156 18% 
 Surrender 59 7% 
 Fine 61 7% 
 Reprimand/Censure 46 5% 
 Emergency Suspension 8 1% 
		 Total Sanctioned 776 91% 
Not Sanctioned No Action 20 2% 
 State Dismissal 20 2% 
 Board Dismissal 19 2% 
 Exonerated 12 1% 
  Total Not Sanctioned  80 8% 
  Pending 9 1% 
  Total 856 100% 
Note: Outcomes of disciplinary cases. One retirement in lieu of surrender counted as surrender; one voluntary 
indefinite summary suspension counted as suspension. Pending cases are those have been officially complained, but 
not yet disposed.   
 
As Table 5.6 shows, 91% of the Board’s cases ended up with actual disciplinary action, 
ranging from probation (27%) down to a reprimand/censure (5%). Sometimes probation is 
imposed as the sole sanction, but it is also often required after a suspended license is reinstated.  
Suspension (26%) is usually imposed for an undefined period with a minimum time that must 
pass before reinstatement.  
Revocation (18%) is the most severe sanction. Doctors may choose to reapply for a new 
license after seven years, but only two in my dataset did so. Surrender (7%) has the same effect 
of licensure revocation or suspension, depending on whether the doctor also agreed never to 
apply for an Indiana license again.   
Fines, reprimands and censures have only a limited impact on a physician’s license. Fines 
are often imposed in conjunction with other sanctions. Indiana state law allows the Board to 
impose fines on a violation basis (as opposed to a case basis), with $1,000 limit for each 
violation of law. A letter of reprimand creates an official disciplinary record; censure is an 
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expression of official disapproval. Relatively few cases ended up only with fine, reprimand or 
censure.  
Not all doctors with disciplinary files were sanctioned. Twelve doctors were exonerated 
completely after hearing; 19 cases were dismissed by the Board; and in 20 cases the AG moved 
to dismiss. Finally, in 20 cases the Board found violations, but decided to take no action.  
Emergency suspension (or summary suspension), is a non-final action. It is an extendable 
90-day suspension impose on doctors represents a clear and immediate danger to the public 
health and safety. It is often used before formal prosecutions. 25% of all emergency suspension 
cases were drug diversion cases, and 24% were drug-abuse cases.  
For the 776 physicians who ended up actual sanctions, Table 5.7 summarizes their 
educational and professional characteristics. I use regression analysis in the next section to 
estimate the effects of these attributes on the hazard of discipline.  
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Table 5.7: Characteristics of Disciplined Physicians 
Disciplined Physicians 
Credential  
MD 90% 
DO 9% 
Medical Education  
United States 73% 
International  25% 
Uncertain 2% 
Gender  
Male 88% 
Female 12% 
Specialty  
Family/General 28% 
Surgery 10% 
Psychiatry 8% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 8% 
Internal Medicine 7% 
Anesthesiology 7% 
Emergency Medicine 7% 
Radiology 3% 
Pediatrics 2% 
Neurology 2% 
Cardiovascular Disease 1% 
Hematology/Oncology 1% 
Pulmonary Diseases 1% 
Nephrology 1% 
Gastroenterology 0% 
Other 10% 
Missing 5% 
Total 776 
Note: Characteristics of physicians sanctioned by the Indiana Board. 776 licensed physician ended with actual 
sanctions. MD = allopathic doctors. DO = Osteopathic doctors. International medical education = degree from 
medical schools outside of U.S. Other specialty = other underrepresented specialty. Missing = specialty information 
not available.  
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Regression Analysis 
Who will be sanctioned, and for what? 
To what extent is the risk of discipline predictable? I approach this question first with a 
Cox proportional hazards model (model 1) which explains both the presence of an event and the 
length of time until the event happens (i.e., time at risk). I specify below the sample, the event of 
interest (i.e., failure), censoring, and left truncation in the data.  
The earliest disciplinary case in my dataset was opened in 1972, and involved a physician 
who graduated from medical school in 1930, and was licensed in 1938. It is possible that there 
were disciplinary cases involving physicians licensed earlier than 1938 that took place prior to 
1972. To avoid biasing my estimates, I accordingly exclude 704 physicians who were licensed 
before 1938.129 I also run a robustness check in which I drop the physicians who graduated from 
medical school prior to 1930. The results are not substantially different from those displayed in 
Table 5.8.  
The event of interest in model (1) is a disciplinary case that ultimately resulted in a 
sanction. If a physician received multiple sanctions over his or her time in the dataset, the event 
is the first sanction. But, virtually all disciplined physicians had only one case during the study 
period.130 
Aside from events, right censoring occurs where event had not occurred at the last time 
that physician was observed. Observations are also treated as censored if a disciplinary case was 
opened, but no action was imposed; or a non-disciplinary case was opened, regardless of the 
outcome. The final sample consists of 61,205 physicians, and 751 failures. The mean exit time is 
23 years after graduation, the median is 21 years, with a range of one to 79 years. 131 
                                                
129 I include these 704 physicians in the summary statistics, because there is no reason to believe the distributions of 
their characteristics are biased. I also exclude from the sample a physician whose license year was later than his 
expiration year. In addition, observations with missing values of any predicators are dropped from the estimation. 
130 Over the entire study period, only two physicians were sanctioned twice and only one was sanctioned three times. 
Because multiple events are extremely rare, I choose not to fit a recurring events model.  
131 Some physicians have unlikely long time from graduation to expire, likely due to data entering problems. For 
those with greater than 60 years of time until failure/censoring, I replace their time with years between expiration 
and license year plus four years if licensed by examination, or plus 11 years if licensed by endorsement. This 
decision rule is based one the mean calculated using the rest of the sample. Even with this imputation/correction, the 
longest exit time is still as 79 years long.  
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I use year of graduation from medical school, as opposed to license year, as the origin of 
the time scale in order to deal with the possible left truncation.132 It is tempting to use license year 
as the origin of the time scale (see e.g. Khaliq et al. 2005). However, the license “issue year” in 
my data is the year that a physician is licensed in Indiana, not the year in which the physician 
enters the physician workforce. And, closer examination of the data reveals that disciplined 
doctors who were licensed by endorsement have shorter analysis time; and that the mean time 
from graduation to Indiana licensure is four years among physicians licensed by examination, but 
10.7 years for the physician licensed by endorsement. This difference suggests the presence of 
left truncation, which means the physicians who were licensed by endorsement had been at risk 
before they enter the data. Stated differently, the risk exposure of physicians who are licensed by 
endorsement starts at their initial license year (which occurs in another state, and is therefore 
unobserved in the Indiana data.  License year is not the first year that a physician’s risk exposure 
begins. I therefore use graduation year as the origin of the time scale.  
Model (1) does not distinguish between the different kinds of disciplinary offenses. 
Models (2) – (6) test whether physician attributes are associated with some but not all types of 
offenses. One might suspect, for example, that physicians with more CSRs have a higher 
propensity towards drug abuse or diversion. But, there is no obvious reason to suspect that they 
are also more likely to be sexually involved with their patients.  
To examine the possibility of variation by offense-type, I subdivide offenses into five 
types, treating each offense type as a competing risk, so that each offense type has its own hazard 
function. I estimate a separate event-specific proportional hazards model for each offense type, 
such that when concerning one of the offense type, doctors sanctioned for all other offenses are 
treated as censored. Table 5.8 reports the results (in hazard ratios) of Cox regressions for binary 
outcomes, and for the competing-risks specifications. Hazard ratios give the ratio of the hazard at 
one level of independent variables compared to the hazard at a level that is one unit lower. 
Hazard, in this case, is the probability that an individual experiences an event at time t, given that 
the individual was still at risk at time t (meaning the doctor hasn’t been disciplined at t here). 
 
                                                
132 Left truncation occurs when the subjects have been at risk before entering the study. A typical example would be 
life insurance policy holder where the study starts on a fix date, but the policy holder has been at risk since birth (see 
e.g., Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May 2008, 7). 
  
111 
Table 5.8: Estimated Association between Physician Characteristics and Hazard for Discipline 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Discipline Abuse Drug Negligence Sex Other 
Panel A - Physician Attributes         
Male 1.572*** 1.503 1.593** 1.428 5.889** 1.156 
 (0.184) (0.322) (0.249) (0.402) (3.499) (0.281) 
CSR 1.217** 1.806*** 1.600*** 0.745 1.004 0.997 
 (0.0859) (0.236) (0.149) (0.129) (0.224) (0.165) 
Endorsement 1.304*** 1.218 1.254* 1.428 0.866 1.582* 
 (0.105) (0.185) (0.135) (0.276) (0.213) (0.297) 
IMG 1.026 0.250*** 0.901 1.569* 1.740* 1.295 
 (0.0906) (0.0660) (0.0854) (0.304) (0.450) (0.247) 
DO 1.566*** 1.253 1.760*** 1.226 2.404* 1.084 
 (0.210) (0.298) (0.285) (0.491) (1.009) (0.407) 
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Table 5.8 (cont.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Discipline Abuse Drug Negligence Sex Other 
Panel B - Specialties           
Family/GP 4.867*** 3.558*** 4.910*** 4.305*** 3.406** 6.748*** 
 (0.547) (0.749) (0.710) (1.251) (1.317) (1.865) 
Internal 2.043*** 1.728 1.780** 2.607** 2.219 2.439* 
 (0.325) (0.522) (0.382) (0.952) (1.083) (0.938) 
Ob/Gyn 4.771*** 2.442** 2.918*** 8.953*** 7.698*** 7.270*** 
 (0.751) (0.832) (0.706) (2.915) (3.420) (2.578) 
Pediatrics 1.027 0.454 0.650 1.536 3.819* 1.013 
 (0.299) (0.329) (0.300) (0.943) (2.163) (0.751) 
Psychiatry 4.534*** 2.475* 3.707*** 2.591* 7.372*** 8.681*** 
 (0.696) (0.877) (0.792) (1.190) (3.166) (2.776) 
Radiology 1.048 1.081 0.794 2.643* 0.514 0.633 
 (0.240) (0.417) (0.266) (1.026) (0.531) (0.467) 
Surgery 2.097*** 1.141 1.138 3.860*** 2.775* 4.168*** 
 (0.306) (0.345) (0.262) (1.202) (1.195) (1.314) 
Anesthesiology 3.058*** 4.194*** 3.507*** 1.889 2.333 2.338 
 (0.497) (1.072) (0.696) (0.931) (1.325) (1.085) 
Emergency Med. 3.374*** 3.457*** 3.191*** 4.400*** 2.850 3.609** 
 (0.567) (0.929) (0.681) (1.830) (1.642) (1.595) 
Observations 58279 58279 59882 58279 58279 58279 
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.042 0.036 0.025 0.037 0.038 
Log lik. -7290.3 -2040.8 -4034.1 -1243.6 -732.8 -1346.4 
Chi-squared 398.4 177.2 297.3 64.73 56.46 105.2 
Note: Cox Proportional Hazard Models. Time since graduation until first event. Event in model (1) is actual sanction 
in disciplinary case; event (2) is sanction for abuse offense; event (3) is sanction for drug-diversion; event (4) is 
sanction for negligence; event (5) is sanction for sexual misconducts; event (6) is sanction for N.O.C., other 
criminal, or Fraud. “CSR” refers to number of Controlled Substances Registrations, = 0 if none, =1 if one CSR, =2 if 
2+ CSRs. “Endorsement” = licensed in Indiana without examination, but instead based on existing licenses from 
elsewhere. “IMG” = attended non-U.S. medical schools, including Puerto Rico. “DO” =osteopathic doctor. 
Reference group for specialties = “other” unlisted, underrepresented specialties. Exponentiated coefficients. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
Model (1) in Table 5.8 suggests that male gender, increasing number of CSRs, being 
licensed by endorsement, having a DO degree, and practicing in certain specialties (including 
family medicine/general practice, internal medicine, obstetrics-gynecology, psychiatry, surgery, 
anesthesiology, and emergency medicine) are associated with higher hazard for discipline.  
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Competing-risks models (2) -(6) show that male physicians have a significantly higher 
hazard only for sexual misconducts and drug diversion cases. More specifically, a non-
disciplined male physician is 5.9 times more likely to be disciplined for sexual misconduct in the 
“next time interval” than a non-disciplined female physician; and 1.6 times more likely to be 
disciplined for drug diversion. Having more CSRs is only associated with a higher hazard for 
drug abuse and drug-diversion. Interestingly, IMGs have a higher hazard for negligence and 
sexual misconduct, but a lower hazard in drug abuse and drug diversion cases. When all offense 
types for IMGs are lumped into a binary outcome, these effects cancel each other out. 
Radiology and pediatrics both have a hazard ratio of one in model (1). That is, being a 
radiologist or pediatrician does not change the probability that an individual being disciplined at 
a given time point, given that the individual hasn’t been disciplined yet. Model (5), however, 
shows that pediatricians have a significantly higher hazard for being disciplined for sexual 
misconduct (3.8 times more likely).133 And model (4) shows that radiologists have a significantly 
higher hazard for being disciplined for negligence (2.6 times more likely).  
Anesthesiologists, who have less restricted access to controlled substances than most 
other physicians, have a significantly higher hazard for being disciplined for drug abuse (4.2 
times more likely) and drug-diversion (3.5 times more likely), even after controlling for the 
number of CSRs. Psychiatrists’ have a higher hazard across all offense types, but the risk is 
especially high for sexual misconduct (7.4 times more likely). Similarly, obstetricians-
gynecologists have a higher risk of being disciplined for all types of offense, but the risk is 
especially high for negligence (8.95 times more likely) and sexual misconduct (7.7 times more 
likely).  
 
 
 
                                                
133 All specialties are compared to “other” specialty, which is the combined group of all non-listed specialties. For 
example, a pediatrician is 3.8 times more likely to be disciplined for sexual misconducts than a physician of other 
specialties (that are not listed in the regression table) in the next “time point,” given that both haven’t been 
disciplined for sexual misconducts yet.  
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A Note on the Time Scale and Left Truncation 
Defining the time-at-risk is crucial in studying adverse events, as it is a part of the 
outcome of interests. A survival analysis/event-history analysis, in essence, explains a “failure” 
that happens at time t since the origin of the time scale (rather than any earlier or later time 
point). It is tempting to choose licensure year (in the state) as the origin of the time scale in state 
case study, as it is usually available and accurate in a state administrative database. But, choosing 
the origin is complicated by the fact that physicians have multiple methods to be licensed.  
In Indiana, 66.5% of the doctors were licensed by endorsement. That means, before they 
moved to Indiana, they had initially been licensed in other states; and the year of license in the 
state is not the beginning of their risk-exposure periods. This results in left truncation in the data. 
In other words, there is an “unobserved” period of time between physicians’ initial licensure and 
their mid-career relocation. Only those physicians who were licensed by endorsement have this 
“unobserved” period of time. When using first licensure in the state as the origin, one subtracts 
time-at-risk for those endorsement doctors; and thereby, artificially moves them up in the 
sequence of events. Because the partial likelihood estimation (of the Cox regression) depends on 
the order in which events occur, the “unobserved period” problem would artificially move up the 
events happened to those licensed by endorsement (as their time since the origin is truncated). 
One possible consequence is artificially inflating the coefficient of the endorsement indicator, 
which may further lead to the overestimation of the association between being licensed by 
endorsement and higher hazard for discipline (i.e., failed sooner than those licensed with 
examination). For this reason, I used year of graduation from medical school, rather than 
licensed year in Indiana, as the origin of the time scale. 
Alternative Specifications 
I briefly describe several alternative specifications in this section. These alternatives 
produced outcomes that are largely consistent with that of the Cox regression. The first 
alternative consists of a series of matched case-control studies. I match doctors based on medical 
school, graduation year (plus minus five years), and gender. In my binary outcome model, cases 
are disciplined doctors, regardless of the underlying offenses. In the subsequent event-specific 
models, cases are those doctors disciplined for each types of offense.  
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One of the advantages of the case-control model is that it allows me to match physicians 
based on the medical schools they attended. Using medical school as one of the matching criteria 
simultaneously fixes the medical degree and, more importantly, the prestige of one’s medical 
school. Comparing a “case physician” (i.e., disciplined) with some “controls” (i.e., not 
disciplined) who attended the same medical schools at similar time may cancel out some 
unmeasured factors.  
The conclusions of the case-control studies are consistent with those from the survival 
analysis. In the disciplined v. non-disciplined model, disciplined physicians are more likely to 
hold more CSRs, practice family medicine or general practice, internal medicine, obstetrics and 
gynecology, psychiatry, surgery, anesthesiology, and emergency medicine. In abuse and drug-
diversion models, disciplined physicians are more likely to hold more CSRs. Disciplinary cases 
for negligence are more likely to involve radiologists. I provide detailed results of these models 
in Appendix Table A.6.  
My second robustness check is a multinomial logistic regression, which allows me to test 
whether independent variables’ effect on the multinomial outcomes are distinguishable. These 
tests provide valuable information, because in event-specific proportional hazard model whether 
the random censoring is actually non-informative (i.e., being disciplined for one type of offense 
does not provide significant amount of information on the likelihood of other misconducts) is not 
directly testable. Post-estimate test for combining dependent categories suggests that any two of 
the listed types of offenses are distinguishable with respect to the independent variables in the 
model. This suggests the combined effect of independent variables on the odds of one outcome is 
significantly different from any other. Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives Tests also find no 
violation, suggesting that the outcomes are dissimilar (and not substitutes) and multinomial 
logistic model is appropriate. I also provide the multinomial logistic regression outputs in 
Appendix Table A.7.  
I also fit a random-effects panel data model, taking into account unobserved physician-
specific factors when explaining their hazard for discipline. This model reach similar conclusion 
as those discussed above. Table A.8 reports the results of the random-effects model.  
To address the rare-event issue that maximum likelihood estimation sometimes has 
difficulties to deal with, I also estimate a complementary log log regression and a simple logistic 
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regression model with the Firth method. The conclusions are not substantially different from 
those binary outcome models discussed above.  
Sanction Severity and Offense Types 
In the models just reported, I estimated the association between physician characteristics 
and their discipline hazard. In this section, I turn to a second causal process: conditional on the 
opening of a disciplinary case, does the “typical” sanction severity vary across offense type? I 
answer this question by fitting an ordered logit model to predict the sanction severity as a 
function of the underlying misconduct and certain procedural factors. The sample here consists 
of 856 disciplinary cases.   
This model posits that the likelihood of a disciplinary cases to end up with a more severe 
sanction may be related to the misconducts type, whether an Emergency Suspension Order was 
granted for the investigation (ES), whether the disciplinary decision was made in a default order 
(default), whether the offending doctor settled the case with the state AG (settlement), and 
whether the doctor was represented by lawyers (representation). Summary suspensions are 
granted to alleged clear and immediate danger to the public health and safety. The Board may 
decide cases by default if the offending doctor fails to appear for the scheduled hearing despite 
adequate notice. I use negligence as the omitted reference group for offense type, so that the odds 
ratio associated with each listed offense is a comparison to the results for negligence cases. I 
combine several offense types so that each category has reasonably large sample size for 
maximum likelihood estimation. Specifically, drug abuse and alcohol abuse are combined 
(“Abuse”); criminal conviction is merged with N.O.C (“Other”). Since I use principal offense to 
categorize underlying misconduct, negligence means “pure” negligence. Of course, in some 
sense, all of these offense classes involve quality of care concerns. Coding the principal offenses 
captures the nature of the misconducts and avoids small cell sizes (i.e., sample size of individual 
categories) which may result in unnecessary statistical difficulties.   
The outcome variable (i.e., severity) has five levels: (a) exoneration/dismiss/no action on 
proved violation, (b) fine only /reprimand/censure, (c) probation only, (d) suspension only, (e) 
revocation or voluntary surrender. The odds ratios reported in Table 5.9 are based on the 
likelihood of ending up with a more severe sanction, compared to the combined lower-level 
sanctions. Table 5.9 provides the results of the ordered logit model.   
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Table 5.9: Estimated Effects of Offense Type and Procedure Factors on Severity of Sanction 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A – Offense type 
Abuse offense 1.767** 1.400 1.765** 1.617* 1.390 1.588* 
 (0.332) (0.268) (0.346) (0.313) (0.266) (0.307) 
Drug offense 2.125*** 1.858** 1.953*** 1.941*** 1.912*** 1.974*** 
 (0.412) (0.363) (0.388) (0.380) (0.374) (0.386) 
Fraud Offense 1.852 1.955* 2.059* 2.045* 2.039* 2.106* 
 (0.594) (0.633) (0.673) (0.664) (0.668) (0.691) 
Sexual Offense 2.656*** 2.397*** 3.027*** 2.517*** 2.752*** 2.789*** 
 (0.653) (0.596) (0.769) (0.625) (0.690) (0.698) 
Other Offense 0.696 0.686 0.741 0.725 0.690 0.723 
 (0.156) (0.153) (0.165) (0.161) (0.154) (0.161) 
Panel B – Other 
ES order  2.476*** 2.872*** 2.128*** 2.807*** 2.378*** 
  (0.352) (0.424) (0.308) (0.410) (0.355) 
Default   8.726***    
   (1.628)    
Settlement    0.445***  0.475*** 
    (0.0594)  (0.0641) 
Representation     0.730*** 0.783** 
     (0.0578) (0.0626) 
Observations 856 856 855 856 856 856 
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.034 0.092 0.048 0.040 0.051 
Log lik. -1285.0 -1264.3 -1186.6 -1245.6 -1256.3 -1240.9 
Chi-squared 46.53 88.02 240.6 125.3 104.0 134.7 
Note: Ordered logit regression model on sanction severity level of (a) exonerated/dismissed/no action on proved 
violation, (b) fine/reprimand/censure, (c) probation, (d) suspension, (e) revocation/surrender. 
Negligence/incompetence is the reference category for offense-type indicators. “ES” stands for Emergency 
Suspension order. Exponentiated coefficients provided; Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
***p<0.001.  
 
I report in Table 5.9, Panel A the estimated association between offense type and sanction 
severity, controlling in Table 5.9, Panel B for various combinations of procedural covariates. 
Technically, default and settlement are not mutually exclusive, neither does default and 
representation. A doctor could fail to respond to the notice of hearing, but later hire a lawyer 
and/or decide to settle the case. But, in practice, doctors in default cases usually were not 
represented, and usually did not settle. I estimate two models (3) and (5) to incorporate each of 
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them in a model - one at a time - as opposed to dichotomizing them (in which case including one 
of them would be sufficient, and the other would have been omitted). 
Model (3), which controlled for default status, and (6), which controlled for settlement 
and representation status, are the most plausible models, as evidenced by the highest chi-squared 
for overall validity. I therefore focus on these two models for interpretation.  
As Panel A of Table 5.9 reflects, “typical” sanction severity does vary across offense 
type. Offenses, in descending odds of ending up with more severe sanctions, are sexual offense, 
health care fraud, drug diversion, abuse, “pure” negligence, and other miscellaneous offenses. 
More precisely, as predicted by model (3), for abuse offenses, the odds of higher versus the 
combined lower severity are 1.76 times higher than for negligence, holding other variables 
constant. For drug offenses, the odds are 1.95 times higher than for negligence. For health care 
fraud, the odds are 2.05 times higher than for negligence. For sexual misconduct, the odds are 
3.02 times higher. Other miscellaneous offenses are not significantly different from negligence in 
odds of higher sanction severity, but the direction is other offenses being less likely than 
negligence.  
Panel B covariates, which are procedure-related, also help to explain the severity 
outcome. For cases with Emergency Suspension Order history, the odds for high severity are 
2.872 times higher (model 3). For default cases the odds for high severity are 8.7 times higher 
than for non-default cases. For represented cases, the odds for high severity are 0.78 times lower, 
even when controlled for the presence or absence of settlements. Settled cases are 0.475 times 
less likely to be severely sanctions, all else equal.   
Below, I further present some the results from the ordered logit model just described: first 
focusing on the offense type, and then on the procedural factors. In Table 5.10, I summarize the 
mean probability of revocation, suspension, probation, other, and no action by offense type, 
based on model (3) reported above.  
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Table 5.10: Mean Predicted Probability of Severity 
                  Mean prob. of sanction severity   
  Revocation Suspension Probation Other sanction No action 
Abuse 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.13 0.07 
Drug 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.06 
Fraud 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.06 
Negligence 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.19 0.12 
Other offense 0.11 0.18 0.31 0.23 0.17 
Sex 0.34 0.30 0.24 0.08 0.04 
Note: mean predicted probability of sanction severity by offense type controlling for default statues and ES order 
history, based on Model (3) in Table 5.9. Predictions based on other models are not substantially different.  
 
By and large, probation is more commonly imposed among all offenses, followed by 
suspension and revocation, other sanction and no action are relatively unusual. Table 5.10 makes 
it clear that sexual misconducts, fraud, and drug cases are more likely to end up with revocation 
or suspension; and therefore are less common in probation, other, and no action. By comparison, 
the Board appears to be less inclined to revoke or suspend licenses over negligence or other 
miscellaneous offenses.  
Figure 5.2, also based on model (3) estimation and prediction, shows how the probability 
of severity vary with default, settlement, and representation status. Part 1- 5 separately plot the 
probability of five level of severity (y axis).  
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Figure 5.2: Mean probability of severity by default, settlement, and representation status. 
 
Note: mean probabilities of revocation (part 1), suspension (part 2), probation (part 3), other sanction (part 4), and 
no action (part 5) by offense default, settlement, and representation status. Predications are based on ordered logit 
model (3).  
 
Part 1 – 2 of Figure 5.2 (i.e., the first row) shows probability of the two most severe 
sanctions. Part 3 – 4 (i.e., the second row) displays the less severe ones, and part 5 (i.e., the last 
row) shows the unusually cases where the board dismisses the case or decides to take no action. 
Most lines move up and downs to the same directions with in charts, suggesting that default, 
representation, and settlement are systematically associated with different level of sanction 
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severity. Part 1 makes clear that where the offending doctors fail to respond despite the Board’s 
notice of hearing, and let the Board decides the case by default, the probability of higher severity 
is substantially higher than for those cases with lawyer representation, or settled cases. None of 
default, presentation, and settlement seems to matter much in cases ended up with suspension. 
But, negligence and miscellaneous cases, when decided by default, appear to be slightly more 
likely to end up with suspension. Conversely, default cases are less likely, and settlement and 
representation are more likely, to ended up with just probation or other sanction (e.g., fine only, 
censure, reprimand). These predictions mirror the odds ratio changes reported in Table 5.9.  
Discussion 
Discipline is rare 
Consistent with prior research, I find that discipline is rare. About 1.2% of 63,485 
Indiana-licensed doctors in my data were disciplined. It is difficult to know whether this figure is 
too big, too small, or just right. There are various reasons why the Board might be reluctant to 
pursue disciplinary action – including a shortage of funding and/or staff, reluctance to take on the 
medical establishment, and concern about access to care if a (admittedly problematic) physician 
is unable to see patients. For example, the Board justified the reinstatement of a suspended 
license stating that “[s]ince the Respondent's suspension, the delivery of medical services in this 
rural community has been severely compromised.” 134In another case, in another case, when 
deciding whether to renew a license, the Board noting that the physician “was convicted of a 
misdemeanor in Michigan .... It did not involve the treating of a patients in any way and did not 
involve predatory behavior”135 
 
                                                
134 In the Matter of Kenneth D. Watkins, Findings of Fact and Order (License 01028715A, 11/13/1986), available at 
http://www.in.gov/apps/pla/litigation/pdfs.aspx?lic=01028715A, 3. A physician in the same community submitted a 
letter indicating that the defendant had 2,000 patients in his practice, and “they are currently with limited medical 
care due to Dr. Watkin’s suspension and the limited number of doctors in the area.” Id. at Exhibit B.  
135 Clausen v. State of Indiana, Findings of Fact and Order 12/27/2001, available at 
http://www.in.gov/apps/pla/litigation/pdfs.aspx?lic=01031859A, 1. 
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Offense Type Matters 
Disciplinary risk is not random. Rather, the odds of being disciplined for certain type of 
misconduct vary, based on physicians’ personal and professional characteristics. If state 
licensing boards wish to strengthen their physician quality control, their own licensure databases 
offer a good starting point. For example, most physicians hold one (and only one) CSR. Indiana 
physicians with multiple CSRs face a significantly higher risk of being disciplined for substance 
abuse and drug diversion. Indiana could easily direct more educational and/or monitoring efforts 
to those with more CSRs. Similar strategies could be used for other offense types. 
To preventing sexual misconducts, states may wish to emphasize on measures such as 
having a female chaperone or nurse (which is not practical for psychiatry given the confidential 
nature of the practice), making previous offenses known to the patients, requiring group 
practicing or supervising practicing for offenders, especially for Obstetrics-gynecology, 
pediatrics and psychiatry practicing. IMGs have higher hazard for negligence and sexual 
misconduct; but significantly lower hazard for abuse and drug-diversion cases. State boards, 
therefore, may continue to focus on the authenticity of credentials, adequacy of clinical training 
of IMGs.  
A natural question would be given that discipline is rate, how useful are the ameliorative 
measures, which might increase the cost of delivery of services? Of course, It is ultimately an 
empirical question whether ameliorative measures are cost-effective. And, the cost impact of the 
ameliorative measures should be a factor in the analysis. But, I model the the relationship 
between physician characteristics and disciplinary risk to predict which kind of physicians are 
potentially “prone” to disciplines. Thus, ameliorative measures (e.g., chaperones) may be 
implemented to protect vulnerable sub-populations against not only those disciplined doctors, but 
also those risky ones.  
Guidance For Patients 
More and more states make detailed information about their licensee physicians available 
online. What should consumers infer from such data? First, extremely few doctors are 
disciplined. So, one should not avoid male physicians simply because they are more likely to be 
disciplined. Conversely, the rarity of discipline means that one should take it seriously once it 
occurs.  
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Guidance For Physicians 
Discipline is rare, and focuses on egregious unethical and unprofessional behavior. As 
such, discipline does not appear to be a threat to those who practice in good faith. Medically 
necessary prescription of controlled substances seems unlikely to lead to an investigation, but pill 
mills will cause difficulties.  
Physicians that who have disciplinary cases opened, first advice would be try to appear 
for hearing and to avoid default decision. For default cases the odds for high severity are 8.7 
times higher than for non-default cases, all else equal. Second, hiring a lawyer is probably a good 
idea. And, try to settle the case if possible. My findings show that the odds for high severity are 
0.78 times lower for represented cases, and settled cases are 0.475 times less likely to be severely 
sanctions. 
Further analysis also suggests that “typical” sanction severity vary across offense types. 
Offenses, in descending odds of ending up with more severe sanctions, are sexual offense, health 
care fraud, drug diversion, abuse, pure negligence, and other miscellaneous offenses. A 
suppressing finding it that, pure negligence cases are less likely to end up with severe sanctions – 
suggesting that the isolated (i.e., not habitual) negligence is one-piece evidence that the state and 
the Board consider to evaluate physician quality. Some systematic factors may also help to 
explain. Prior studies noted that high cost of quality-case cases, and lack of agreed standards of  
how many instances of negligence are needed to demonstrate incompetence to a great extent 
impeded boards’ performance in related cases (Bovbjerg, Aliaga, and Gittler 2006). 
Indeed, the link between negligence and state discipline is curios. In my data, negligence 
cases represent a fair share of offenses in my data, but 75% of them were reciprocal. That is, 
most negligence cases were not initiated by Indiana. The negligent doctors had been investigated 
and disciplined in another state. Indiana subsequently recognized the finding and sanction. In 
Chapter 6, I further examine the overlap between state discipline and the med mal system.  
Conclusion 
I use comprehensive data on licensing and discipline from Indiana to study the physician 
population, the characteristics of the disciplined physicians, and the severity of the imposed 
sanctions. I find that drug-diversion, drug abuse, and alcohol abuse account for most cases of 
physician discipline in Indiana. Consistent with past research, I find that some physician 
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characteristics are associated with a higher hazard for discipline. I further find that the effects of 
those physician characteristics very across offense types. My analysis on sanction severity 
suggests the cases where negligence is the only ground for discipline are significantly less likely 
to end up with severe sanctions. My findings make clear that neither disciplinary risk nor 
sanction severity is random. I further study the medical liability, which deals exclusively with 
negligence, and state discipline in Chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER 6: IS REPEAT NEGLIGENCE DISCIPLINED: 
OVERLAP BETWEEN MALPRACTICE AND DISCIPLINE TARGETS 
 
The medical malpractice and the state licensure systems have a common goal of ensuring 
quality of care. The med mal system does it through ex post private litigation; the licensing 
system does it through ex ante permission to practice (i.e., licensure), coupled with ex post 
disciplinary cases against physicians that engage in “bad” behavior. How often do these two 
quality control mechanisms pursue actions against the same doctors? I merge med mal history 
with board disciplinary records of 29,939 physicians licensed by Indiana, who practiced in the 
state between 1975 to 2015. I identify and compare the demographic characteristics associated 
with a higher likelihood of med mal claims and medical discipline. I also estimate how past med 
mal claiming affects the doctor’s current risk of discipline, and vice versa. I show that the state 
licensure system pursued disciplinary actions against far fewer doctors than the med mal system 
did. Extremely few doctors were tagged by both systems, and the most common sanction for 
such physicians was probation. Regression analysis using a panel data model indicates that 
disciplinary risk increases with cumulative paid med mal cases, with larger payouts increasing  
disciplinary risk. However, unpaid med mal cases had no significant effect on disciplinary risk. 
In the short run (<2 years), disciplinary action results in higher med mal claiming risk, but lower 
med mal claiming in the long run.  These findings suggest an obvious model for the interaction 
of the two systems.  
Introduction 
The med mal and state licensing systems are two distinct and separate regulatory 
mechanisms. Yet, they share a common purpose: setting a minimum standard of quality, to 
ensure vulnerable patients are not exploited or mistreated. Although these two systems use 
different mechanisms (ex post private litigation versus ex ante licensure, coupled with ex post 
disciplinary cases against physicians that engage in “bad” behavior), they will ideally assist and 
reinforce each other in accomplishing their common purpose. Thus, one should expect to find 
evidence of overlap, particularly in dealing with repeat offenders.  
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In this Chapter, I use med mal and disciplinary data on 29,939 physicians who practiced 
medicine in Indiana at some point during 1975-2015. I show that Indiana’s licensure system 
pursued actions against many fewer doctors than its med mal system did. And, a very small 
number of doctors were “tagged” by both systems. During the past four decades, 39% of 
Indiana’s physicians were sued for med mal, and 10% of physicians had one or more paid med 
mal claims. By comparison, less than 2% of Indiana doctors were involved in a disciplinary case, 
and only 0.55% of Indiana doctors had one or more paid med mal claims and were also 
disciplined. The most severe disciplinary sanctions were used sparingly; most disciplined 
physicians ended up with probation or a less restrictive licensure sanction.   
I used a  panel data model to analyze the link between physicians’ past experience and 
the subsequent likelihood of being disciplined or involved in a paid med mal claim.  The model 
shows that disciplinary risk increases with the cumulative number of paid med mal claims. 
Larger paid cases had a stronger effect than smaller ones. Unpaid cases had no significant effect 
on disciplinary risk. But, In the short run (<2 years), disciplinary action results in higher med 
mal claiming risk, but lower med mal claiming in the long run.   
My findings suggest that med mal payments do signal quality issues to the licensure 
system, but the effectiveness of board discipline in preventing those doctors from continuing to 
practice medicine is questionable at best.  
This chapter proceed as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature on the link 
between med mal and disciplinary systems. Section III describes my data sources, and the 
detailed steps that I went through to construct the sample that I used for my analysis. Section IV 
presents the results; Section V discusses the main findings and some implications. Section VI 
concludes.  
Literature Review 
It there any interplay between the med mal tort system and state medical board 
discipline? In this section, I first review past research that approached this question at the state 
level, and then turn to studies that focus on claim-prone and discipline-prone physicians. I 
conclude by noting some general limitations of past research.  
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State level – Tort Reforms and Licensing Board Activity Levels 
State level studies have compared licensing board activity levels before and after tort 
reform, and found some evidence of interplay. Stewart et al. (2012) used data from the Texas 
Medical Board covering 1996 to 2010, and concluded that the number of board actions 
significantly increased after Texas’ 2003 tort reforms. Lavenant, Hayward, and Jesilow (2002) 
compared sanction rates in states with and without tort reforms, and concluded that modifying 
the rules on joint and several liability was associated with increased serious actions (probation, 
suspension, and revocation, excluding consent orders) by licensing boards, while imposing 
screening panels and limiting attorneys’ fees decreased the rate of sanctions. In a related study, 
Jesilow and Ohlander (2010) relied on the same set of data, employed a panel count model and 
reached similar conclusions. 
Claim-Prone and Discipline-Prone Physicians 
Prior studies have found that a few “claim prone” doctors with distinct characteristics 
accounted for a disproportionately large share of med mal claims and payout dollars. For 
example, Rolph, Pekelney, and McGuigan (1993), Bovbjerg and Petronis (1994), and Sloan et al. 
(1989) all found that physicians with claims in the first half of the study period were more likely 
to have claims in the latter half of their data.136  Weycker and Jensen (2000) conducted a similar 
study, but were able to control for education, training credentials, and practice characteristics –
none of which were available in the earlier studie. They similarly found that those who had 
worse records during the first half of the data were more likely to incur claims in the latter half of 
the period.  
Gibbons et al. (1994) developed a random intercept model to examine the effect of claim 
history and risk management education on physician vulnerability to a med mal claim. They 
found that there is a sizeable random physician effect that remain unobserved; that med mal risk 
increased between age 40 to 60; and that the risk increased following an initial claim, particularly 
in the year subsequent to the initial year. More recently, Studdert et al. (2016), employing 
multivariate survival analysis, found that a small number of physicians with distinctive 
                                                
136 These studies, in response to the then Secretary of DHHS’s recommendation for replacing the zero floor for 
NPDB reporting requirement with a $30,000 threshold, emphasized the unpaid and small-payment claims’ 
predictive values on future large payment. 
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characteristics accounted for a disproportionately large number of paid malpractice claims; and 
that physicians’ risk of future paid claims increased with their number of previous paid claims.  
Similar studies have identified physician characteristics associated with disciplinary 
sanctions, and with high rate of recidivism. Grant and Alfred (2007) found a high degree of 
recidivism among disciplined doctors. Tillinghast and Cournos (2000) similarly found that 
physicians who engaged in sexual misconduct with their patients were likely to be sanctioned 
again for the same offense.    
Individual physicians – few but existing overlapping targets 
Sloan et al. (1989) found that fewer than 10% of the physicians with adverse claim 
experiences were disciplined by the licensing board. When there was discipline, it was limited to 
letter of guidance or probation.  None of the physicians with an adverse claim experience had 
their license suspended or revoked. Fournier and Mcinnes (1997) used an estimate of physicians’ 
“excess” med mal risk as a regressor, along with other characteristics, to predict the likelihood of 
being disciplined.137  by the Florida Board on the data from 1992-1995. They reported found an 
overall low rate of overlap between med mal and discipline; but by comparison, the doctors 
associated with worse med mal records were more likely to be disciplined by the licensing board. 
This elaborate model was unfortunately limited by data quality. The authors relied on court-
awarded payment, which presumably left out settled cases, to estimate physician’s med mal risk. 
And, the study period is relatively short. There might be board actions that were were taken years 
after the med mal claims and were not captured by the data.  
Other studies used the National Practitioners Data Bank (NPDB), which have been 
collecting adverse events against individual providers since 1991, to study the physicians with 
multiple reported events and the relationship between different types of events. Oshel, Croft, and 
Rodak (1995) examined the event rates and the correlations between various types of events. 
They reported that the mast majority (82%) of reports received by the NPDB were med mal 
payments, and licensure reports made up the bulk of the rest. Most physicians with payment had 
only one such report; and a few (16.7%) had more than one. They found, on state level, a low 
correlation coefficient between state med mal payment rates and adverse action rates. On 
                                                
137 Excess med mal risk was defined as the difference between the physician’s actual number of paid cases and the 
expected number of cases of the peer group. 
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individual level, most (84.7%) had only med mal payment report, fewer (12.5%) had only 
reportable action reports, and only 2.8% (of those with report) had both.  
The Data Bank’s annual reports, during the subsequent decade (1996-2006), consistently 
confirmed the earlier findings reported by Oshel, Croft, and Rodak (1995). A few physicians 
were responsible for a large proportion of both number and the dollars of malpractice payments. 
The relationship between malpractice payment and state license actions were weak on both state 
aggregate and individual level. In 2006 (the latest year that the figure was reported), 5% had both 
malpractice payment report and state licensure action report (U.S. General Accounting Office 
2006, 38). The NPDB, however, also consistently reported that as a physician’s number of 
malpractice payment increased, the likelihood that the physician had no reportable action 
decreases and vice versa. The tendency reversed for physicians with nine or more actions, 
suggesting that physicians with large number of adverse events might leave their practice and no 
longer have the opportunity to be the targets of malpractice and/or licensure actions (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 1996, 21). 
AbuDagga et al. (2016) used NPDB data from 2003-2013, and focused on physicians 
with sexual misconducts. The authors found a fairly low level of interplay among the malpractice 
system, the state medial board discipline system, and the clinical privilege system in dealing with 
physician sexual misconducts. They reported that the majority of sexual misconducts was 
handled by state boards only; and of those cases handled by malpractice or clinical privilege 
system, only 30% were also disciplined by medical boards.  
Most of these studies were dated, some were limited by data availability or study design. 
Studies used data between the 1980s to earlier the 1990s were unable to take into account that 
this was also when many states reformed their medical boards and enacted mandatory reporting 
laws, which were aimed at giving the licensing boards better access to the med mal information. 
Studies relied on the NPDB data were able to examine med mal that resulted in payments. 
Studies used court-awarded damages as indication of paid claims presumably left out settled 
cases. 
Data 
In this chapter, I focus on the 29,939 Indiana physicians who practiced in the state at 
some point during 1975-2015. As in prior chapters, my data on each physician’s malpractice 
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claims was obtained from the Patient’s Compensation Fund (PCF) sector of the Indiana 
Department of Insurance (IDOI). This med mal database (“PCF data”) contains all claims, 
payouts, and insurance coverages associated with Indiana health care providers from 1975 
through 2015. Indiana requires all med mal claims first be filed with the IDOI, and subsequent 
actions be reported. It also requires all providers wish to be protected by the state’s Med Mal Act 
to file proof of required primary coverage with the IDOI. Each claim, paid or unpaid, in the 
database contains information on the provider-defendants, the ultimately indemnity payments, 
dates of injury, filing, and closing.  
From the PCF data, I constructed a physician-level data file that contains the malpractice 
records of all known Indianan health care providers (“PCF providers”) since 1975. For each 
physician, I rolled up number of claims (paid and unpaid), number of paid claims, number of 
claims exceeded $100,000 (in 2015$, “large claim”).  
The PCF data, in 917 paid cases, failed to identify the paid defendants.138 383 of the 917 
are single-defendant cases, the remainder (534) have multiple named defendants. Since I wish to 
construct the malpractice history data on physician-level, I need to allocate these paid cases to 
physicians in these 534 cases (resulted in payment, but unclear from which defendant). 
Although it is not possible to identify the actually paid defendants in those cases, it is 
possible to get some ideas of how sensitive the “paid cases” analysis is to the treatment of those 
cases. I identify “paid” cases in two ways. In essence, I run every paid cases analysis twice, each 
time treating those in a different, extreme way. “Measure 1” treats all of the named defendants in 
these 534 cases as paid defendants; “measure 2” treats none of the named defendants as paid 
defendants. Measure 2 is under-inclusive, in the sense that it erases these 534 paid cases from the 
history of the actually liable defendants. Measure 1, on the other hand, may allocate payout cases 
to someone who, in the reality, did not make the payment. As a result, measure 1 may slightly 
inflate the number of physicians faced paid cases, and marginally overestimated the effect of 
their characteristics on the likelihood of med mal payment.  
Measure 2, the “over-estimation” scenario, is more plausible. I, therefore, use measure 2 
for tables in the main text; rerun all paid-case analysis by measure 1 and put them in Appendix 
Section VI. I explain the difference in results (if any) in the main text. 
                                                
138 “Paid cases” refer to those med mal cases closed with positive payout.  
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 Licensure data come from the Medical Licensing Board. The Board operates as a part of 
Professional Licensing Agency (PLA). The licensure data provide a listing of all allopathic (MD) 
and osteopathic (DO) physicians, active or inactive, licensed by the Board at some point since 
1975 (“PLA providers”). It contains detailed information regarding each physician’s 
demographic and educational backgrounds. 
Licensure disciplinary records were not available as a database, but instead, came as 
scanned version of archived administrative documents (“license litigation files”) from the PLA. 
Those documents include Complaint, Petition for Summary Suspension, Motion, Order to Show 
Cause, Emergency Suspension Order, Notice of Proposed Default, Finding of Facts and Order, 
etc. Through an elaborate set of protocol, I coded the offender’s name, license number, offenses 
(disciplinary grounds), case outcomes, sanctions type and durations into a dataset.  
I treat a matter that has a distinct administrative cause number assigned by the Licensing 
Board as a disciplinary “case”. A case, therefore, has one offender/physician, and may involve 
multiple sanctions. Both the licensure data and the disciplinary files identifies physicians by their 
license numbers. All disciplinary records can be matched to the licensure data.  
I then merged the PCF provider data (with med mal history) with the PLA provider data 
(with licensure and discipline records). Because the PCF and the PLA use different identification 
systems, not every physician was successfully matched. I first merge the two based on license 
numbers; and when license number returns no matches, on last and first names. Figure 6.1 
summarizes the data sources and the merge process. 
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Figure 6.1: Data Overview. 
Note: 1. “PCF providers” = providers in the PCF database, include individuals and institutions; identified by 
provider ID. Some PCF providers have multiple provider IDs. 2. “PLA providers” = providers in the Professional 
Licensing Agency database, including MDs and DOs licensed in Indiana; identified by license number. 3. License 
matched = successful merge based on license number. 4. Name matched = merge based on last and first name. 5. 
Matching returns “m:1 or 1:m” duplicates when multiple PCF providers with same license number/ name matched 
with one PLA provider, or visa versa. 6. “Overlap providers” = matched PLA and PCF records, based on license 
number, or names where license number returns no matches.  
 
License numbers identify 30,432 matches. For those had no license matches, I then use 
last and first name to match, which returns an additional 737 matches. Those matches, however, 
involved 1,230 “many to one” or “one to many” duplicates (multiple PCF providers with same 
license number/ name matched with one PLA provider, or visa versa). Elimination of those 
duplicates ultimately left 29,939 “overlap providers.” I use exact matches to avoid mismatches; 
and drop the duplicates to avoid double-counting providers and overestimating their 
characteristics on the risk of being tagged by one or both the systems. 
PCF Providers 
N1=104,743 
PLA Providers 
N2=63,485 
License matched 
n=30,432 
Name matched 
n=737 
License or name matched 
n=31,169 
Overlap physicians 
n=29,939 
m:1 or 1:m duplicates 
n=1,230 
License unmatched 
Use name 
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Every overlap provider has a distinct license number and a distinct PCF provider ID. The 
final sample consists of 29,939 “overlap providers”, who were allopathic or osteopathic 
physicians licensed by the Indiana Medical Licensing Board who practiced in the state at some 
point between 1975 – 2015. The constructed dataset contains these overlap providers, their 
demographics, medical education, practice characteristics, together with their malpractice history 
and board disciplinary records. I use this cohort of physicians for most of the analysis in this 
chapter.  
In examining the relationship between past experience and current malpractice risk, I 
constructed a panel dataset for the overlap providers. Every physician appears in the dataset for 
the number of years that they practice in the state. That is, every observation in the panel data is 
identifiable by person-year. Malpractice and discipline records are collapsed by person-year; and 
“past experiences” are measured as cumulative number of events subtracting the number of 
events incurred in the current year (i.e., running sum minus the events in current year). 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics on the samples, both the original ones and the 
overlap proportion. I mainly use the cohort of 29, 939 physicians in the analysis.  
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Table 6.1: Data Overview 
  Observations Data Sources 
PLA providers 63,485 from licensure data 
PCF providers 104,743 from PCF database 
Overlap providers 29,939 based on license number, or last + first names  
Disciplined providers  
All 935 from license litigation files coding 
Overlap 578 based on matched physicians 
Providers with med mal claims 
All 26,434 from PCF database 
Overlap 11,823 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Providers with paid med mal claims 
All      4,639 from PCF database 
Overlap 3,231 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Overlap Providers with both Med Mal & Discipline 
All claims 350 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Paid claims 166 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Note: descriptive statistics on PLA providers, PCF providers, and the overlap providers used in subsequent analysis. 
“PLA providers” = providers in the Professional Licensing Agency database, including MDs and DOs licensed in 
Indiana; identified by license number. “PCF providers” = providers in the PCF database, include individuals and 
institutions; identified by provider ID. Some PCF providers have multiple provider IDs. “Overlap providers” = 
matched PLA and PCF records, based on license number, or names where license number returns no matches. 
“Disciplined providers” = physicians have disciplinary cases with the PLA. “Providers with med mal claims” 
include all claims, paid or unpaid. “Providers with paid med mal claims” take into account only those with claims 
resulted in indemnity payments. See Appendix Table A.12 for the version using an alternative measure of paid 
cases. 
 
Providers from one data source failed to match with any from the other for at least two 
reasons. First, PCF and PLA databases were created for different purposes and captured different 
set of providers. The PLA providers were licensed physicians, whereas PCF providers could be 
physician, non-physician individuals or institutions. The second cause for non-matching is 
technical matching failure. In this case, some physicians may in fact exist in other databases, but 
have no matches due to missing license numbers (from the PCF data) or misspelling of names (in 
either database). 
Table 6.2 summaries and compares the demographic and professional characteristics of 
all PLA providers and the overlap providers. I mainly used PLA data to determine physician 
characteristics, and use PCF data to supplement specialty information where needed.  
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Table 6.2: Physician Characteristics 
Panel A. Basic Attributes 
  Overlap All PLA 
Credential   
MD 93% 93% 
DO 7% 7% 
Gender   
Female 24% 23% 
Male 75% 75% 
Missing 1% 2% 
Medical Education   
U.S.  74% 67% 
IMG 21% 27% 
Uncertain 5% 6% 
Licensed by   
Examination 32% 33% 
Endorsement/application 68% 67% 
CSRs   
None 4% 38% 
One 85% 56% 
Two or more 11% 6% 
In-state   
No 65% 59% 
Yes 35% 40% 
Uncertain 0.30% 1% 
Note: “U.S” medical education = medical schools located in the United States, excluding Puerto Rico. “IMG” = 
International medical graduates. “Endorsement/Application” = license first elsewhere, and licensed by Indiana PLA 
without examination. “CSR” = controlled substances registration, a state license required for every location that a 
provider physically possess controlled substances. “In-state” = practice address on file with PLA shows Indiana zip 
code.  
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Table 6.2 (cont.)  
Panel B: Specialty   
 Overlap All PLA 
Anesthesiology 7% 7% 
Cardiovascular Disease 3% 2% 
Emergency Medicine 9% 8% 
Family/General 16% 15% 
Gastroenterology 1% 1% 
Hematology/Oncology 1% 1% 
Internal Medicine 13% 13% 
Nephrology 1% 1% 
Neurology 2% 2% 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 5% 5% 
Pediatrics 6% 6% 
Psychiatry 4% 4% 
Pulmonary Diseases 1% 1% 
Radiology 7% 8% 
Surgery 13% 12% 
Other 12% 12% 
N 29,939 63,485 
Note: Summary statistics on provider characteristics. % in specialty section = % of non-missing. 
 
As Table 6.2 shows, overlap providers and PLA providers have similar distributions of 
most characteristics. Of both samples, most are male MDs educated in U.S. medical schools, 
licensed in Indiana by endorsement or application. Most practice in family medicine or general 
practice, internal medicine, and surgical subspecialties. Physicians with some attributes may be 
underrepresented among overlap providers, including International medical graduates (“IMGs”) 
and physicians with no Controlled Substances Registrations (“CSRs”). 
Findings 
In this section, I begin by examining the “repeat players” in the two systems, and then 
turn to those that overlap. I conclude with a random-effects model, estimating whether past med 
mal and disciplines predict later med mal and discipline risks.  
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Repeat Offenders 
In this section, I examine the number and percentage of physicians with multiple med 
mal claims, multiple payments, and/or multiple disciplines. I begin by summarizing the “risk 
exposure period” which defines the base for med mal and board discipline risks. Having five 
claims during a one-year exposure period, for example, would be different than five claims 
during a ten-year period. I define exposure period as years with liability insurance in Indiana. For 
most physicians, the insurance period equals the license period. For the 264 providers that the 
PCF data do not record insurance data, I use license expiration minus issuance as the exposure 
period.139 I treated coverage shorter than twelve months as one year of coverage, and treated 
coverage end dates later than 2015 as 2015. Table 6.3 summarizes the exposure/coverage period 
of overlap providers.  
 
Table 6.3: Risk Exposure Period, years with insurance coverage (overlap physicians only) 
Years insured No. of physicians % 
1-4 11,284 38% 
5-9 5,309 18% 
10-19 6,797 23% 
20-29 6,245 21% 
30-39 246 1% 
40-49 33 0.1% 
50+ 25 0.1% 
Total  29,939 100% 
Note: Distribution of risk exposure periods of overlap providers. Risk exposure = years of insurance coverage in 
Indiana. Percentages add up to more than 100% due to rounding. 
 
Table 6.3 shows that many physicians have relatively short exposure periods. The earliest 
record in the data starts in year 1922; and the latest ends in 2015. Virtually all physicians in my 
dataset have less than thirty years of exposure, and almost 40% of physicians have less than five 
years of exposure. 
Table 6.4 summarizes the med mal experiences for overlap providers, regardless of 
whether the defendant paid or not. The third column shows the proportion of providers with the 
                                                
139 I choose insurance (in Indiana) period as the primary identification, to take into account that some physicians 
may keep their Indiana licenses active while not actually practice in the state. In this case, insurance coverage period 
presumably serves as the more accurate “exposure” period. 
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corresponding number of med mal cases. The forth column then provides similar information for 
those have been sued at least once.  
 
Table 6.4: Number of Physicians with n Med Mal Claims  
No. of Med 
Mal n= 
No. of 
Providers 
% % with n>0 
0 18,116 61% N/A 
1 5,140 17% 43% 
2 2,395 8% 20% 
3 1,407 5% 12% 
4 926 3% 8% 
5-9 1,517 5% 13% 
10-19 370 1% 4% 
20+ 68 0.2% 0.6% 
Total 29,939 29,939 11,823 
Note: Number of overlap providers by number of med mal claims, paid or unpaid.  
 
As Table 6.5 shows, most (61%) physicians have not been sued for med mal. Of those 
who have been sued, 43% were sued once. 68 physicians (0.2% of all overlap providers, and 
0.6% of overlap providers with one or more med mal claims) have more than twenty cases. 
Three physicians had more than 100 claims.  
Table 6.5 provides the same information as Table 6.4, but is limited to cases resulted in 
an indemnity payout.   
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Table 6.5: Number of Physicians with n Paid Cases 
No. of Paid 
Cases 
No. of 
Providers 
% % with n>0 
0 26,708 89% N/A 
1 2,351 8% 73% 
2 551 2% 17% 
3 171 1% 5% 
4 84 0.3% 3% 
5-9 69 0.2% 2% 
10+ 5 0.02% 0.2% 
Total 29,939 100% 100% 
Note: Number of overlap providers by number of paid cases. In multiple defendants paid cases where no paying 
defendants were reported, all of the named defendants in those cases as paying defendants. See Appendix Table 
A.13 for an alternative version treating none as paying defendants. 
 
The vast majority (89%) of physicians did not have any paid med mal claims. Taken 
together, Tables 4 and 5 indicate that a sizeable proportion of named defendants were later 
dismissed or exonerated. And 73% of physicians with a paid claim had only one. Only 74 
physicians (0.22%) had five or more paid claims.  
What about licensing? How often did the Board pursue disciplinary actions against 
physicians? Table 6.7 summarizes the disciplinary experiences of the same cohort of physicians. 
I include both prejudicial cases (in which resulted in substantial restriction or limitation on one’s 
license) and non-prejudicial cases (usually administrative cases); both cases resulted in actual 
sanctions, and dismissed or exonerated cases. 
 
Table 6.6: Number of Physicians with n Disciplinary Cases  
 No. of 
disciplinary 
cases n= 
 No. of 
matched 
physicians 
% % with 
n>0 
0 29,361 98% N/A 
1 532 2% 92% 
2 44 0.1% 7.6% 
3 2 0.01% 0.4% 
Total 29,939 100% 100% 
Note: Number of overlap providers by number of disciplinary cases. Disciplinary cases = cases with distinct 
administrative cause number.  
 
Table 6.6 shows that fully 98% of the doctors had no disciplinary records whatsoever. 
Among the 578 physicians with a disciplinary record, 92% had event; 44 had 2, and 2 had 3. 
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Thus, disciplinary action is rare, and there are many fewer repeat-players than in the med mal 
system.  
Systems Overlap 
How often do the licensure and med mal systems pursue actions against same doctors? 
And, when both systems pursue a physician, which one goes first?  Table 6.7, Panel A provides a 
breakdown of the number of doctors tagged by each system, and the degree of overlap.  Med mal 
means “all filed claims,” whether paid or not.  Discipline refers to any case that was assigned a 
formal administrative cause number, regardless of whether an actual sanction was imposed.  
 
Table 6.7: Part A. Systems Overlap, Claiming v. Discipline 
Med Discipline Total 
Mal N Y  
N 17,888 228 18,116 
Y 11,473 350 11,823 
Total 29,361 578 29,939 
 
Note: Med mal system and state board discipline system overlap. Overlap providers (N=29,939 or 100%) only. 
Physicians have both med mal claims and disciplinary complaints = 350 (1.2%). Sued for med mal only (not 
disciplined) so far = 11,473 (38%). Disciplined only so far (not sued) = 228 (0.8%). Neither sued or disciplined = 
17,888 (60%).  
 
Table 6.7: Part B. Systems Overlap 
    Discipline       
Med Mal N % of Total Y % of Total Total 
0 17,888 98.7% 228 1.3% 18,116 
1 5,037 98.0% 103 2.0% 5,140 
2 2,329 97.2% 66 2.8% 2,395 
3+ 4,107 95.8% 181 4.2% 4,288 
All 29,361 98.1% 578 1.9% 29,939 
Note: Med mal system and state board discipline system overlap, breakdown by number of med mal claims. 
 
Table 6.7, Part A shows that 60% (or 17,888 out of 29,939) of the physicians have neither 
been sued for med mal, nor disciplined by the board; 38% (or 11,473) had been sued for med mal 
but had no disciplinary cases).  Only 1.2% (or 350 out of 29,939) physicians had been sued for 
med mal and were also subject to disciplinary action.  Finally, 228 disciplined physicians (0.8%) 
were never sued for med mal. 
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Table 6.7 Part B provides a finer breakdown, by number of med mal claims. For those 
without med mal experiences, 1.3% have been disciplined; for those have been sued once, 2% 
were disciplined; for those have been sued twice, 2.8% were disciplined; and those have three or 
more claims, 4.2% were also disciplined. It suggests that physicians with med mal claims are 
more likely to have been disciplined by the board; and that as their number of claims increase, 
the proportion being disciplined also increase. 
Table 6.8 provides similar information on overlap, but used number of paid med mal 
cases instead. Although not all meritorious cases were ultimately paid; past research show that 
med mal payments are good indicators of true negligence. Paid med mal cases, therefore, are 
likely at better odds to reach the boards as a signal of bad quality sent by the tort system.  
 
Table 6.8: Part A. System Overlap, Paid Med Mal v. Discipline 
Paid Discipline Total 
(Measure 2) N Y  
N 26,296 412 26,708 
Y 3,065 166 3,231 
Total 29,361 578 29,939 
 
Note: paid med mal cases and state board disciplines overlap. 
 
Table 6.8: Part B. System Overlap, Paid Med Mal v. Discipline 
Paid   Discipline       
Med Mal N % of Total Y % of Total Total 
0 26,296 98% 412 2% 26,708 
1 2,263 96% 88 4% 2,351 
2 522 95% 29 5% 551 
3+ 280 85% 49 15% 328 
All 29,361 98% 578 2% 29,939 
Note: Paid med mal cases and state board disciplines overlap, breakdown by number of paid med mal claims.  
 
Table 6.8 shows that, 88% (or 26,296 out of 29,939) of the physicians have no paid med 
mal cases or board discipline; 10% (or 3,065) paid in at least one med mal cases but have not 
been disciplined; only 0.55% (or 166) physicians were sued for med mal and disciplined by the 
licensing board. This finding is consistent with that of the studies using NPDB data – as a 
physician’s number of malpractice payments increases, the likelihood that the physician was 
disciplined also increases.  
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The odds ratio for a physician with paid cases to have also discipline is 0.054, compared 
to 0.03 for a physician with claims, paid or unpaid, to be have been disciplined (where odds ratio 
reflects the ratio of an event happened to not happened).140 The higher ratio may suggest that paid 
cases are better at signaling the Board about the quality of care delivered by the physicians. This 
is unsurprising, consider that NPDB receives and circulate to state medial board only paid med 
mal reports.  
Table 6.8 Part B provides a finer breakdown. Similar to Table 8 Part B, it shows that 
physicians who have paid med mal experiences are more likely to be disciplined by the licensing 
board. And physicians with more paid cases are more likely to be disciplined than those those 
fewer. Of those who paid in three or more cases, 15% were disciplined. 
Table 6.9 summarizes the characteristics on physicians with both med mal and 
disciplinary cases. In terms of disciplinary grounds, about half of the disciplinary cases are 
reciprocal, where the physicians had been sanctioned by another licensing state before the 
Indiana recognized and investigations and sanctions. For reciprocal cases, I use the underlying 
offense (i.e., the disciplinary grounds used by the originating state) to categorize the cases and 
providers. 
 
                                                
140 as an alternative measure, 5% of the physicians faced paid cases were disciplined; compared to 1.5% of those 
faced claims, paid or unpaid, were disciplined.  
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Table 6.9: Hall of Shame: Summary Statistics on Physicians with Med Mal and Discipline 
  
No. of 
Physicians 
% 
 
Panel A - Outcomes    
Discipline Outcome    
Probation 114 33%  
Suspend 92 26%  
Revoke/surrender 62 18%  
Other sanction 49 14%  
Dismissed/exonerated 33 9%  
Disciplinary Ground    
Drug-Diversion 80 23%  
Drug-Abuse 67 19%  
N.O.C. 44 13%  
Negligence/Incompetence 39 11%  
Sex 35 10%  
Alcohol-Abuse 30 9%  
Licensure false statement 25 7%  
Health Care Fraud 16 5%  
Other Criminal 14 4%  
Total 350 100%  
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Table 6.9 (cont.)  
  
No. of 
Physicians 
% 
Panel B – Med Mal Claims    
No. of Med Mal Claims, Paid and Unpaid 
1 237 68% 
2 65 19% 
3+ 33 9% 
5+ 11 3% 
10+ 4 1% 
No. of Paid Med Mal   
0 189 54% 
1 138 39% 
2 15 4% 
3+ 8 2% 
No. of Med Mal > $100k (2015$) 
0 245 70% 
1 96 27% 
2 9 3% 
Total 350 100% 
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Table 6.9 (cont.)  
  
No. of 
Physicians 
% 
Panel C - Professional Characteristics 
Credential     
MD 321 92% 
DO 29 8% 
Medical Education  
U.S. 269 77% 
IMG 71 20% 
Uncertain 10 3% 
Specialty     
Family/ General 116 33% 
Surgery 51 15% 
Ob/Gyn 32 9% 
Emergency Medicine 31 9% 
Other Specialty 29 8% 
Internal Medicine 24 7% 
Anesthesiology 20 6% 
Psychiatry 16 5% 
Neurology 7 2% 
Cardiovascular 5 1% 
Pediatrics 5 1% 
Hematology/Oncology 3 1% 
Pulmonary Diseases 3 1% 
Gastroenterology 2 1% 
Nephrology 2 1% 
Radiology 1 0% 
Missing Specialty  3 1% 
Licensed by  
Endorsement 176 50% 
Examination 174 50% 
Gender   
Male 311 89% 
Female 39 11% 
Total 350 100% 
 
Table 6.9 shows that more than half of the overlapping targets receive probation or less 
restrictive sanctions. That is, they were able to continue practice without any break. Although all 
of them were sued for med mal, most were not repeat defendants – 68% triggered only one 
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claims. 54% of them had no paid cases, and 70% had no large med mal claims (> $100k in 
2015$). Theses overlapping targets, in general, display similar distributions in characteristics as 
the general physician population in the state. One exception is specialty distribution. Surgeons, 
obstetricians/gynecologists, and emergency medicine doctors are overrepresented; and internal 
medicine doctors are underrepresented.  
I now turn to the timeliness of the board actions. The med mal system tagged relatively 
more doctors, but state boards are the only entity authorized to stop a doctor from practicing bad 
medicine.  To those 350 physicians tagged by both system, which system reacted first? Table 
6.10 provides the the frequencies of these two scenarios by primary disciplinary ground. 
 
Table 6.10: Timeliness of Board Actions by Disciplinary Grounds 
 Which System Reacted First   
Disciplinary Ground 
Med Mal 
First 
Discipline 
First Total 
Alcohol-Abuse 77% 23% 30 
Drug-Abuse 58% 42% 67 
Drug-Diversion 83% 18% 80 
Health Care Fraud 88% 13% 16 
Incompetence/malpractice 77% 23% 39 
License app-false statement 88% 12% 25 
N.O.C. 68% 32% 44 
Other Criminal 79% 21% 14 
Sex 69% 31% 35 
N 259 91 350 
Note: Number and percentage of cases in which the med mal filings preceded disciplinary cases, and vice versa. 
N.O.C = not otherwise classified. 
 
Table 6.10 shows that most physicians with both med mal and discipline were first 
caught by the med mal system (74% of 350), and the disciplinary complaints followed. By 
comparison, the three categories that have the higher percentage of discipline first are: drug-
abuse, office or practice related misconducts (N.O.C), and sex offenses. The disciplinary ground 
breakdown further shows that timeliness of the actions differs across different types of 
misconducts. Or, it is equally possible that some grounds take less time to investigate and 
conclude. For most doctors, med mal claims against them precede discipline.  
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Regression Analysis 
In this section, I estimate a random-effects model predicts the probability of a paid claim 
in a year using physician’s past experiences when controlled for personal and professional 
characteristics. I also briefly report an alternative specification, modeling physicians’ practice 
life-time likelihood and rate of med mal claims.  
A well –functioning licensure discipline process and a med mal system can be expected 
to assist and reinforce each other in the following ways. Although not every instance of 
malpractice is evidence of incompetence that warrants disciplinary actions, repeat claims are a 
reasonable signal of low quality of care. If the Board does regard such signal as evidence of 
physician quality and takes action, individual physician’s disciplinary risk would increase as the 
number of med mal claims increases. Paid claims would have stronger effect than unpaid claims, 
consider that NPDB circulate only paid claim reports to state boards. Claims resulted in larger 
payout would have stronger effects than smaller claims.  
The disciplinary system improves physician performance and eliminate unfit physicians 
from practice. If the systems indeed functions in this way, one’s med mal risk would be lower 
after discipline; unless med mal claims on the same negligence are subsequently filed, in which 
case, the med mal risk would increase. 
Adverse Events – History and Current Risks 
To examine how the systems actually function, and to take into account factors that vary 
from year to year, I developed a random-effects logit model to estimate the likelihood of 
incurring discipline cases or a paid med mal claims in practice year t for physician i conditional 
on a set of time-varying and time invariant covariates measuring the physician’s demographic, 
personal, and professional characteristics.  
I assign every doctor in the panel dataset a starting year equal to the first year of 
insurance coverage in Indiana or the license year –whichever is earlier. Everyone’s last year in 
the dataset is the last year of malpractice coverage or the license expiration year –whichever is 
later. Each year in between is a separate observation. If med mal claims or disciplinary cases 
were filed against doctors later than their last year in the dataset, I treat the last year as the filing 
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year.141 Each observation is a person-year. Characteristics and specialties are constant for each 
physician. The sample consists of 28,348 Indiana physicians licensed between 1922-2015, 
representing 551,772 person-years.142  
I then merge the number of med mal claims, number of paid claims, and licensing board 
actions to the person-year against whom and in which they were filed. Past experience is 
evaluated by a set of running sums of unpaid claims, paid claims, and board actions. Each 
running sum is the cumulative number of “past” events – from the first year, to the year before 
the current one. I divided past cases into paid and unpaid cases to separately evaluate their 
predicative values.  
In addition, the model incorporates a random effect of unobserved physician-specific 
quality. This term reflects the otherwise unmeasured characteristics that put the physician in a 
greater risk of paid med mal than his peers. Random-effects models take into account both the 
between-individual and the within-individual differences. 
I report in Table 6.11 four models. The outcome variables in model (1) and (2) are the 
presence or absence of paid med mal cases being filed; the outcome variables in (3) and (4) are 
disciplinary cases being filed in year t. Model (2) differ from (1) in that it has a two-year lag.  
Model (4) divides “past paid claims” (as in model (3)) into two classes: larger cases are 
those ultimately resulted in $100,000 (2015$) or more payouts, the remaining paid cases are 
small cases. That is, “past paid claims” in model (3) is divided into “past small claims” and “past 
large claims” in model (4). Thus, “past paid claims” is not included in model (4).  
I group all covariates into two panels. Panel A shows all time-invariant covariates, 
reflecting physician personal and professional characteristics. Panel B reports time-varying 
attributes, including physician’s practice duration, a quadratic term of the practice duration, and 
cumulative number of past adverse events. Physician experience is measured by years since 
graduation from medical school, and the quadratic term of the years.  
                                                
141 For purpose of the panel data model, my goal was to construct a time scale that can incorporate all event 
histories, and to be as accurate in time as possible. A plausible alternative would be to use a uniform time scale for 
every doctor (e.g., licensure year or insurance year). The difficulty was that many claims or disciplines were filed 
out of this range. I would have treated all events before the starting year as happened in that starting year, and all 
those after the last year as happened in the last year.  
142 Physicians with missing gender or medical school information cannot be included in the estimation.  
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Table 6.11: Estimated Odds of Med Mal and Discipline 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Paid med 
mal 
Paid med mal 
with 2-year 
lag 
Discipline Discipline 
Panel A – Characteristics     
Male 1.759*** 1.750*** 1.578*** 1.586*** 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.218) (0.220) 
CSR 1.128* 1.122* 1.458*** 1.455*** 
 (0.0553) (0.056) (0.157) (0.157) 
Endorsement 0.643*** 0.672*** 1.748*** 1.738*** 
 (0.0256) (0.027) (0.174) (0.173) 
IMG 1.154** 1.223*** 1.115 1.117 
 (0.0567) (0.061) (0.127) (0.127) 
DO 1.113 1.132  1.401 1.402 
 (0.0962) (0.100) (0.241) (0.242) 
Family/GP 1.521*** 1.509*** 2.323*** 2.327*** 
 (0.0947) (0.095) (0.325) (0.326) 
Internal 0.915 0.911  0.894 0.900 
 (0.0764) (0.077) (0.180) (0.181) 
Ob/Gyn 4.455*** 4.582*** 1.597* 1.591* 
 (0.337) (0.352) (0.342) (0.342) 
Pediatrics 0.822 0.819  0.493* 0.496* 
 (0.0955) (0.096) (0.170) (0.171) 
Psychiatry 0.423*** 0.410*** 2.565*** 2.585*** 
 (0.0688) (0.068) (0.521) (0.526) 
Radiology 1.157 1.176  0.583 0.585 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.165) (0.165) 
Surgery 2.984*** 3.091*** 1.027 1.026 
 (0.182) (0.192) (0.176) (0.177) 
Anesthesiology 0.946 0.929  1.632* 1.644* 
 (0.0916) (0.091) (0.317) (0.319) 
Emergency Med. 1.775*** 1.773*** 1.779** 1.786** 
  (0.149) (0.151) (0.340) (0.342) 
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Table 6.11 (cont.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Paid med 
mal 
Paid med 
mal with 2-
year lag 
Discipline Discipline 
Panel B - Experience and past events      
Practice duration 1.127*** 1.099*** 1.083*** 1.083*** 
 (0.00662) (0.007) (0.0153) (0.0153) 
Duration squared 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 
 (0.000115) (0.000) (0.000260) (0.000261) 
Past severe discipline 2.147*** 0.945    
 (0.438) (0.285)   
Past non-severe discipline 0.945 0.861    
 (0.167) (0.174)   
Past paid med mal  1.502***  
   (0.0738)  
Past unpaid med mal 1.011** 1.002  0.998 1.006 
 (0.00353) (0.005) (0.00742) (0.00759) 
Past small payment   1.346** 
    (0.133) 
Past large payment   1.710*** 
    (0.135) 
Observations 551772 495106 551772 551772 
Log lik. -23153.8 -22650 -4520.1 -4517.4 
Chi-squared 1561.8 1288.7 292.4 297.6 
rho 0.226 0.234 0.387 0.390 
Note: Specification: random-effects logit model on likelihood of paid med mal in the “current” year; in two years; 
and discipline case in current year. “CSR” refers to number of Controlled Substances Registrations, = 0 if none, =1 
if one CSR, =2 if 2+ CSRs. “Endorsement” = licensed in Indiana without examination, but instead based on existing 
licenses from elsewhere. “IMG” = attended non-U.S. medical schools, including Puerto Rico. “DO” =osteopathic 
doctor. Reference group for specialties = “other” unlisted, underrepresented specialties. “Severe discipline” = 
revocation, surrender, and suspension. “Non-severe” = probations, fine only, other actions, dismissed cases. “Paid” 
= resulted in payment; in multiple defendants paid cases where no paying defendants were reported, all of the named 
defendants in those cases as paying defendants. Exponentiated coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
Table 6.11 reports the odds ratio of having a med mal claim (that ultimately resulted in 
payouts) or a disciplinary case filed in year t. Male gender, holding more Controlled Substances 
Registrations (CSRs), and longer practice durations up to a point predict both higher likelihood 
of a paid med mal and a disciplinary case. 
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The effects of practice duration, measured by years since graduation from medical 
schools, are quadratic on both kinds of events.143 Observed paid med mal incidence is highest 
around 30 -34 years after graduation from medical school; and disciplinary incidence is highest 
around 25-29 years after graduation. Increased number of past paid med mal cases is associated 
with higher likelihood of discipline; but number of past unpaid cases is not. 
Table 6.11 also reveals a considerable different between med mal propensity and 
disciplinary risk across specialties. Psychiatry is associated with a higher likelihood of 
disciplinary, be a smaller chance of incurring paid med mal claims. The same goes for 
anesthesiology. In Chapter 5, I found that psychiatrists are more likely to be disciplined for, 
among others, sexual misconducts; and anesthesiologists are likely to be disciplinary for drug-
abuse. It is understandable that sexual misconducts and self abuse of drug do not always results 
in patient harm which may ultimately amount to paid med mal claim.  
Past adverse events affect physician’s current risk of med mal and discipline. Model (3) 
Panel B shows that, one’s disciplinary risk increases as cumulative number of past paid med mal 
increases. Model (4) further confirms that increasing number of larger claims has a greater effect 
on disciplinary risk than number of smaller claims. Unpaid claims do not significantly affect 
disciplinary risk. This is likely attributable to the fact that the NPDB circulates only paid claims 
to state medical board. Thus, the Board is more likely to regard paid claims as evidence of 
physician competence.  
Model (1) Panel B shows that past severe board sanctions (suspension, revocation, or 
surrender) predicts higher med mal risks, and non-severe sanctions (probation or less restrictive 
ones) does not significantly affect later med mal risks. This is counterintuitive, as board 
sanctions are expected to improve physician’s behavior or to eliminate unfit ones from the 
profession. And, as I shown above, the Board often takes actions after a few med mal filings. If 
this is the case, past disciplinary cases would have a decreasing effect on med mal risk, which is 
not seen in Model (3).  
                                                
143 For the purpose of this model, one’s practice duration may be different from the time in the dataset. “Time in the 
dataset” starts from the first possible year for a physician to experience an adverse event, and is therefore from the 
first practicing year in Indiana (measured by insurance or state licensure). “Practice duration”, on the other hand, 
measures one’s experience, and thus start from the first year out of medical school.  
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A possible explanation of the higher med mal risk following discipline is that the 
publicity of the physician discipline enabled more patients to file med mal against the same 
underlying misconducts. In this case, the discipline and the subsequent med mal are responses 
from the two systems over the same incident. Although it is impossible at this point to tell which 
cases involves single-incident multiple events, I tried to address this issue by estimating a model 
(4) with a 2-year lag. Because the Indiana law put a two year statutes of limitations on med mal 
cases, modeling the med mal propensity in two years can eliminate the possibility that the 
subsequently filed claims are over the same incident that led to the disciplinary cases. Model (4) 
Panel B shows that, with a 2-year lag, past discipline have no significant effect on med mal risk.  
The individual-physician specific effects in both models are sizeable. The intraclass 
correlation (rho), the fraction of the variance in the error term that is attributable to individual-
specific effects, is 0.23 for paid med mal, and 0.39 for disciplinary cases. Thus, approximately 
23% of the total variation in paid med mal risk is individual specific; and 39% of the total 
variation in disciplinary risk is individual specific. The sizeable physician-specific terms suggest 
that physicians vary substantially in the quality of care that they delivered.  
Several factors are also worth mentioning. DO, controlling for all the characteristics and 
past experience, has no significant effect on either type of event.  IMG has a significant effect on 
paid med mal, but not on discipline.  
Limitations 
A major limitation here is including past adverse events as independent variables to 
predict later events in a random-effects model. In a random-effect model, the individual-specific 
effect term explains part of the outcome, and is assumed to be distributed independently of (i.e., 
not significantly dependent on) the predictors. Because the number of past events is incorporated 
as a predictor to explain the later risk of events, the individual-specific effect cannot 
simultaneously explain the later events and independent from the past events.  
If the assumption is violated, the coefficients of the predictors that are not independent of 
the individual-specific effects (number of past events in this case) may be overestimated; and the 
coefficients of other predictors (time-invariant characteristics in this case) may be 
underestimated. 
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Here, the concern is some unobserved/unmeasured individual-specific factors affect (a) 
both the past and the later events of the same type (i.e., past and later paid med mal; or past and 
later disciplinary cases); and (b) the risks of both event types.  
Take the example of a physician’s communication skills (assuming it does not vary over 
time within individual), which is not measured. All others equal, how a doctor communicates 
with her patients may play a role in predicting the risk of her being sued in in year t (see e.g. 
Fielding 1999, 111–13). But, this individual-specific skill may also affect (a) the number of 
previous number of claims; and to a less degree, (b) past disciplinary history.  
For the reason of scenario (a), I do no use past events to predict later events of the same 
type; but use only past discipline to model later med mal, and past med mal to model later 
discipline. That is, “past paid med mal” is not used in model (1)-(2) to predict later paid med 
mal; and “past discipline” is not used in model (3)-(4) to predict later discipline. But, I cannot 
rule out the possibility of scenario (b), where some unobserved factors affect both types of risks 
(e.g., some physician characteristics are associated with both past med mal and later discipline).   
Another limitation of a random-effects logit model is that it only predicts a binary 
outcome – the presence or absence – not the number of events. For the purpose if this specific 
application, it is not a major concern, because of incurring multiple events in a year is extremely 
rare. The incidence of incurring two paid claims in a year is 0.03%. In terms of disciplinary 
cases, no physicians incurred multiple cases in a same year in the panel data. In the next 
subsection, I provide an additional count data model to further address this issue.  
Additional specification 
Alternatively, I modeled physicians’ practice life-time rate of malpractice.144 As the 
number of claims vary substantially for those who have been sued, it is possible that claim-prone 
defendants have different characteristics from those of one-time defendants. I use negative 
binomial-logit hurdle models to test the possibility. The outcome variables in logit models are 
binary. The zero-truncated negative binomial models regress, only among those with at least one 
event, the number of events on the physician’s characteristics.  
                                                
144 Because very few doctors were associated multiple disciplinary cases, I did not fit a count data model in 
disciplinary cases. 
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A risk exposure term is included into the model (as an offset term = ln (exposure)). This 
term changed claim count into claim rate over the length of one’s career (in the dataset). This is 
to take into account the possibility that med mal claims tend to be proportional to practice 
duration. 
Detailed results are reported in Appendix, Table A.11. Male physicians, 
obstetricians/gynecologists, surgeons, and emergency medicine doctors are more likely to be 
sued and for multiple times; and license by endorsement, pediatricians and psychiatrists are 
significantly less likely to be sued and sued for multiple times. Holding more Controlled 
Substance Resignations (CSRs) increases the likelihood of being sued, but have no significant 
effect on the number of claims. And international medical education does not significantly affect 
the likelihood of being sued, but is significantly affect the number of claims. Practicing in 
anesthesiology does not affect the likelihood of claim, but decrease the number of claims. Being 
a DO is not associated with any significant effects.  
Paid cases model shows that male, obstetricians/gynecologists, surgery affect both the 
likelihood and the number of events. But in the paid case model, the effects (or the significance 
of the effects) disappear for number of CSRs and pediatrics. Male, obstetricians/gynecologists, 
IMG, in general, have stronger effects in paid case models. Family medicine and general practice 
is association with higher likelihood in paid case models (but still no effect on number of 
events). Psychiatrists, similar as suggested by the claim models, are less likely to pay for med 
mal, but have no effect on number of paid cases.  
Discussion 
The Relationship between Med Mal and Licensing 
Both the med mal and licensing systems seek to promote the delivery of high quality 
care. If functioning properly, these two system can assist and reinforce each other. The licensing 
process screens applicants before granting them a license to practice medicine.  It also disciplines 
physicians that deliver poor quality care, or engage in other “bad behavior” that indicates they 
lack the necessary character to practice medicine. The med mal system compensates injured 
patients and can signal quality concerns back to the licensing system. Many state licensing 
boards reportedly regard egregious or frequent med mal claims as triggering events for 
disciplinary investigations. These investigations may result in sanctions, including the possibility 
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of outright revocation of the license to practice medicine. Although malpractice lawsuits may 
cause considerable stress to doctors, state boards are the only entity that can legally stop a 
licensed doctor from continuing to practice. Thus, communication between the systems, and the 
effectiveness of follow-on state sanctions are likely to be key aspects of health care quality 
assurance, at least for dealing with a subset of particularly problematic physicians.  
As noted previously, many states responded to the med mal crises of the 1970s and 1980s 
by passing mandatory reporting laws that required hospitals, insurance companies, professional 
associations, and other entities to report malpractice claims to state medical licensing boards 
(Ameringer 1999, 51). With the establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank, all state 
medical board now have access to all adverse events information for licensees. 
In Indiana, the reporting of med mal claims to the Licensing Board is not mandatory. The 
medical review panel, in addition to review the med mal claims filed with the Department of 
Insurance (before they can proceed to a court), makes separate decision as to whether to forward 
the matter to the Board. I examine the panel process in detail in Chapter 4, but I lack data on the 
forwarding decision, and therefore cannot study the role that the review panel plays in the 
communication.  
Another plausible approach, as adopted by Wisconsin, is to place on the PCF the 
responsibility of communicating med mal claims to the licensing board (see Sloan et al. 2005). 
Although this approach is likely insensitive to unpaid to modest med mal claims, as a payer in 
large claims with a substantial financial stake, the state PCF may be more incline to effectively 
communicate to the Board regarding large payouts (which usually involves more serious 
injuries). 
Repeat Med Mal Defendants and Overlapping Targets 
Not every med mal claim is an ultimate evidence of professional incompetence. It is, 
therefore, understandable that state boards do not question or sanction doctors for temporary 
failures. But, state boards are expected to take action against those repeat med mal defendants. 
My examination of Indiana doctors in the past four decades confirms that repeat 
defendants and habitually poor practice are outliers but do exist. During the past four decades, 
most Indiana doctors had no paid med mal claim; but a few generated a comparatively large 
number of claims, and an even smaller group is responsible for most paid claims.  
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The Board pursue actions against far fewer doctors than the med mal system does. Of the 
disciplined doctors, 29% were also med mal defendants. Med mal defendants accounted for a 
small fraction of the Board’s disciplinary portfolio. Most repeat med mal defendants (85% with 3 
or more paid claims) were not disciplined; and most disciplined physician (71%) had no paid 
claims. Of those tagged by both systems, most (68%) were not repeat defendants, 54% had no 
paid cases, and 70% had no large (> $100k in 2015$) med mal claims. This Indicates that board 
may have different standard and perspective on physician quality; and is not motivated by the 
same determinations that trigger med mal liability.   
But, consistent with prior studies, I find that physicians with some characteristics are 
systematically more likely to face med mal payments. When controlling for those characteristics, 
I find evidences that physicians with worse med mal history are more likely to be disciplined. 
Male physicians, international medical graduates, and those who practice in family medicine or 
general practice, obstetrics/gynecology, radiology, surgery, and emergency medicine are more 
likely to face paid med mal claims. Identifying these attributes may aid in evaluating differences 
in the quality of care across physicians. 
Controlling for various characteristics, individual physician’s disciplinary risk increases 
as the cumulative number of past paid med mal increases. The number of large claims has 
stronger effect on disciplinary risk than the number of smaller claims. The number of unpaid 
med mal claims has no significant effect on the likelihood of discipline, although it has some 
predictive power of subsequent paid claims. Disciplinary risk not responding to unpaid claims 
likely reflects the NPDB’s practice of collecting and circulating only paid med mal claims to 
state medical boards. 
Disciplinary risk’s responsiveness to the number of past paid med mal suggests that the 
Board does regard paid claims as evidence of physician competence, and is more inclined to act 
against repeat defendants, controlling for physician characteristics. 
 
Effectiveness of Board Sanctions on Propensity of Med Mal 
A well-functioning licensure system can promote and maintain high health care quality 
by carefully screening physicians for initial licenses, improving physician behaviors, and 
eliminating unfit practitioners. I study the initial licensure and the physician population in 
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Indiana in Chapter 5, and I examine the post-licensure monitoring and quality control function of 
the Board here. 
I find that more than half of the physicians tagged by both systems ended by with 
probation or less restrictive sanctions (including probation, fine only, censor, and letter of 
reprimand). That is, even those “bad apples” identified by both systems are not likely to leave the 
profession.  
How well do the Board sanctions improve physician behaviors? I lack direct measure, but 
find no evidence that disciplinary actions lower the likelihood of subsequent med mal. In the 
short-run, med mal risk increase as the number of past severe discipline (including revocation, 
surrender of license, and suspension) increases, likely due to patients bringing med mal after 
knowing their doctors’ sanction and getting access to more information. With a two-year-lag, 
past discipline has no significant effect on med mal risks, which provides no evidence for 
deterrence effects. The low likelihood and severity of the sanctions that the board imposed on the 
overlapping targets calls into questions the effectiveness of board sanction. 
Conclusion 
The med mal and state licensure systems share the common goal of setting a minimum 
standard of quality. Although these two systems use different mechanisms, they will ideally 
assist and reinforce each other in accomplishing their common purpose. Thus, one should expect 
to find evidence of overlap, particularly in dealing with repeat offenders.  
My examination of the 29,939 physicians, who were licensed by the Indiana Medical 
Licensing Board and practiced in the state between 1975 to 2015, indicates that repeat med mal 
defendants are outliers but do exist. Some repeat med mal defendants were disciplined, but they 
accounted for a small fraction of the Board’s portfolio. Most repeat med mal defendants were not 
disciplined, and most disciplined doctors were not repeat med mal defendants and were 
associated with no large claims. Of those physicians tagged by both system, many ended up with 
probation or less restrictive actions. 
Several characteristics are systematically associated with higher med mal propensity. 
Controlling for various demographic factors and specialties, individual physician’s disciplinary 
risk increases as cumulative number of past paid med mal increases. Larger claims had stronger 
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effects than smaller claims, unpaid claims have no significant effect on subsequent disciplinary 
risk. 
Together, my findings may suggest that the Board indeed consider repeat paid med mal 
as evidence of questionable quality of care. But, to the Board, med mal may well be just a piece 
of evidence. The inclination to act in response to med mal history, and the effectiveness of the 
board actions, are at best, questionable.  
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CHAPTER 7: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Indiana offers an ideal location to study the various strategies that a state can use to 
address health care quality. It has a PCF and medical review panels.  It has a cap on non-
economic damages. It has a typical licensing and disciplinary regime. And, I was able to obtain 
comprehensive data on both the med mal and licensing/disciplinary systems, and use that data to 
study the performance (and overlap) of both systems. This concluding chapter summerizes my 
findings, and discusses several policy implications.   
System Performance 
Med Mal Claiming Environment and Premiums Trends 
As Chapter 3 shows, Indiana’s tort claiming environment has remained fairly stable 
during the post-reform period. More specifically, since the mid-1980s, the number of physicians 
has steadily increased.  Over the same period, per physician lawsuits rate remained fairly flat, but 
then trended downward since 2001. The per-physician rate of paid cases has been dropping since 
1994, and payout per physician has been dropping since 2001.  
Are these changes in med mal litigation associated with observed premiums trends?  I 
find little evidence in Chapter 3 that malpractice premiums in Indiana track the larger med mal 
claiming environment. Premiums hit a low in the late 1990s, and then spiked in the early 200s – 
but neither was associated with the expected changes in the med mal system.  The cost of 
coverage started dropping in 1997 and bottomed out in 1999, when payouts per physician were 
close to their historical high point. And, when premiums spiked beginning in 2001, payout per 
physician was dropping.  My findings from Indiana (i.e., a lack of association between med mal 
premiums and med mal claiming) are consistent with earlier studies.  
My findings indicate that policymakers who want to address med mal premium spikes 
should focus on explanations other than the med mal litigation system.  The most plausible 
candidate is the insurance market.  Future research (and policy initiatives) should focus on 
insurance reform, rather than the med mal system.  
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Does Indiana’s Disciplinary System “Work?” 
How should we evaluate whether Indiana’s disciplinary system is working?  In Chapter 5, 
I show that disciplinary actions against physicians in Indiana are rare.  Only 1.2% of the 63,485 
physicians in my dataset were disciplined during my 43-year sample period. Four types of cases 
account for 70% of all disciplinary actions: drug diversion (25%), substance abuse (18%), sexual 
misconduct (17%), and negligence related offenses (10%). The two most common disciplinary 
sanctions were probation (26%) and suspension (25%). 
How does this compare to disciplinary activity in other states?  Public Citizen, a 
consumer advocacy group, used to publish a widely followed annual ranking report of state 
medical boards, based on their disciplinary activity.145 Indiana ranked 21st among all jurisdictions 
in their most recent study (2009-2011), based on a sanction rate of 3.25 serious actions per 1,000 
physicians. In earlier studies using the same methodology, Indiana ranked 33rd (2001-2003) and 
14th (1993-1995).  Thus, it is typical for Indiana to rank somewhere around the middle of all 
states (e.g. Wolfe, Williams, and Zaslow 2012; Wolfe and Lurie 2005). Of course, states operate 
with different financial resources, level of autonomy, legal constraints, and staffing level.  As 
such, the number of actions does not directly translate into evidence of a board’s effectiveness 
(see Andis Robeznieks 2013).  
How fast does the disciplinary system react to physician misconduct?  For 653 of the 996 
cases, I have the date of the first-complained instance of misconduct, and the date of the initial 
administrative complaint.  The median time span is 2.4 years, with a mean of 3.6 years, and a 
range of zero to 26 years.  This time lag seems too long to protect the public.  However, this 
calculation is based only on the cases that result in administrative filings.  I do not have data on 
complaints to the Indiana Board, so I am not able to assess how quickly it handles all inputs, or 
determine whether the number of disciplinary actions is too high, too low, or just about right. 
Similarly, I am unable to quantify the processing time to detection stage (i.e., whether it takes the 
state too long to get information about questionable doctors) or to the investigation and 
preparation of the prosecution.  
                                                
145 The Public Citizen rankings were based on FSMB reports, which were dropped in 2012 allegedly due to Public 
Citizen’s use of the data to rank state despite the FSMB’s discouragements. Public Citizen calculated a three-year 
(moving) average of the number of revocation, suspension, and other “serious actions” by each state, compute a per 
1,000 physician number of serious actions, and ranked them. 
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Predictability of Malpractice and Disciplinary Risk 
How predictable are the med mal and disciplinary systems? Do claims, payouts, and 
disciplinary sanctions occur at random, or are they associated with specific physician 
characteristics? I show in Chapter 6 that both med mal and disciplinary risk are predictable. A 
relatively small number of doctors account for a disproportionately large number of claims and 
payouts. Similarly, disciplinary risks for various offense types are associated with certain 
characteristics (i.e.,  gender, holding more Controlled Substances Registrations (CSRs), and 
longer practice duration).   
More specifically, male physicians are more likely to be disciplined for sexual misconduct. Most 
physicians hold only one CSR – and those who hold two or more are more likely to be 
disciplined for drug abuse and diversion. Psychiatrists are more likely to be disciplined for 
sexual misconduct, but less likely to incur paid med mal claims. The same goes for 
anesthesiologists (who are more likely to be disciplined for, among others, drug abuse and drug 
diversion).  
We should care about predictability because if relatively few doctors are accountable for 
a large proportion of medical errors (in the context of med mal) and/or unprofessional behaviors 
(in the context of disciplinary cases), direct educational or interventional quality assurance 
efforts might address these risks before they occur. If, on the other hand, the risks are randomly 
distributed, education or intervention would be impossible or unjustifiably expensive. 
Explaining the Performance of Indiana’s Med Mal System 
As noted above and in Chapter 3, the med mal litigation environment in Indiana has been 
reasonably stable. Indiana physicians pay modest premiums, and median med mal payouts on 
their behalf are quite low. And, Indiana’s premium spike in the early 2000s was relatively small 
compared to other states. How much of this stability is attributable to Indiana’s tort reforms 
(specifically, the damage cap, the PCF, and the medical review panels)?  
Does Having A PCF and A Cap Make A Difference? 
How much credit should the PCF get for this state of affairs? One immediate 
complication is that Indiana combines a PCF with other reforms (medical review panel, cap on 
non-econ damages) – so differentiating the effects of the PCF from the effects of these other 
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reforms is impossible with a single state study. Plus, other researchers have noted the existence 
of a nationwide “receding tide”: the per-physician rate of paid med mal claims has been dropping 
since at least 2001 (although it has been dropping faster in states that enacted caps during 2002-
2005 (Paik, Black, and Hyman 2013). Separating general trends from Indiana-specific factors 
calls for more data and multi-state studies. 
Given these constraints, a better (or at least easier to answer) question is: how does the 
design of Indiana’s PCF (including a low damage cap) affect the state’s med mal system? About 
30% of cases filed in Indiana were ultimately paid. In more than 60% of the paid cases, 
defendants paid at their (quite low) policy limits, allowing plaintiffs to access the PCF for above-
limits damages. Most (70%) of cases that got into the PCF layer were ultimately paid near or at 
the total damages cap. Mean payout per paid claim increases over time. Despite the increasing 
cap amount, the percentage of cases that resulted in near-cap or at-cap payouts increased. 
Why do so many cases cluster near or at the cap? Is that a good thing or a bad thing? 
Why does the near- or at- cap proportion increase over time? Earlier studies suggest that Indiana, 
on a per case base, paid more than its neighboring states; and attributed the higher average to the 
PCF’s lack of power to defend cases (see Gronfein and Kinney 199; Kinney, Gronfein, and 
Gannon 1991). In fact, the Indiana PCF can take some steps to protect its interest: it may not 
dispute liability, but it can dispute the amount to be paid by the PCF, resulting in judicial review 
of the settlement.146 But, a more plausible explanation for the clustering of payouts at limits is 
that the relevant limits are quite low. If that is correct, the reason for clustering is that severely 
injured patients are being systematically under-compensated – and their cases with above-limits 
damages are piling up at the limits imposed by the damage cap. When the cap amount increased 
from $500k to $750k in 1990, and to $1.25M in 1999, these patients were less “under-
compensated,” but there were still enough with damages that exceeded the damage cap to trigger 
the clustering.   
Second, the increasing per case payment and the growing portion of cases that resulted in 
near- or at- cap recoveries might be explained by the med mal system becoming more generous.  
But, like previous researchers, I show that this result is at least partially explained by the 
                                                
146 Of course, some of the existing PCFs can actively defense their cases. But, as other studies have pointed out, a 
passive-payer PCF would presumably generated lower defense costs and administrative overhead (which eventually 
has to be paid by the doctors in the state by annual surcharges) (see Sloan et al. 2005). 
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disappearance of small paid claims. My findings indicate that the med mal system is becoming 
less generous over time – and injured patients with modest claims are dropping out entirely.  
Ohio and Michigan (the two states compared by the above mentioned studies to Indiana) 
do not have state-level databases similar to Indiana. But, NPDB data from 2003 – 2012 indicates 
that median malpractice payments in Indiana are lower than median payments in Ohio and 
Michigan.147 Thus, I do not find evidence that Indiana’s med mal system has higher per-case 
payouts – and the pile-up at the damage cap probably has more to do with the distribution of 
injuries than the presence or absence of the PCF, and limitations on the PCF’s ability to defend 
cases.   
Do Review Panels Work? 
Indiana established the review panel process to “reduce nuisance suits and to avoid 
lawsuits whenever possible by advocating quicker settlements of claims outside of the court 
system.” It is far from clear whether the review panels accomplish either of these objectives. I 
am not aware of any data that would allow me to assess the rates of “nuisance suits” in Indiana 
compared to other states. But the rate at which claims are paid in Indiana does not diverge 
significantly from the rates in other states – roughly 30% of all cases results in payouts.  If 
Indiana’s medical review panels were doing a good job of deterring the filing of nuisance suits, 
the payout rate in Indiana would be higher than in states that lacked that reform.   
Perhaps panels provide a useful signal about the merits of a case, even if they do not deter 
frivolous litigation. I find that case outcomes (in terms of payment) closely track the decisions of 
the review panel. If the panel finds there was malpractice, payout is very likely.  Conversely, if 
the panel does not find malpractice, payout is very unlikely.  
What about “quicker settlements?” According to the latest NPDB Annual Report, Indiana 
med mal claims had the longest “delay between incident and payment” among all jurisdictions 
                                                
147 The data reported by NPDB is not consistent with the data I obtained from IDOI. I am in the process of sorting 
out the differences between these two data sources.  
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(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2014, 70). It is important to note that this 
measure of “delay” was limited to paid cases, and that multiple factors can affect case duration.148  
So, is the panel procedure itself to be blamed for the nation’s longest case duration? 
Probably not. Duration has been decreasing over time, and non-panel cases showed a larger drop 
in duration than panel cases. A finer breakdown of panel case duration shows that most of this 
drop came after panels issued their opinions and before the parties closed their cases. Duration of 
other stages (i.e., panel member and chair selections, hearing and rendering of an opinion) was 
effectively unchanged. These findings suggest that the case duration “problem” in Indiana is not 
limited to panel cases.  
Towards Better Systems 
Protecting the Public Against Repeat Negligence 
The licensing and med mal systems are both trying to promote the delivery of high 
quality care. The licensing system acts as a barrier to entry, screening applicants before granting 
them a license to practice medicine. The same system disciplines physicians that deliver poor 
quality care, or engage in other “bad behavior” that indicates they lack the necessary character to 
practice medicine. The med mal system compensates injured patients and can signal quality 
concerns back to the licensing system. Many state licensing boards reportedly regard egregious 
or frequent med mal claims as triggering events for disciplinary investigations. So, ideally, these 
two systems should work together to accomplish their common goal. But, I find little evidence of 
coordination.  
I show in Chapter 6 that med mal defendants accounted for a small fraction of the 
Board’s disciplinary portfolio. Most repeat med mal defendants were not disciplined; and most 
disciplined physician had no paid claims. Of those tagged by both systems, most were not repeat 
defendants, more than half of them had no paid cases, and most had no large med mal claims. 
This indicates that the Board may have different standards and perspectives on physician quality 
                                                
148 The NPDB does not provide details on how they calculate the delay, except a footnote that says “[y]ear is 
malpractice payment year.” It is unclear how the periodic payments, of which at least 40% of the payments in 
Indiana were made according to my data, were treated. In case of multiple liable defendants or insurers, was the first 
payment or the last payment used for the calculation. In case of cases involves PCF payments, was the defendant(s) 
payout, the PCF payout date, the earliest, or the latest of the dates counted? 
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than the med mal system, and is not motivated by the same determinations that trigger med mal 
liability. 
In a 1986 GAO study, interest groups in Indiana (including physicians, lawyers, and the 
IDOI) stated that their major concerns about the med mal environment was that repeat offenders 
(i.e., bad apples) were not being effectively addressed. There was strong support for giving the 
Board more power to monitor and address the quality of practicing physicians (U.S. General 
Accounting Office 1986d). My findings suggest that more needs to be done.149 
I can only speculate about the reasons for the low degree of overlap of the two systems. 
One possibility is that the Board has a different perspective on what counts as “quality” than the 
med mal system, and therefore has different priorities. Of course, not every negligent act is 
dispositive evidence of physician incompetence, and disciplined physicians may not have 
committed malpractice on every (or any) patient that they see. So, some degree of non-overlap 
should be inevitable. 
An alternative possibility is that the disciplinary system is not receiving (or failing to 
respond) to the quality signals sent by the med mal system. In Indiana, the reporting of med mal 
claims to the Licensing Board is not mandatory. The medical review panel, in addition to review 
the med mal claims filed with the Department of Insurance (before they can proceed to a court), 
makes a separate decision as to whether to forward the matter to the Board. Unfortunately, I do 
not have data on how often review panels forward information to the Board, so I cannot study the 
role that these issues. If lack of communication is the concern, perhaps charging the IDOI to 
report med mal filings to the Board would be a better choice.  
In a report on California Board performance, researchers noted another possible hurdle in 
using the disciplinary process as a follow-on to medical malpractice proceedings. They report 
that physicians routinely insert “regulatory gag clauses” — provisions that prohibit an injured 
plaintiff from complaining to or cooperating with the Medical Board — into civil malpractice 
settlement agreements, thereby concealing their negligence from the board (Fellmeth and 
Papageorge 2005, ES-5). The researchers proposed a statutory ban on using the clauses.  
The third possibility is that the disciplinary system has a weak inclination to pursue 
action against doctors. In some Findings, the Board recognized the negligence, but decided not to 
                                                
149 See Figure A.4 in Appendix for number of disciplinary cases per year.  
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take action, citing the reason as “the respondent has suffered enough from the malpractice 
lawsuits.” In other cases, the Board recognized that disciplining the physician would mean that 
some patients had no access to care – meaning the choice was between low quality care and no 
doctor whatsoever.150 
Finally, for sanctions short of revocation, it is not clear how Board sanctions affect 
quality of care in the long run. I find no evidence that disciplinary actions lower the likelihood of 
subsequent med mal.151 And, for the limited number of physicians who were tagged by both 
systems, half ended up with probation or a less restrictive sanction. These facts call into 
questions the effectiveness of Board sanctions. 
Lessons for Policy Reform  
To policymakers, the existence of repeat offenders and the predictability of malpractice 
and disciplinary risk means that data on med mal claim history and disciplinary records can be 
used as powerful quality improvement tool. But, interventions must be targeted to the type of 
problem we wish to address. For drug abuse and diversion problems, states might direct more 
educational or monitoring efforts to those with more CSRs. To prevent sexual misconduct, states 
may wish to emphasize measures such as having a female chaperone or nurse present at all 
times; making previous offenses known to patients; and requiring direct supervision for past 
offenders. IMGs have a higher hazard for negligence, so state boards might want to focus on the 
authenticity of their credentials and the adequacy of their clinical training.  
Public disclosure of physicians’ malpractice and discipline histories may also benefit 
consumers. But, the information has to be accessible and usable. States should consider whether 
they are doing enough to ensure consumers have necessary information.  
Lessons for Consumers and for Physicians 
Consumers can use information on physicians’ med mal and disciplinary history to make 
more informed decisions.  Unpaid med mal claims predict later paid claims -- so consumers 
should proceed with caution if their doctor has already incurred multiple claims. Disciplinary 
                                                
150 See Chapter 5 for examples. 
151 In the short-run, med mal risk increase as the number of past severe discipline (including revocation, surrender of 
license, and suspension) increases, likely due to patients bringing med mal after knowing their doctors’ sanction and 
getting access to more information. With a two-year-lag, past discipline has no significant effect on med mal risks, 
which provides no evidence for deterrence effects. 
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actions, on the other hand, are rare. So, although having been sanctioned should be taken as a 
sign of caution, the reverse it not true. A discipline-free doctor is not necessarily problem-free.   
Physicians with an elevated propensity for errors and/or misconduct may also benefit 
from tailored educational programs or interventions.  Physicians with a pending disciplinary case 
should (i) hire a lawyer; (ii) avoid defaulting; and (iii) try to settle the case, if possible.152  
Toward Better Compensation 
To oversimplify, the current PCF-cap structure functions as a $1.25M per occurrence/no 
annual aggregate limit policy for Indiana physicians. Risk exposure is apportioned between 
commercial carriers and participating providers in the state. A natural question is, should there be 
an annual aggregate limit to limit the PCF’s exposure – considering that a small portion of 
physicians generate a disproportionate amount of med mal claims and payouts (both in a given 
year and over time).153 
Commercial carriers use annual aggregate limits to limit their exposure from repeat 
players. They also switched from occurrence to claims-made policies to avoid paying for 
habitually poor practices that span a longer period of time.  
                                                
152 During the past four decades, 31% of the disciplinary cases in Indiana were settled, 54% were represented by one 
or more lawyers, and 18% were closed by default. My findings show that the odds for high severity are 8.7 times 
higher for default cases; 0.78 times lower for represented cases; 0.475 times lower for settled cases. 
153 Take the example of Indiana’s (in)famous former nose doctor, Mark Weinberger, who triggered 358 malpractice 
claims arising from unnecessary surgeries. A class of 1989 graduate of UCLA Medical School, Weinberger was first 
licensed in 1990 by the California Board. He subsequently relocated to Indiana, and was licensed by endorsement in 
1996. He practiced in Lake County, Indiana. ProAssurance had since insured him with occurrence policies, switched 
to claims-made policies in June 2004, and cancelled his policy in October 2004.  
Patients began filing Proposed Complaints for med mal against him with the IDOI in June 2004. However, in 
September 2004, Weinberger “vanished during a family vacation in Greece. On October 2004, the state Attorney 
General filed with the state Medical Licensing Board a petition for summary suspension, which was granted two 
months later. The formal complaint was filed in January 2005. The Board revoked Weinberger’s license by default 
three months later. 
A federal grand jury indicted him in 2006. In December 2006, the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional 
Regulation revoked his Illinois license. In January 2006, California Board revoked his license. In December 2009, 
after a “high-profile manhunt,” Weinberger was discovered “camping in deep snow in the Italian Alps”. He pleaded 
guilty to 22 counts of health care fraud, and was sentenced to seven years. 
In 2013, when most of his claims finally settled, the PCF made 342 payments. Because the PCF assumes liability 
upon the exhaustion of either occurrence or annual aggregate limit, most of the payments were made from the first 
dollar to the total damages cap by the Fund. “Weinberger claims” created mini-spikes in lawsuits rate in 2004 and 
2005, and PCF payout dollars in 2013. 
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Whether and where to set such a limit is ultimately a balance between compensating 
patients and sustaining the financial solvency of the PCF. But when making the judgment, it is 
worth noting that one of the primary goals of a tort system is to compensate the injured. And one 
legislative purpose of creating a PCF was to provide severely injured patients with excess 
damages through a stable funding mechanism. A PCF that does not have an annual aggregate 
limit may be better at serving the purpose of distributional justice among severely injured 
patients.  
A well-functioning PCF should also be able to accommodate the existence of individuals 
that have substantially higher risks. And, there are more obvious way to improve a PCF’s 
financial sustainability. One of these ways, as suggested by multiple studies, is for a PCF to set 
aside reserves as opposed to rely on surcharges from the current payers to fund the liability of 
already opened cases. This will make the funding mechanism of a PCF more like an insurance 
practice and less like a social security fund (see e.g. U.S. General Accounting Office 1986d; 
Sloan et al. 2005). 
How Generalizable are My Findings?  
Indiana is a reasonably large state, with larger cities (such as Indianapolis and Fort 
Wayne) and smaller urban and rural areas spread throughout the state. According to the FSMB 
data, Indiana had the 15th largest population of actively licensed physician in the United States, 
and ranked 23rd in the number of physicians per 1000 population. (Federation of State Medical 
Boards 2015, 19). I show in Chapter 5 that the characteristics of Indiana physicians are highly 
representative of the entire U.S. physician population. And, as noted above, Indiana’s sanction 
rate is about the median of all jurisdictions.  
Many of my findings are consistent with the conclusions from other state case studies and 
national studies. The lack of congruence between premium changes (the fall in 1990s and the 
renounce in 2000s) and the med mal claim rates, for example, is observed nationwide. The 
existence of malpractice-proneness is also well-documented. The rarity of board sanctions, and 
the focus on abuse and sexual misconducts cases has also been found elsewhere.  
That said, I expand the literature on health care quality assurance systems in several 
ways. The Indiana data allows me to study not only paid cases, but cases closed without 
payment; not only tried cases, but also settled cases; not only closed claims, but all filed cases. 
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My study benefits from the richness of the data, and paints a more comprehensive picture of the 
med mal and disciplinary environments in a single state. My study also covers the entire time 
period since Indiana adopted a PCF. The high-quality licensure data and disciplinary files allow 
me to code much previously unavailable information. And, I was also able to merge physicians’ 
med mal claiming history with their disciplinary records, and study the overlap between the two 
systems.   
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
Additional Results for Chapter 3 
Figure A.1: Historical PCF surcharge rates by physician classes, 1996-2015. 
Figure A.1 provides historical PCF surcharge rates for all physician specialties class from 1996 
to 2015. 
 
 
Note: PCF surcharge rates 1996-2015 in 2015$. Physician class plan is based on specialties and is used to determine 
surcharge rates. Data come from Indiana Insurance Bulletins.  
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Figure A.2: Insurance coverage cost (premium + PCF surcharge), 1987-2015.  
Figure A.2 presents information on cost of insurance coverage (premium charged by primary 
insurers + PCF surcharges) for three selected specialties. Data come from the PCF database. All 
primary insurers and all counties included. 
 
 
Note: total cost of insurance coverage for selected specialties. Both premium and surcharge rates come from 
individual physicians’ policies in the PCF database. Although the PCF started collecting data since 1975, 1987 is the 
first year in which more than 100 policies were reported. Rates include all counties, all insurers, all policy limits, 
both occurrence and claim-made policies. Coverage costs less than 10 percentile or greater than 99 percentiles were 
dropped to address the potential underreporting issue.  
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Figure A.3: Number of cases filed per year, 1976-2014. 
Figure A.3 provides an alternative to Figure 3.3, number of cases filed per year, in the main text 
of Chapter 3. In Figure A.2, I treated cases filed against three doctors in a year as consolidated 
cases. That way, I was able to eliminate the mini-spikes created by these three doctors. 
 
 
Note: number of cases filed per year, cases against three doctors consolidated including 221 cases filed against Dr. 
Weinberger in 2004, and 130 in 2005; 152 cases filed against Dr. Crowley in 2013; and 96 cases filed against 
OSMC (a medical center as a professional corporation) in 2014. This is an alternative version to Figure 3.3 in the 
text.  
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Additional Results for Chapter 4 
Table A.1: Sample Size/Available Observations for Duration 
Table A.1 summarizes the available observations used to calculate the duration in Table 4.2 in 
the main text of Chapter 4.  
 
  Panel Cases   Non-panel cases 
  Before After  Before After 
Injury-Filing 9,635 6,456  3,244 2,925 
Filing-Close 2,799 6,421  566 2,831 
Filing-Panel Complete 6,255 5,513  N/A N/A 
Panel Complete-Opinion 5,535 4,726  N/A N/A 
Opinion-Close 2,422 4,870  N/A N/A 
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Additional Results for Chapter 5 
Table A.2: Number of CSRs per Physician (Active, in State) by Specialty  
Table A.2 provides the number of CSRs held by physicians in various specialties. 
 
    No. of CSRs Held     
Primary Specialty 0 1 2 3+ N 
Family Physicians/ GPs 1% 85% 10% 4% 2,696 
Internal Medicine 2% 90% 7% 1% 2,255 
Surgery 1% 87% 10% 3% 1,867 
Anesthesiology 0% 84% 12% 3% 1,091 
Pediatrics 1% 92% 6% 1% 1072 
Emergency Medicine 1% 83% 11% 6% 953 
Ob/Gyn 1% 90% 8% 1% 814 
Radiology 2% 83% 9% 6% 715 
Psychiatry 1% 89% 10% 1% 545 
Cardiovascular Diseases 1% 89% 8% 2% 440 
Neurology 0% 90% 9% 1% 294 
Hematology/Oncology 1% 66% 13% 20% 228 
Gastroenterology 0% 93% 7% 0% 227 
Nephrology 0% 80% 14% 6% 173 
Pulmonary Diseases 0% 93% 7% 1% 149 
Other 9% 79% 9% 4% 1,479 
Specialty Not Available 19%154 75% 5% 1% 822 
All 3% 85% 9% 3% 15,820 
 
                                                
154 Missing category shows a quite different distribution, which may suggest that the missing is not random.  
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Table A.3: Origin of Medical Education, International Medical Graduates 
Table A.3 provides further details on counties and regions that have graduated most Indiana 
physicians.  
 
Country of Medical 
Education 
No. % of Identified IMGs 
India 4,768 28% 
Philippines 1,861 11% 
Caribbean Islands/ Countries 1,760 10% 
Pakistan 1,343 8% 
Canada 613 4% 
Syrian Arab Republic 534 3% 
Nigeria 477 3% 
Egypt 435 3% 
Mexico 431 3% 
Other Countries 4,922 29% 
Total identified IMGs 17,144 100% 
Note: Those physicians who did not report medical schools, and those school names cannot be 
identified are excluded from this table.  
 
 
Table A.4: Most Commonly Attended U.S. Medical Schools of Indiana Physicians (MDs) 
Table A.4 provides details on U.S. allopathic medical schools that attended by most Indiana 
physicians. 
    State Graduates Percent 
Indiana University IN 12,390 32% 
University of Louisville KY 1,794 5% 
University Of Illinois IL 1,461 4% 
University of Cincinnati OH 868 2% 
Ohio State University OH 767 2% 
Loyola University IL 743 2% 
Northwestern University IL 711 2% 
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences MD 625 2% 
Wayne State University MI 613 2% 
University of Michigan MI 612 2% 
Other U.S. Medical Schools - MD N/A 18,021 47% 
All identified U.S. MDs N/A 38,605 100% 
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Table A.5: Most Commonly Attended Caribbean Medical Schools  
Table A.5 provides details Caribbean medical schools that graduated most Indiana physicians  
 
Medical school Country/Region Graduates 
Ross University Dominica 411 
St. George's University Grenada 356 
American University of the Caribbean Sint Maarten, Caribbean Netherlands 279 
University of Puerto Rico Puerto Rico, US 88 
University of Havana Cuba 73 
University of the West Indies West Indies 73 
Saba University Saba, Caribbean Netherlands 69 
Eastern Central University Dominican Republic 50 
Santiago University of Technology (UTESA) Dominican Republic 48 
Autonomous University of Santo Doming Dominican Republic 42 
Ponce Health Sciences University Puerto Rico, US 41 
Other Caribbean Medical School N/A 230 
All identified Caribbean school graduates          N/A 1,760 
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Table A.6: Physician Characteristics and Odds of Being Disciplined, Matched Case-
Control 
Table A.6 presents result of a series of matched case-control studies, estimating the associations 
between physician characteristics and the likelihood of being disciplined.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Discipline Abuse  Drug Negligence Sex 
CSRs 1.251* 1.404** 1.468* 0.915 0.946 
 (0.117) (0.182) (0.234) (0.100) (0.214) 
Family/ GP 7.641*** 5.234*** 10.71*** 7.793*** 7.301*** 
 (1.176) (1.232) (3.503) (2.750) (3.380) 
Internal Medicine 3.118*** 2.356** 2.814** 3.927** 5.495** 
 (0.548) (0.714) (1.048) (1.644) (3.181) 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 6.058*** 2.640** 4.285** 23.44*** 5.631** 
 (1.274) (0.874) (2.209) (11.35) (3.463) 
Pediatrics 1.613 0.834 0.824 3.035 7.064** 
 (0.434) (0.537) (0.607) (1.846) (4.362) 
Psychiatry 6.851*** 4.095*** 4.651*** 3.969** 19.18*** 
 (1.357) (1.579) (1.793) (1.908) (11.26) 
Radiology 1.322 1.234 0.369 3.959*** 0.699 
 (0.302) (0.466) (0.288) (1.603) (0.731) 
Surgery 2.443*** 1.466 1.408 7.443*** 6.156*** 
 (0.463) (0.456) (0.605) (2.442) (3.346) 
Anesthesiology 4.037*** 4.714*** 2.804* 2.876* 3.735* 
 (0.791) (1.301) (1.216) (1.473) (2.128) 
Emergency Med. 3.497*** 5.102*** 1.869 2.296 3.616 
 (0.752) (1.504) (0.899) (1.076) (2.463) 
Observations 4381 1462 1148 886 417 
Pseudo R-squared 0.136 0.124 0.216 0.179 0.192 
Log lik. -1364.0 -450.9 -300.8 -237.2 -108.7 
Chi-squared 342.7 109.8 119.4 71.50 41.37 
Note: case-control matched on Medical School, Graduation Year (5-year interval), and Gender.  
Cases of model 1-5 are (in column): (1) disciplined of any kind of offense, (2) disciplined for abuse, (3) disciplined 
for drug case, (4) disciplined for negligence case, (5) disciplined for sex case. Controls (1)-(5) are: (1) not 
disciplines, (2) not disciplined for abuse (but may be for other offenses); (3) not for drug;(4) not for negligence; (5) 
not for sex. Max. number of controls=5 for each case.  
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Table A.7: Physician Characteristics and Odds of Being Disciplined  
Table A.7 presents results of a logistic and a multinomial logistic regression, estimating the 
association between physician characteristics and the likelihood of being disciplined.  
 
  (1)   (2) 
 Binomial  Multinomial Outcomes 
  Disciplined   Abuse Drug Negligence    Sex Other 
Panel A: Non-Specialty Factors           
Male 2.215***  2.013*** 2.131*** 1.850* 8.654*** 1.798** 
 (0.252)  (0.390) (0.478) (0.447) (5.159) (0.358) 
CSRs 1.209***  1.303*** 1.146* 1.197* 1.048 1.163* 
 (0.0352)  (0.0485) (0.0685) (0.0881) (0.160) (0.0740) 
IMG 1.171  0.270*** 1.690** 1.978*** 1.751* 1.808*** 
 (0.101)  (0.0656) (0.272) (0.333) (0.445) (0.272) 
In Indiana 0.867  1.104 1.115 0.357*** 1.251 0.891 
 (0.0682)  (0.153) (0.176) (0.0632) (0.319) (0.133) 
Endorsement 1.421***  1.412* 1.213 1.385 0.919 1.800** 
 (0.131)  (0.226) (0.206) (0.270) (0.257) (0.322) 
License Year 0.975***  0.987** 0.970*** 0.964*** 0.984* 0.976*** 
 (0.00244)  (0.00410) (0.00416) (0.00492) (0.00728) (0.00449) 
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Table A.7 (cont.)  
 (1) (2) 
 Binomial  Multinomial Outcomes 
 Disciplined  Abuse Drug Negligence Sex Other 
Panel B: Specialty Indicators            
Anesthesiology 4.817***  5.766*** 4.353*** 3.621** 3.035 1.851 
 (0.755)  (1.356) (1.366) (1.431) (1.728) (0.756) 
Emergency Med. 4.232***  4.218*** 2.787** 3.288** 3.073 2.711** 
 (0.669)  (1.005) (1.042) (1.313) (1.766) (0.927) 
Family/ GP 7.665***  4.902*** 10.04*** 6.651*** 5.085*** 6.282*** 
 (0.841)  (0.956) (1.981) (1.687) (1.893) (1.325) 
Internal 2.769***  2.072* 2.821*** 3.248*** 2.395 2.557*** 
 (0.431)  (0.590) (0.832) (1.077) (1.183) (0.716) 
Ob/ Gyn 8.357***  3.246*** 5.197*** 18.30*** 11.55*** 8.290*** 
 (1.305)  (1.093) (1.857) (5.086) (5.140) (2.359) 
Pediatrics 1.659  0.755 0.808 2.418 3.444 1.655 
 (0.447)  (0.451) (0.587) (1.285) (2.195) (0.786) 
Psychiatry 9.309***  5.048*** 8.828*** 5.280*** 15.83*** 9.848*** 
 (1.373)  (1.531) (2.515) (2.077) (6.180) (2.507) 
Radiology 1.729*  1.475 0.587 4.085*** 0.706 1.390 
 (0.374)  (0.514) (0.426) (1.430) (0.731) (0.607) 
Surgery 3.249***  1.749* 1.931* 8.051*** 3.495** 4.046*** 
 (0.462)  (0.469) (0.642) (2.032) (1.508) (0.998) 
Observations 58306   58427 
Chi-squared 749.4   1063.1 
Note: (1) binomial logistic model, Penalized Maximum Likelihood Estimation (or the Firth Method), (2) 
Multinomial logistic model; measuring the effects of independent variables on odds of being disciplined for 
substance-abuse, drug-diversion, malpractice, sex misconducts and other types of offenses. Base outcome (omitted 
reference) is No Cases. Health care fraud outcome combined to Other, due to extremely small sample size and data 
separation. The reference group for listed specialty indicator variables is “other” specialty. Relatively fewer 
offenders in each outcome groups are pediatricians or radiologists. Pediatricians’ and radiologists’ likelihood of 
discipline may be underestimated. IMG stands for International Medical Graduates. Endorsement stands for licensed 
in Indiana without examination, but instead based on existing licenses from elsewhere. Exponentiated coefficients 
specified; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.   
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Table A.8: Characteristics of Disciplined Doctors (Random-Effects)  
Table A.8 presents results of a random-effects panel data model, estimating the effects of 
physician characteristics and the likelihood of being disciplined. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Practice Duration 1.009** 1.007** 1.006* 1.007* 1.005 1.009** 
 (0.00284) (0.00286) (0.00286) (0.00288) (0.00291) (0.00298) 
Male  1.640*** 1.667*** 1.674*** 1.916*** 1.865*** 
  (0.190) (0.194) (0.194) (0.226) (0.220) 
CSRs   1.289*** 1.287*** 1.133*** 1.186*** 
   (0.0417) (0.0415) (0.0417) (0.0420) 
IMG    1.225*** 1.248*** 1.202** 
    (0.0734) (0.0748) (0.0742) 
Family/ GP     4.896*** 5.727*** 
     (0.554) (0.669) 
Internal Med.     2.072*** 2.339*** 
     (0.329) (0.375) 
Obstetrics and 
Gynecology     5.680*** 6.403*** 
     (0.947) (1.078) 
Pediatrics     1.272 1.349 
     (0.339) (0.370) 
Psychiatry     6.732*** 6.942*** 
     (1.080) (1.129) 
Radiology     1.346 1.344 
     (0.296) (0.296) 
Surgery     2.277*** 2.528*** 
     (0.334) (0.376) 
Emergency Med.     3.517*** 3.641*** 
     (0.579) (0.602) 
Anesthesiology     3.222*** 3.523*** 
     (0.532) (0.586) 
in Indiana      0.583*** 
      (0.0484) 
Observations 1,058,777 1,039,718 1,039,718 1,014,501 1,014,501 1,008,304 
Log lik. -6867.9 -6843.0 -6818.3 -6793.9 -6632.9 -6559.2 
Chi-squared 10.23 27.12 84.74 93.69 363.9 396.3 
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Additional Results for Chapter 6 
Table A.9: Number of Med Mal Cases and Disciplinary Cases 
Table A.9 provides an alternative to Table 6.7 of Chapter 6 main text. 
 
Med Discipline   
Mal 0 1 2 3 Total 
0 17,888 212 16 0 18,116 
1 5,037 95 6 2 5,140 
2 2,329 62 4 0 2,395 
3+ 4,107 163 18 0 4,288 
Total 29,361 532 44 2 29,939 
 
 
Table A.10: Disciplinary Grounds Comparison 
Table A.10. provides an alternative to Table 6.8 in Chapter 6 main text. In Table A.10 I 
separately lists reciprocal cases.  
 
Disciplinary Ground Not 
matched 
Matched Disciplined 
Physicians 
Alcohol-Abuse 3% 8% 
Drug-Abuse 7% 14% 
Drug-Diversion 8% 17% 
Health Care Fraud 1% 2% 
Incompetence/malpractice 5% 6% 
License app-false statement 8% 8% 
N.O.C. 6% 11% 
Other Criminal 1% 4% 
Sex 3% 6% 
Reciprocal 59% 23% 
N 357 578 
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Table A.11: Negative Binomial-Logit Hurdle Model for Physician Characteristics on 
Likelihood and Estimated Number of Med Mal. 
Table A.11 presents the results of a negative binomial-logit hurdle model estimating the 
association between physician characteristics on likelihood and estimated number of med mal, as 
an additional model to the random-effects model in Chapter 6 main text. 
 
  Claims count   Paid cases (Measure 2) 
 (1) (2)   (5) (6) 
 Logit Negative 
Binomial   
Logit Negative 
Binomial 
Panel A – non-specialty attributes   
Male 1.638*** 1.435***   2.112*** 2.328*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0576)   (0.134) (0.386) 
CSR 1.145*** 0.986   1.000 1.002 
 (0.0430) (0.0384)   (0.0552) (0.128) 
Endorsement 0.578*** 0.832***   0.503*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0234)   (0.0215) (0.0489) 
IMG 0.979 1.278***   1.201*** 1.476*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0457)   (0.0654) (0.168) 
DO 0.911 1.063   1.079 1.019 
 (0.0532) (0.0648)   (0.0985) (0.208) 
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Table A.11 (cont.)  
 Claims count  Paid cases (Measure 2)  
 (1) (2)  (5) (6)  
 
Logit Negative 
Binomial  
Logit Negative 
Binomial  
Panel B – Specialty       
Family/GP 1.079 1.089   1.681*** 1.284 
 (0.0500) (0.0490)   (0.113) (0.188) 
Internal 0.916 0.893*   0.940 0.728 
 (0.0468) (0.0491)   (0.0819) (0.157) 
Ob/Gyn 3.819*** 2.831***   4.748*** 4.184*** 
 (0.277) (0.158)   (0.415) (0.711) 
Pediatrics 0.570*** 0.521***   0.818 0.636 
 (0.0400) (0.0459)   (0.101) (0.201) 
Psychiatry 0.504*** 0.413***   0.506*** 0.586 
 (0.0425) (0.0486)   (0.0851) (0.273) 
Radiology 1.137* 1.086   1.335** 0.797 
 (0.0718) (0.0688)   (0.133) (0.189) 
Surgery 2.542*** 3.229***   3.078*** 3.467*** 
 (0.126) (0.136)   (0.207) (0.488) 
Anesthesiology 0.933 0.523***   1.000 0.532* 
 (0.0576) (0.0362)   (0.0999) (0.149) 
Emergency 1.480*** 1.151*   1.739*** 0.804 
 (0.0855) (0.0664)   (0.155) (0.168) 
Observations 28348 11199   28348 3075 
Log lik. -13829.3 -18810.2   -7826.2 -2690.0 
Chi-squared 1580.6 1888.2   1039.6 330.9 
Note: Specification: negative binomial-logit hurdle models on practice life-time number of med mal claim (1) – (2); 
and on number of paid med mal claims (3) - (4). Offset = ln(exposure period per insurance coverage) included in the 
model. The reference specialty is “other” underrepresented ones.  “CSR” refers to number of Controlled Substances 
Registrations, = 0 if none, =1 if one CSR, =2 if 2+ CSRs. “Endorsement” = licensed in Indiana without examination, 
but rather based on existing licenses from elsewhere. “IMG” = attended non-U.S. medical schools, including Puerto 
Rico. “DO” =osteopathic doctor. Reference group for specialties = “other” unlisted, underrepresented specialties. 
Note: Physicians with uncertain gender and medical education were dropped from the estimations. In multiple 
defendants paid cases where no paying defendants were reported, all of the named defendants in those cases were 
treated as paying defendants. 
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Additional Results for Chapter 7 
Figure A.4: Number of disciplinary cases per year, 1981-2014.   
Figure A.4 provides the time-trends of disciplinary cases count and case per 1000 physicians. 
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Alternative Measure of “Paid Case” 
The PCF data, in 534 multiple-defendant paid cases, do not identify the paid defendants. I 
identify “paid” cases in two ways. “Measure 1” treats all of the named defendants in these 534 
cases as paid defendants; “measure 2” treats none of the named defendants as paid defendants. 
This Appendix provides alternative tables using Measure 1. 
 
Table A.12: Data Overview 
Table A.12 is an alternative to Table 6.1 in the main text of Chapter 6. 
 
  Observations Data Sources 
PLA providers 63,485 from licensure data 
PCF providers 104,743 from PCF database 
Overlap providers 29,939 
based on license number, or last + first 
names  
Disciplined providers  
All 935 from license litigation files coding 
Overlap 578 based on matched physicians 
Providers with med mal claims 
All 26,434 from PCF database 
Overlap 11,823 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Providers with paid med mal claims 
All   from PCF database 
Overlap 2,685 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Overlap Providers with both Med Mal & Discipline 
All claims 350 based on 29,939 overlaps 
Paid claims 150 based on 29,939 overlaps 
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Table A.13: Physicians with n Paid Cases, with Alternative Measure of Paid Cases 
Table A.13 is an alternative to Table 6.5 in Chapter 6 main text. 
 
No. of Paid 
Cases 
No. of 
Providers 
% % of  Providers 
with Paid Cases 
0 27,254 91% N/A 
1 1,982 7% 74% 
2 446 1% 17% 
3 141 0.5% 5% 
4 64 0.2% 2% 
5-9 47 0.2% 2% 
10+ 5 0.02% 0.19% 
Total 29,939 100% 100% 
 
 
 
Table A.14: Part A. System Overlap, paid Med Mal v. Discipline 
Table A.14 is an alternative to Table 6.7 in Chapter 6 main text. 
 
Paid Discipline Total 
(Measure 1) N Y   
N 26,826 428 27,254 
Y 2,535 150 2,685 
B 29,361 578 29,939 
 
 
Table A.14: Part B. System Overlap, Paid Med Mal v. Discipline 
Paid   Discipline       
(Measure 1) N % of Total Y % of Total Total 
0 26,826 98% 428 2% 27,254 
1 1,902 96% 80 4% 1,982 
2 418 94% 28 6% 446 
3+ 215 84% 42 16% 257 
All 29,361 98% 578 2% 29,939 
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Table A.15: Logit-Negative Binomial Hurdle Model for Physician Characteristics on 
Likelihood and Estimated Number of Med Mal 
Table A.15 is an alternative to table 6.12 in Chapter 6 main text. 
 
  Claims count  Paid cases (Measure 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Logit Negative 
Binomial  
Logit Negative 
Binomial 
Panel A – non-specialty attributes 
Male 1.638*** 1.435***  2.162*** 1.961*** 
 (0.0578) (0.0576)  (0.152) (0.360) 
CSR 1.145*** 0.986  1.006 1.090 
 (0.0430) (0.0384)  (0.0601) (0.153) 
Endorsement 0.578*** 0.832***  0.488*** 0.546*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0234)  (0.0225) (0.0574) 
IMG 0.979 1.278***  1.207** 1.574*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0457)  (0.0714) (0.198) 
DO 0.911 1.063  1.095 1.053 
 (0.0532) (0.0648)  (0.108) (0.238) 
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Table A.15 (cont.)  
 Claims count  Paid cases (Measure 1) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 
Logit Negative 
Binomial  
Logit Negative 
Binomial 
Panel B – Specialty     
Family/GP 1.079 1.089  1.715*** 1.291 
 (0.0500) (0.0490)  (0.124) (0.207) 
Internal 0.916 0.893*  0.854 0.511* 
 (0.0468) (0.0491)  (0.0835) (0.135) 
Ob/Gyn 3.819*** 2.831***  4.978*** 3.668*** 
 (0.277) (0.158)  (0.459) (0.676) 
Pediatrics 0.570*** 0.521***  0.734* 0.577 
 (0.0400) (0.0459)  (0.103) (0.220) 
Psychiatry 0.504*** 0.413***  0.366*** 0.738 
 (0.0425) (0.0486)  (0.0778) (0.410) 
Radiology 1.137* 1.086  1.294* 0.841 
 (0.0718) (0.0688)  (0.142) (0.225) 
Surgery 2.542*** 3.229***  3.254*** 3.199*** 
 (0.126) (0.136)  (0.234) (0.493) 
Anesthesiology 0.933 0.523***  0.938 0.420* 
 (0.0576) (0.0362)  (0.104) (0.145) 
Emergency 1.480*** 1.151*  1.664*** 0.734 
 (0.0855) (0.0664)  (0.162) (0.176) 
Observations 28348 11199  28348 2558 
Log lik. -13829.3 -18810.2  -6890.0 -2171.7 
Chi-squared 1580.6 1888.2  1010.0 249.2 
 
 
  
  
199 
Overview of Existing PCFs 
PCF design varies across states. In some states, the fund’s liability is unlimited; in other, 
the fund’s liability is limited by damage caps; in still others, health care providers pay beyond 
the fund’s liability limit. State laws very in terms of what the fund is called, when the fund 
begins and stop to pay, how the fund is financed, etc. This section provides a brief overview of 
existing PCFs.  
States operating PCFs 
At least thirteen states have a law that permits the establishment of a PCF. Most of this 
legislation was enacted in response to the malpractice insurance crisis in the 1970s. Currently, 
there are nine active PCFs, in Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico, South 
Carolina, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. (see e.g. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 
2014, 64) Pennsylvania’s PCF is being phased out (see Bovbjerg and Bartow 2003).155  
Organizational form 
PCFs are either housed in the state Department of Insurance or operated as a free-
standing state agency. Either the state commissioner of insurance or a specially designated 
oversight board monitors PCF performance, and determines surcharges and assessments.   
Names  
PCFs go by a variety of names. In Nebraska, the PCF is called the “Excess Liability 
Fund.”  In Kansas, the PCF is called the “Health Care Stabilization Fund.”  In Pennsylvania, the 
PCF has been called the “Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Fund,” as well as 
“Pennsylvania Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund.”  
Participation 
Participation in the PCF is voluntary in most states, but is mandatory in some. The 
rationale for a voluntary coverage is to provide coverage as a last resort. On the other hand, 
mandatory coverage may expend the base of enrollment and avoid adverse selection (Sloan et al. 
2005). 
Most states created incentives for provider to participate. In Indiana and New Mexico, for 
                                                
155 Act 13 of 2003 provided for a gradual phase-out of MCARE; Act 44 of 2003 was signed into law as the Health 
Care Provider Retention Program, commonly referred to as the MCARE abatement program. Act 128 of 2006 
extended the Abatement program for 2007. 
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example, the state damage cap only applies to those who participate in the PCF. In Louisiana, 
physicians cannot get hospital privileges unless they are Fund members.  In states where 
participation is voluntary, participation rates vary widely.  In Indiana, virtually all physicians 
participate.  In South Carolina, approximately 79% of nongovernmental physicians participate. 
(Connecticut Office of Legislative Research 2003b, 17). In New Mexico, it is believed that only 
a small percentage of doctors participate.  
Primary insurance coverage requirement 
Most states require physicians to purchase a minimum amount of primary insurance 
coverage to participate in the PCF. Many states have also established programs to assist/provide 
required primary insurance coverage for those providers who could not obtain coverage from 
commercial insurers. Some examples include the Indiana Residual Malpractice Insurance 
Authority (IRMIA) and the Kansa Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Plan.  
Surcharges and Annual Assessments 
To finance their PCFs, states generally impose a surcharge tied to the cost of primary 
insurance coverage, or they impose an annual assessment that varies based on practice attributes. 
The surcharge and/or assessment is typically broken out into several rating classes, based on 
provider type or other attributes, although Pennsylvania simply imposed a single statewide rate.  
(Bovbjerg and Bartow 2003, 19).  
The rating classes vary across states. In Indiana, the private insurance market does most 
of the classification job. Surcharge amounts for each year are based on a percentage of the 
median premium paid by physicians in each class to the three leading underwriters. Wisconsin’s 
annual assessments are based on a number of factors, such as the past and prospective loss and 
expense experience of the provider’s practice, the fund, and the individual provider. 
Fund coverage, providers’ liability limit, damage cap 
PCF exposures is limited by state law. PCF payment is typically triggered by an award in 
excess of the providers’ primary insurance coverage.  Total payment from the PCF is either 
limited by total damages cap, or a statutory maximum that applies only to the PCF.  In the latter 
instance, providers are theoretically liable for amounts that exceed the PCF statutory maximum, 
and can buy excess coverage in the private market against that risk.  
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Fiscal soundness/Financial viability 
PCF fiscal soundness varies across states. According to one 2003 study, five of the nine 
PCFs are fiscally sound (Connecticut Office of Legislative Research 2003b). Wisconsin’s PCF 
had an accounting surplus, but Pennsylvania’s PCF was more than $2 billon in deficit, and was 
being phased out. Nebraska’s fund experienced some difficulty because of 80 lawsuits filed 
against one physician in connection with a hepatitis C outbreak. South Carolina’s was recovering 
from earlier challenge after some statutory changes. I was unable to locate a more recent multi-
state study of PCF solvency. 
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List of Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Key Terms 
The following list serves as a quick reference to the acronyms used throughout the 
dissertation. In the text of the dissertation, the acronym is presented with the full official title 
upon the first reference to the entity being alluded to. After the first reference, acronyms are 
used. 
 
AG 
ALJ 
The state Attorney General  
Administrative Law Judge 
Board 
CSR 
The Medical Licensing Board of Indiana. Operates as a part of Indiana PLA. 
Controlled Substances Registration 
FSMB Federation of State Medical Boards 
IDOI Indiana Department of Insurance 
Med Mal Act The 1975 Medical Malpractice Act of Indiana 
NPDB National Practitioner Data Bank 
PCF Patient’s Compensation Fund. 
PLA 
PTC 
 
Endorsement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Provider’s 
liability limit 
 
Qualified 
providers 
 
Total damage 
cap (Indiana) 
Indiana Professional Licensing Agency 
Payout-to-cap ratio, where cap refers to the total damage cap in Indiana. 
 
Licensure endorsement is a process through which a state issues a medical 
license to an individual who holds a valid license in another jurisdiction. 
Endorsement is based on documentation of successfully completing an 
approved examination and authentication of required documents, rather than 
the passing of additional examinations. The process was previously referred 
to as “reciprocity”. 
 
The maximum amount that a qualified health care provider is responsible per 
injury or death. 
 
Providers who file their primary insurance policy (as certificate of financial 
responsibility) with the IDOI, and pay the annual PCF surcharges. 
 
The total amount recoverable per injury or death, in both settled cases and 
tried cases.  
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Further Robust Check for Chapter 5 
Tables below exclude 16 disciplinary cases of which the offense-type coding may involve 
judgment.  
 
Table A.16: Estimated Association between Physician Characteristics and Hazard for 
Discipline 
Table A.16 is an alternative to Table 5.8.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Discipline Abuse Drug Negligence Sex Other 
Panel A - Physician Attributes         
Male 1.545*** 1.504 1.509** 1.403 5.674** 1.139 
 (0.181) (0.322) (0.239) (0.396) (3.375) (0.278) 
CSR 1.228** 1.805*** 1.576*** 0.755 0.982 1.021 
 (0.0875) (0.236) (0.150) (0.133) (0.225) (0.170) 
Endorsement 1.312*** 1.218 1.290* 1.431 0.909 1.528* 
 (0.106) (0.185) (0.142) (0.281) (0.231) (0.288) 
IMG 1.021 0.250*** 0.687** 1.533* 1.718* 1.328 
 (0.0911) (0.0659) (0.0928) (0.303) (0.455) (0.254) 
DO 1.571*** 1.253 1.679** 1.239 2.159 1.118 
 (0.213) (0.298) (0.280) (0.497) (0.969) (0.421) 
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Table A.16 (cont.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Discipline Abuse Drug Negligence Sex Other 
Panel B - Specialties           
Family/GP 4.946*** 3.560*** 4.715*** 4.826*** 3.707*** 6.489*** 
 (0.563) (0.749) (0.694) (1.443) (1.457) (1.803) 
Internal 2.068*** 1.728 1.742* 2.917** 2.379 2.416* 
 (0.332) (0.522) (0.385) (1.085) (1.173) (0.929) 
Ob/Gyn 4.905*** 2.441** 2.786*** 9.963*** 8.210*** 7.213*** 
 (0.776) (0.832) (0.688) (3.317) (3.690) (2.559) 
Pediatrics 1.056 0.454 0.527 1.705 4.059* 1.004 
 (0.307) (0.329) (0.271) (1.054) (2.315) (0.744) 
Psychiatry 4.666*** 2.474* 3.602*** 2.911* 7.798*** 8.619*** 
 (0.720) (0.876) (0.791) (1.352) (3.391) (2.758) 
Radiology 1.032 1.081 0.804 2.947** 0.545 0.318 
 (0.242) (0.417) (0.270) (1.162) (0.564) (0.325) 
Surgery 2.073*** 1.141 1.144 4.084*** 2.307 4.156*** 
 (0.308) (0.345) (0.264) (1.322) (1.087) (1.310) 
Anesthesiology 3.150*** 4.193*** 3.662*** 2.109 2.502 2.313 
 (0.514) (1.072) (0.731) (1.050) (1.431) (1.074) 
Emergency Med. 3.330*** 3.458*** 3.035*** 4.860*** 2.335 3.571** 
 (0.570) (0.929) (0.665) (2.050) (1.513) (1.579) 
Observations 58263 58263 58263 58263 58263 58263 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.027 0.042 0.036 0.027 0.038 0.039 
Log lik. -7140.9 -2040.7 -3859.4 -1206.2 -691.5 -1326.7 
Chi-squared 400.2 177.2 286.0 67.35 54.52 106.5 
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Table A.17: Estimated Effects of Offense Type and Procedure Factors on Severity of 
Sanction 
Table A.17 is an alternative to Table 5.9. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Abuse offense 1.790** 1.413 1.745** 1.616* 1.406 1.587* 
 (0.339) (0.273) (0.345) (0.315) (0.272) (0.310) 
Drug offense 2.132*** 1.872** 1.923** 1.951*** 1.934*** 1.989*** 
 (0.419) (0.371) (0.387) (0.387) (0.383) (0.395) 
Fraud Offense 1.875 1.994* 2.043* 2.066* 2.087* 2.134* 
 (0.603) (0.648) (0.670) (0.674) (0.687) (0.702) 
Sexual Offense 2.494*** 2.259** 2.849*** 2.374*** 2.603*** 2.634*** 
 (0.624) (0.571) (0.735) (0.599) (0.663) (0.670) 
Other Offense 0.677 0.669 0.708 0.698 0.673 0.697 
 (0.153) (0.150) (0.159) (0.157) (0.151) (0.157) 
ES order  2.559*** 2.921*** 2.203*** 2.916*** 2.474*** 
  (0.367) (0.435) (0.322) (0.431) (0.374) 
Default   8.835***    
   (1.680)    
Settlement    0.452***  0.484*** 
    (0.0606)  (0.0657) 
Representation     0.724*** 0.778** 
     (0.0583) (0.0631) 
Observations 840 840 839 840 840 840 
Pseudo R-
squared 0.018 0.035 0.093 0.049 0.041 0.052 
Log lik. -1264.3 -1242.4 -1166.8 -1224.7 -1234.3 -1219.8 
Chi-squared 45.93 89.72 238.3 125.3 106.0 134.9 
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Alternative Tables and Figures Excluding Pre-1986 Cases 
Tables below exclude closed cases that were filed before 1986. There are 1,948 (8.73% 
of the 22,304 closed cases) cases filed before 1986. The remaining 20,356 (91.27%) closed cases 
were filed in or after 1986.  
 
Table A.18: Case Outcomes by Number of Named Defendants, 1986-2014 
Table A.18 is an alternative to Table 3.2. 
 
No. of 
Defendants 
% of 
Closed 
Cases  
Payout Rate 
Unpaid Defendant Payout 
Only 
Defendant + 
PCF  
1 34% 35% 39% 24% 
2 27% 28% 26% 23% 
3 16% 16% 15% 19% 
4 9% 9% 9% 12% 
5-10 12% 11% 10% 19% 
11+ 1% 1% 0.5% 2% 
Missing 0% 0% N/A 0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 20,356 14,588 2,221 3,547 
Note: missing = missing defendant information.  
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Table A.19: Case Outcomes by Defendant Configuration, 1986-2014 
Table A.19 is an alternative to Table 3.3. 
 
  
% of Closed 
Cases 
 row %  
 
Unpaid Defendant 
Only 
Defendant  
+ PCF 
Physician Only 24% 78% 9% 12% 
Physician + Ancillary 19% 76% 9% 15% 
Physician + Ancillary + Institution 20% 63% 10% 27% 
Physician + Institution 16% 68% 10% 23% 
Ancillary Only 11% 79% 14% 7% 
Institution Only 7% 61% 19% 19% 
Ancillary + Institution 4% 72% 15% 14% 
Other 0% 56% 0% 44% 
Total N=20,356 72% 11% 17% 
 
 
Table A.20: Payout Distribution of Closed Cases, 1986-2014 
Table A.20 is an alternative to Table 3.4. 
 
Payout Range Number of 
cases 
% of cases % of paid 
cases 
Total Payout 
(millions) 
% of Total 
Payout 
$0  14,588 72% N/A N/A N/A 
1-100,000 1,926 9% 33% 68 2% 
$100,001-500,000 752 4% 13% 207 6% 
$500,001-1,000,000 1,690 8% 29% 1,360 40% 
$1,000,001-1,250,000 732 4% 13% 809 24% 
$1,250,001+ 668 3% 12% 927 28% 
Total 20,356 100% 100% 3,370 100% 
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Table A.21: Panel Status and Payout Rate, 1986-2014 
Table A.21 is an alternative to Table 4.8.  
 
  Panel Non-panel All 
Unpaid 67% 82% 72% 
Defendant Only 12% 9% 11% 
PCF Paid 21% 9% 17% 
N 14,157 6,199 20,356 
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Table A.22: Cause Duration by Panel Status, 1986-2014 
Table A.22 is an alternative to Table 4.2 in the main text, and Table A.1. in Appendix.  
 
Part A. Mean Duration     
  Panel Cases   Non-panel cases 
  Before After   Before After 
Injury-Filing 2.0 2.0  2.2 2.3 
Filing-Close 7.1 5.3  6.6 3.4 
Filing-Panel Complete 1.8 1.8    
Panel Complete-Opinion 1.0 1.0    
Opinion-Close 4.2 3.0       
      
Part B. Median Duration     
  Panel Cases   Non-panel cases 
  Before After   Before After 
Injury-Filing 2.0 1.9  2.0 2.0 
Filing-Close 5.8 4.9  4.7 3.0 
Filing-Panel Complete 1.5 1.5    
Panel Complete-Opinion 0.8 0.9    
Opinion-Close 2.7 2.6       
      
Part C. Count     
  Panel Cases   Non-panel cases 
  Before After   Before After 
Injury-Filing 7,693 6,456  3,244 2,925 
Filing-Close 2,783 6,421  566 2,831 
Filing-Panel Complete 5,171 5,513    
Panel Complete-Opinion 4,579 4,726    
Opinion-Close 2,408 4,870       
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Figure A.5: Case outcomes by panel opinion type, 1986-2014.  
Figure A.5. is an alternative to Figure 4.4.  
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